Robinson v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 07 November 1913
• Citation: 88 A. 951,82 N.J.Eq. 466
• Parties: ROBINSON v. ROBINSON.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

88 A. 951

82 N.J.Eq. 466

ROBINSON

v. ROBINSON.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Nov. 7, 1913.

Divorce suit by Mary J. Robinson against Samuel D. Robinson. On petition for alimony, pendente lite and counsel fees. Petition denied.

Townsend Godfrey, of Atlantic City, for petitioner.

U. G. Styron, of Atlantic City, for defendant.

LEAMING, V. C. It is admitted that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and defendant July 15, 1902, and that thereafter until shortly before the institution of this suit petitioner and defendant continuously cohabited as husband and wife, and made themselves known to the world as such during all of that time. It is also admitted that at the time of the marriage ceremony petitioner had a husband living, against whom a divorce suit was then pending, and that the decree in that suit—which decree granted to petitioner a divorce from her former husband—was not in fact entered until 23 days after the ceremonial marriage between petitioner and defendant. The only disputed fact at this time is whether petitioner knew at the time of her ceremonial marriage to defendant that the decree against her former husband had not been then entered; petitioner now claiming that she then believed she had been divorced, and defendant now claiming that she then knew she had not been divorced. Defendant claims that his first knowledge of the fact that petitioner had not been divorced prior to his ceremonial marriage to her was obtained by him since the beginning of this suit.

The views stated for the Court of Errors and Appeals by the learned Chief Justice in Collins v. Voorhees, as reported in 47 N. J. Eq. 555, 22 Atl. 1054, must be regarded as controlling to this court. If, therefore, petitioner knew at the time of her ceremonial marriage to defendant that she was not then divorced from her former husband, and defendant did not know of that fact, and has first ascertained that fact since the recent separation of the parties, it seems impossible to grant relief to petitioner consistently with the rules stated in Collins v. Voorhees, supra, in the absence of some evidence of interchange of consent to marriage by the parties subsequent to the date of the removal of the impediment to a lawful marriage other than evidence afforded by the continuous matrimonial habit and repute. If, on the other hand, both petitioner and defendant believed at the time of their ceremonial marriage that no impediment to their lawful marriage existed, and have since, until their recent separation, continuously lived together as husband and wife in the mutual belief that their ceremonial marriage was lawful, Collins v. Voorhees, supra, and Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 68 N. J. Eq. 736, 62 Atl. 680. 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 244, 111 Am. St. Rep. 658. 6 Ann. Cas. 583, support the view that, upon the removal of the impediment already referred to, the subsequent...