Robinson v. Section 23 Prop. Owner's Ass'n, Inc., Case No: 2:16-cv-888-FtM-38CM
| Decision Date | 10 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2:16-cv-888-FtM-38CM |
| Parties | ALBERT ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. SECTION 23 PROPERTY OWNER'S ASSOCIATION, INC., SECTION 23, PROPERTY OWNER'S ASSOCIATION, INC., JUDGE LISE MARIE SPADER PORTER, JUDGE JOHN LEO BURNS, DAVID KEITH OAKS, DAVID K. OAKS P.A. and DAVID K. OAKS TRUST, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This matter comes before the Court upon review of the file. On June 27, 2017, the Court denied without prejudice pro se Plaintiff's Affidavit of Indigency (Doc. 2), which the Court construed as a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. 8.2 Inaccordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court reviewed Plaintiff's "Original Petition for Declaratory Relief and Relief in Law & Equity" ("Complaint," Doc. 1) to determine whether it was sufficiently pled. The Court found that Plaintiff's Complaint was not sufficiently pled and consequently denied his motion without prejudice to allow him the opportunity to submit an amended complaint. Id. at 3-15. The Court provided Plaintiff until July 26, 2017 to submit an amended complaint. Id. at 15. Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or any other response to the Court's Order. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED and the case closed.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court shall dismiss an action if the action is deemed frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A lawsuit is deemed frivolous when the plaintiff's "realistic chances of ultimate success are slight." Clark v. State of Ga. Pardons and Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 639 (11th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that a case should only be dismissed as frivolous if it relies on meritless legal theories or facts that are clearly baseless. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
With respect to whether a complaint "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) mirrors the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), so courts apply the same standard in both contexts. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim torelief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" that amount to "naked assertions" will not do. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotations and citation omitted). Instead, a complaint must "contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683-84 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Furthermore, Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading set forth a claim of relief and contain a short and plain statement in which the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). This requirement ensures that the defendant is given fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561-63 (abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). "[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that at all relevant times he possessed real property located at 25264 Padre Lane, Punta Gorda Florida (the "Property") that his mother owned. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 22, 40. Section 23 Property Owner's Association, Inc. ("Section 23"), to which Plaintiff refers as "Sec 23 one comma," appears to be a property owners' association authorized to enforce deed restrictions on the Property. Id. ¶ 23. On December 2, 1997, Section 23 changed its name to "Section 23, PropertyOwner's Association, Inc." Id. ¶ 27. Because the new name contains two commas, Plaintiff refers to the newly named entity as "Sec 23 two comma." Id. ¶¶ 15, 27. Because of this name change, Plaintiff questions the legitimacy of the Section 23 entity and its legal authority to act, calling it a "counterfeit corporation." See e.g., id. ¶ 28.
On December 26, 2011, Section 23 filed suit against Plaintiff in Section 23 Property Owner's Association Inc. v. Robinson et. al., Case No. 11-3581-CA alleging that Plaintiff violated deed restrictions on the Property (the "3581 lawsuit"). Id. ¶¶ 24, 41. Defendant David Keith Oaks of the law firm David K. Oaks P.A. represented Section 23 in this lawsuit. Id. ¶ 8, 43. Judge Porter presided over this lawsuit. Id. ¶ 42.
On August 8, 2014, Section 23 filed suit against Plaintiff and his mother in Section 23 Property Owner's Association Inc. v. Robinson et. al., Case No. 14-000601-CC to foreclose a lien on the Property for past due annual fees (the "601 lawsuit"). Id. ¶¶ 24, 29. Judge Burns presided over this lawsuit. Id. ¶ 47.
Because both lawsuits against Plaintiff were filed by Section 23, Plaintiff alleges that it was a "non-existent" corporation that was barred under Section 607.1622(8) of the Florida Statutes3 from maintaining or defending against anylawsuits. Id. ¶¶ 30-32. Plaintiff alleges Judges Porter and Burns had a legal duty to dismiss the lawsuits initiated by Section 23. Id. ¶¶ 33, 34, 42. Plaintiff alleges generally that since the Section 23 entity lacked capacity to sue, the state courts lacked jurisdiction to issue any orders. Id. ¶ 39. Through both lawsuits, Plaintiff alleges that all of the Defendants violated or conspired to violate nine statutes in particular:
Id. ¶ 56. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks to "set aside the void orders of 601 and 3581." Id. ¶ 51. Although Plaintiff does not specify the "void orders" issued in lawsuit 3581, he challenges court rulings on lawsuit 601 to permit the foreclosure of the Property. Id. ¶ 47. Plaintiff also seeks a declaratory judgment that he and his family "are protected under Federal and State law," and that "Defendant's actions . . . are in violation of Federal and State Law." Id. ¶¶ 58, 59.
First, Plaintiff's Complaint does not comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although Plaintiff generally alleges the foregoing facts, he does not link any of the factual allegations with any of the enumerated statutes in his Complaint. See Doc. 1. A Frantz v. Walled, 513 F. App'x 815, 821 (11th Cir. 2013). Under the "Request I" section of his Complaint, Plaintiff re-alleges each and every general allegation (paragraphs 22 through 53). Doc. 1 at 13. Plaintiff lists the enumerated statutes with no underlying facts to support each cause of action and without even a recitation of any of the elements for the causes of action asserted. Id. ¶ 56. Plaintiff's list of causes of action is preceded with the following sentence: "Despite the express language of Florida Statutes and various Federal Statutes the Defendants have continuously maintained 3581 and 601 in direct violation of the following statutes inter alia; . . ." Id. Indeed, the Court cannot discern if Plaintiff is merely attempting to "set aside the void orders of 601 and 3581" or actually asserting causes of action under each of the enumerated statutes in his Complaint. See id. ¶¶ 51, 56. This makes the Complaint a shotgun pleading. In an impermissible shotgun pleading "it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief." Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trustee of Cent. Fl. Comm. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996). Under either scenario, Plaintiff's Complaint contains several deficiencies that the Court addressed in its previous Order to Plaintiff, and will discuss herein.
Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court has no jurisdiction to set aside any alleged "void orders" in lawsuits 601 and 3581. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine "places limits on the subject matterjurisdiction of federal district courts and courts of appeal over certain matters related to previous state court litigation." Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001). The doctrine prohibits lower federal courts from "exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments" when a party takes an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal court. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)). Here, it appears Plaintiff seeks to appeal Judge Burns' and Judge Porter's unspecified orders in lawsuits 601 and 3581. This Court, however, cannot act as a state appellate court and review the judgments of the state court. See Lance, 546 U.S. at 466.
To the extent Plaintiff actually is alleging causes of action pursuant to the statutes that he lists in his Complaint (Doc. 1 ¶ 56), all of Plaintiff's claims against Judges Porter and Burns would be subject to dismissal based on judicial immunity. "Judges are entitled...
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