Robinson v. Standard Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 May 1932
• Docket Number: No. 7066.,7066.
• Citation: 160 A. 471
• Parties: ROBINSON v. STANDARD STORES, Inc.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

160 A. 471

ROBINSON

v. STANDARD STORES, Inc.

No. 7066.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 18, 1932.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Washington County; Antonio A. Capotosto, Judge.

Action by Earl S. Robinson against the Standard Stores, Inc. Verdict for plaintiff. On defendant's exceptions.,

One exception sustained, and others overruled, and case remitted for new trial on the question of damages only.

Tillinghast, Morrissey & Flynn and M. Walter Flynn, all of Providence, for plaintiff.

Morris Berick, of Pawtucket, and Frank H. Bellin, of Providence, for defendant.

SWEENEY, J.

This is an action of trespass on the case for deceit in which the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $854.80. The case is before this court on defendant's exceptions. Defendant's exceptions to the denial of its motions for a directed verdict and for a new trial will be considered together.

It appears in the record that in March and June, 1929, two of defendant's agents sold plaintiff some common stock in the defendant corporation for which he paid defendant $850. Plaintiff testified that he purchased the stock because he relied upon several statements made by defendant's agents, namely, that defendant would take back the stock any time plaintiff wished to dispose of it, and that defendant would loan money on the stock. June 2, 1930, plaintiff requested defendant to loan him $250 on the stock, and defendant replied that it could not comply with the request. December 20, 1930, February 25 and March 10, 1931, plaintiff had letters written to defendant demanding the return of the money paid for the stock and offering to return the stock upon receipt of the money. Not receiving any answer to these demands, plaintiff commenced this action. Defendant's agents, who sold the stock to plaintiff, did not testify.

Defendant's motion for a directed verdict was based on the ground that the statements made by its agents to plaintiff were promissory in character and were not shown to have been falsely made, and therefore were insufficient to sustain an action for deceit. The contention cannot be sustained. We have repeatedly held that a verdict should not be directed for a defendant, if, upon any reasonable view of the evidence under the law, the plaintiff can recover. In Swift v. Rounds, 19 R. I. 527, 35 A. 45, 33 L. R A. 561, 61 Am. St. Rep. 791, this court said that any fraudulent misrepresentation or device whereby one person deceives another, who has no means of detecting the fraud, to his injury and damage, is a sufficient ground for an action of deceit. In Handy v. Waldron, 18 R. I. 567, 29 A. 143,49 Am. St. Rep. 794; Id., 19 R. I. 618, 35 A. 884, it was held that an action for deceit could be maintained against a vendor who made false and fraudulent representations as to the value of stock which the purchaser relied upon to his injury. See, also, Phillips v. Hebden, 28 R, I. 1, 65 A. 266; Bloomberg v. Pugh Bros. Co., 45 R. I. 360, 121 A. 430; O'Gorman v. Haber, 50 R. I. 351, 147 A. 882; 26 C. J. 1093. The trial justice instructed the jury that the plaintiff could recover only if he was deceived and defrauded as a result of false representations as to material facts made by the agents of the defendant. The jury was fully instructed as to the elements in an action of deceit necessary to be proven by the plaintiff. No exception was taken to this portion of the charge and it became...