Robinson v. State

• Decision Date: 21 February 2022
• Docket Number: 21A-CR-1819
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court
• Parties: William Dean Robinson, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

William Dean Robinson, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 21A-CR-1819

Court of Appeals of Indiana

February 21, 2022

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

Appeal from the Warren Circuit Court, Trial Court Cause No 86C01-1902-F3-15, The Honorable Hunter J. Reece, Judge

Attorney for Appellant

Chad Montgomery

Attorneys for Appellee

Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana

Jodi Kathryn Stein

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Tavitas, Judge.

Case Summary

[¶1] William Dean Robinson contests both his convictions and sentence for rape and sexual battery. Twin sisters A.M. and B.M. were both awoken at an after-party by Robinson, who touched their genitalia. Robinson was convicted of two counts of rape and one count of sexual battery and sentenced to an aggregate total of eighteen years. Robinson now contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions and that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. We disagree and affirm.

Issues

[¶2] Robinson raises two issues for our review, which we restate here:

I. Whether sufficient evidence was introduced to sustain Robinson's convictions for rape and sexual battery.

II. Whether Robinson's sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character.

Facts

[¶3] On February 2, 2019, twins A.M. and B.M. went to a bar in West Pendleton. After the bar closed, both went to the nearby home of a friend for an after-party. Robinson was also at the bar and attended the after-party. B.M. fell asleep in an upstairs bedroom, as did A.M. in a different bedroom. Cassie Barnhart, the owner of the home, went upstairs and discovered Robinson moving around in A.M.'s bed. Barnhart ordered Robinson out of the room, and he complied.

[¶4] At approximately 9:30 a.m., A.M. woke to the feeling of being hugged and then felt fingers on her breasts and in her vagina. She was unable to escape, but eventually her captor released her, and she saw that it was Robinson. A.M. grabbed her clothes and left.

[¶5] Shortly thereafter, B.M. awoke to the feeling of hands on her body. Her leg was propped up against Robinson's shoulder, and Robinson's fingers were inside her vagina. B.M. immediately rebuffed Robinson, and her statements woke her bedmate, who observed Robinson next to the bed.

[¶6] A.M. and B.M. subsequently went to the Sheriff's department, where they reported Robinson's actions. The State charged Robinson with two counts of rape, Level 3 felonies, and one count of sexual battery, a Level 6 felony, for touching A.M.'s breast.

[¶7] At trial, A.M. testified:

A. I remember waking up, [ ] I was kind of groggy and I remember waking up because my skin, I felt like my skin was being squeezed.

* * * * *

Q. And as you awoke what were you sensing?

A. [ ] I felt like somebody was like bear hugging me, but squeezing my skin and then I felt [ ] hands on my breasts and then I felt [ ] fingers on my vagina and then I felt those fingers go inside of my vagina.

Q. And what period of time if you can say do you think you were experiencing this sensation before you woke up?

A. Not very long, maybe, maybe a couple of minutes of like I don't know, I'm not sure.

Tr. Vol. II p. 130.

[¶8] B.M. testified as follows:

Q. So tell us about [ ] when you woke up? How did that occur?

A. [W]hen I started to wake up I had not opened my eyes yet. [ ] felt more than two (2) hands which is odd because I only went to bed with one (1) person. [ ] I woke up to [ ] my leg being propped up and Mr. Robinson was, he was touching [ ] my vagina. I didn't even know he was upstairs.

* * * * *

Q. And you described that your leg was up in the air. Which leg are you talking about?

A. My left leg.

Q. When you, I think you said propped up. Can you describe how that [sic]?

A. [M]y right leg was still on the bed and my foot was, my left foot was on the bed and my knee was propped up either on his shoulder or on his head.

Q. So your left leg is, the knee is in the air and the foot is on the bed?

A. Yes.

Q. And you indicated the Defendant was touching you?

A. Yes.

Q. Were his fingers inside you?

A. At one point yes.

Id. at 146-48.

[¶9] A jury found Robinson guilty of all three charges. The trial court found two aggravators: (1) Robinson's criminal history; and (2) the fact that Robinson was on pre-trial release at the time of the offenses. The trial court imposed the advisory nine-year-sentence for each of the rape convictions, to be served consecutively, as well as a one-year-sentence for the sexual battery conviction, to be served concurrently for an aggregate sentence of eighteen years. Robinson now appeals.

Analysis

I. Sufficiency of Evidence

[¶10] Robinson contends that insufficient evidence was introduced to sustain his rape and sexual battery convictions. Sufficiency of evidence claims "warrant a deferential standard, in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility." Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262 (Ind. 2020) (citing Perry v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1236, 1242 (Ind. 1994)). We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. Id. (citing Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). "We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value that would lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. We affirm the conviction "unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is, therefore, not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict." Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007), trans. denied).

A. Sex Crimes Generally

[¶11] Sexual battery is defined by Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-8, which reads:

(a) A person who, with intent to arouse or satisfy the person's own sexual desires or the sexual desires of another person:

(1) touches another person when that person is:

(A)compelled to submit to the touching by force or the imminent threat of force; or

(B)so mentally disabled or deficient that consent to the touching cannot be given; or (2) touches another person's genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or female breast when that person is unaware that the touching is occurring;

commits sexual battery, a Level 6 felony.

[¶12] Rape is defined by Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-1, which reads:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a person who knowingly or intentionally has sexual intercourse with another person or knowingly or intentionally causes another person to perform or submit to other sexual conduct (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5) when:

(1) the other person is compelled by force or imminent threat of force;

(2) the other person is unaware that the sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5) is occurring; or

(3) the other person is so mentally disabled or deficient that consent to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5) cannot be given;

commits rape, a Level 3 felony.

[¶13] Both sex crimes involve sex acts without the consent of the victims. In this case Robinson was charged, in part, based on the fact that both victims were asleep when Robinson climbed into their beds. Sleeping victims are-obviously- unable to consent to sexual activity.

B. Sexual Battery

[¶14] Robinson was specifically charged with sexual battery under Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-8(a), which provides, in relevant part: "A person who, with intent to arouse or satisfy the person's own sexual desires or the sexual desires of another person . . . (2) touches another person's genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or female breast when that person is unaware that the touching is occurring[.]" The State charged Robinson with touching "A.M's breast when A.M. was unaware that the touching was occurring" with the intent to arouse or satisfy Robinson's sexual desires. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 18.

[¶15] Although Robinson mentions the sexual battery conviction and details of the evidence in his argument section, Robinson makes no specific argument regarding this conviction. He has failed to present a cogent argument, and we, therefore, deem it waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a); Clark Cnty. Drainage Bd. v. Isgrigg, 963 N.E.2d 9, 18 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012), adhered to on reh'g, 966 N.E.2d 678 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012) (citing Watson v. Auto Advisors, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 1017, 1027-28 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), trans. denied) ("'When parties fail to provide argument and citations, we find their arguments are waived for appellate review.'"). "'We will not become an advocate for a party or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.'" Picket Fence Prop. Co. v. Davis, 109 N.E.3d 1021, 1029 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018) (quoting Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 984 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016)), trans. denied.

[¶16] Waiver notwithstanding, Robinson argues that the State failed to prove that "A.M. and B.M. were unaware that the sexual conduct was occuring [sic]." Appellant's Br. p. 15. With respect to A.M., Robinson concedes that "A.M. admits that she woke up when Robinson grabbed her breasts and was awake when Robinson inserted his fingers into her vagina," id. at 15, yet Robinson...