Robinson v. State

• Decision Date: 10 November 1890
• Citation: 20 A. 753,53 N.J.L. 41
• Parties: ROBINSON v. STATE.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

20 A. 753

53 N.J.L. 41

ROBINSON

v. STATE.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Nov. 10, 1890.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to court of quarter sessions, Burlington county; WILLS, SCOTT, and FORSYTH, JJ.

Argued June term, 1890, before BEASLEY, C. J., and MAGIE and DIXON, JJ.

Gilbert & Atkinson, for plaintiff in error. Eckerd B. Budd, for the State.

DIXON, J. At the December term, 1889, of the Burlington quarter sessions, the plaintiff in error was convicted upon an indictment, the first count of which charged him with attempting to obtain, and the second count with obtaining, by false pretenses, the signature of a certain person to an instrument of the tenor hereinafter set forth, with intent to cheat and defraud such person. The instrument is as follows: "This order is negotiable. Read carefully before signing, as no verbal understanding will be considered in settlement of goods herein ordered. New York Haying Tool & Pump Company of New York City, N. Y.: Deliver to me, at Jobstown station, seven double harpoon hayforks and carriers, together with track fixtures for all machines, which I will retail at forty dollars each, when a sale is made by me. I further agree to pay you thirty-seven dollars and fifty cents for each machine, on demand. It is understood further orders by me are to be filled for twenty-five dollars each machine, payment for the machines to be made to you or your collector; if not, I agree that it may be collected at my expense, at any place convenient for the company. In consideration of this agreement, I am to have one machine, with track fixtures for putting up machines, free of charge, and to be my property. Date Nov. 25, 1889. P. O. Jobs town, township of Springfield, county of Burlington. New York Haying Tool & Pump Co."

The first question now to be decided is whether the act charged is criminal. The allegations of the indictment are plainly not sufficient to make out an offense at common law, nor do they come within section 172 of our crimes act, (Revision, 257,) which deals with false pretenses relating to valuable securities; but the indictment was evidently framed under section 171 of that act, which renders it a misdemeanor to obtain by false pretenses money, wares, merchandise, goods, or chattels, or other valuable thing, with intent to cheat or defraud. The signature of such an instrument as that before us is certainly not covered by the terms "money," "wares," "merchandise," "goods," or "chattels," and the only question is whether it is a valuable thing, within the meaning of that statute. This law was first enacted as section 44 of the crimes act, passed March 13, 1796, (Pat. Laws, 208,) and, so far as I have discovered, the phrase "valuable thing" was then first employed in statutes for the punishment of false pretenses. Afterwards, it appears in 52 Geo. III., c. 64, (but soon was dropped by 7 & 8 Geo. IV., c. 29,) and in the statutes of New York, Pennsylvania, Missouri, and other states. Under the strict rule for the interpretation of penal statutes, the collocation of this phrase with words descriptive of only tangible personal property might seem to indicate a legislative design to limit its application to things of like nature; but in State v. Vanderbilt, 27 N. J. Law, 328, and in State v. Tomlin, 29 N. J. Law, 13, this court declared it to be true policy neither to restrain the interpretation of the statute within too narrow limits nor to explain it away to the encouragement of fraud. Accordingly, in State v. Thatcher, 35 N. J. Law, 445, it was decided that to obtain by false pretenses the signature of a person to commercial paper, which, on its being passed to a bona tide holder for value, would render the signer legally liable for the amount thereof, was within the statute; the court deeming the language of the act "broad enough to comprehend the maker's own negotiable note or...