Robinson v. State

• Docket Number: 02-21-00113-CR
• Decision Date: 18 August 2022
• Parties: Richard David Robinson, Appellant v. The State of Texas
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

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Richard David Robinson, Appellant v. The State of Texas

No. 02-21-00113-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth

August 18, 2022

Do Not PublishTex.R.App.P. 47.2(b)

On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 9 Tarrant County, Texas Trial CourtNo. 1560062

Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DANA WOMACK JUSTICE

I.Introduction

By information, the State charged Richard David Robinson with the offense of driving while intoxicated with an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more, a Class A misdemeanor.SeeTex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(d).After the trial court overruled Robinson's motion to suppress and request for a jury instruction under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23, a jury found him guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to ninety days in jail (probated for two years) and a fine of $1,500.

On appeal, Robinson asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and requested Article 38.23 charge.We hold that both the facts and the law support the trial court's rulings, overrule Robinson's contentions, and affirm the trial court's judgment.

II.Background

On August 29, 2018, Robinson purchased three bottles of Steel Reserve^[1] at a QuikTrip in Euless, Texas.Later that evening, Nicholas Kubik-Powell(Nick), a manager at the QuikTrip, called 911 after going outside and noticing Robinson unconscious in the driver's seat of a white Ford four-door vehicle.Nick also noticed an empty Steel Reserve bottle on the vehicle's dashboard.Euless Police Officers Blake Mitchell and Isiah Moala arrived at the QuikTrip shortly thereafter and found Robinson unconscious in the driver's seat of a white Ford four-door truck.The truck was parked and running.Mitchell walked around the truck and tried the door handles but found the doors to be locked.He then tapped on the driver's-side window, and Robinson awoke.Both officers instructed him to open the door, but Robinson did not comply.

Mitchell then moved his patrol car directly behind Robinson's truck to secure the truck in place.^[2] Robinson refused to comply with the officers' commands that he open the door, even after Mitchell warned him that they would break a window to his truck if he did not get out.Robinson told Mitchell to "break it."Moala then broke the rear-seat window on the passenger side, unlocked one of the doors, and climbed inside.Robinson, meanwhile, shifted his truck into reverse and backed into Mitchell's patrol vehicle, then shifted into drive and drove forward a short distance before coming to an abrupt stop.Mitchell pulled Robinson out of the truck and arrested him.A breath test taken at the jail showed Robinson's alcohol concentration to be 0.243 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.

At his trial, Robinson moved to suppress his detention and arrest.He argued that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him or probable cause to arrest him.The trial court carried Robinson's motion and, after the close of the evidence, overruled the motion and found, "based upon the facts and circumstance contained in the record[,] that it was reasonable for the officers to initiate a detention and further [that] a reasonable person in the officer's position would have had probable cause to believe the defendant had committed an offense and was subject to arrest."Robinson then requested that an Article 38.23 instruction be included in the jury charge:

I believe the officer said the detention was made based on a possibly intoxicated person.I believe that the first witness, the actual 911 caller, said he didn't know whether the person was intoxicated or not, he could have just been asleep.He didn't believe he was intoxicated.In fact, he doesn't even say he was intoxicated.Again, both the officers testified they came and saw somebody asleep in the truck.Even at one point when the State objected to my asking about him being asleep you had told them in the objection that it is a fact issue whether somebody was passed out or asleep.We believe that portion -- that was a determination for the jury.Was he -- Was this a lawful detention based on him -- the fact question of whether he -- did he appear intoxicated.And so we would ask for the 38.23 instruction be given to the jury.

The trial court overruled this request and submitted the case to the jury, who then convicted Robinson.

III.Discussion

Robinson's issues on appeal center around the legality of his detention at the QuikTrip.The law recognizes three distinct types of interactions between the police and citizens: (1) consensual encounters that do not implicate the Fourth Amendment;(2) investigative detentions that are Fourth Amendment seizures of limited scope and duration that must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) arrests-the most intrusive of Fourth Amendment seizures-that are reasonable only if supported by probable cause.Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 667(Tex. Crim. App.2013).

A. Robinson's Motion to Suppress

In his first issue, Robinson argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion to suppress his detention and arrest.The State responds that the initial interaction between Mitchell and Robinson was a consensual encounter, not a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment, and that Mitchell developed reasonable suspicion to detain Robinson during this consensual encounter.

We apply a bifurcated standard of review to a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence.State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 281(Tex. Crim. App.2019).Because the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony, Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24-25(Tex. Crim. App.2007), we defer almost totally to a trial court's rulings on questions of historical fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on evaluating credibility and demeanor, but we review de novo application-of-law-to-fact questions that do not turn on credibility and demeanor, Martinez, 570 S.W.3d at 281.Whether the totality of circumstances supports reasonable suspicion or probable cause is a legal determination we review de novo.State v. Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d 281, 291(Tex. Crim. App.2008).

When the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports those findings.Johnson v. State, 414 S.W.3d 184, 192(Tex. Crim. App.2013).We then review the trial court's legal ruling de novo unless its explicit fact findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling.State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818(Tex. Crim. App.2006).

When the record is silent on the reasons for the trial court's ruling, or when there are no explicit fact findings and neither party timely requested findings and conclusions from the trial court, we infer the necessary fact findings that would support the trial court's ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports those findings.Johnson, 414 S.W.3d at 192;Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 818-19.We then review the trial court's legal ruling de novo unless the implied fact findings supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling.Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 819.Here, the trial court did not make explicit fact findings other than what was stated on the record when the trial court denied Robinson's motion, and neither party timely requested further findings and conclusions.

1.At the point when Robinson was "seized," Officer Mitchell had reasonable suspicion to detain him.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials.U.S. Const. amend. IV;Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24.A defendant seeking to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds^[3] bears the initial burden to produce some evidence that the government conducted a warrantless search or seizure that he has standing to contest.Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-05, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2561(1980);State v. Martinez,569 S.W.3d 621, 623(Tex. Crim. App.2019).Once the defendant does so, the burden shifts to the State to prove either that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a warrant or was otherwise reasonable, if warrantless.Martinez, 569 S.W.3d at 624.There is no evidence that Robinson was seized pursuant to a warrant, so the State bore the burden to show that the detention and arrest were reasonable under the applicable standards.

A detention may be justified if a person is reasonably suspected of criminal activity based on specific, articulable facts.Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-80(1968);Johnson v. State, 622 S.W.3d 378, 384(Tex. Crim. App.2021).An officer conducts a lawful temporary detention when he reasonably suspects that an individual is violating the law.SeeJohnson, 622 S.W.3d at 384.Reasonable suspicion exists when, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.Id.This is an objective standard that disregards the detaining officer's subjective intent and looks solely to whether the officer has an objective basis for the stop.Ramirez-Tamayo v. State, 537 S.W.3d 29, 36(Tex. Crim. App.2017).

Robinson bases his position that the State failed to establish reasonable suspicion in this case on "the fact that right off the bat, the State failed to prove through the 911 call that the officers were acting properly and in response to a...