Robinson v. State

Decision Date12 February 1998
Docket NumberNo. 86136,86136
Parties23 Fla. L. Weekly S85 Johnny L. ROBINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

John W. Moser, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel; Peter N. Mills, Gail E. Anderson and John M. Jackson, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsels, Middle Region, Tampa, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Judy Taylor Rush, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Johnny L. Robinson, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals an order entered by the trial court below pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the denial of Robinson's motion for postconviction relief.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts of this case are detailed in Robinson's initial direct appeal, Robinson v. State, 520 So.2d 1 (Fla.1988), wherein we Robinson filed his 3.850 motion to vacate judgment and sentence on May 17, 1993, asserting seventeen claims for relief. A pre-trial hearing was held on June 22, 1994, in order to determine whether an evidentiary hearing was required. On July 14, 1994, the trial court summarily denied claims VI, VII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, and XVI as procedurally barred, denied claim XV regarding allegedly improper doubling of aggravators on the basis of Derrick v. State, 641 So.2d 378 (Fla.1994), and denied claim XVII, a public records request, on the basis that Robinson had ample time to obtain any requested documents. The court stated that it intended to give further consideration to claim VIII on the basis of the record and ordered an evidentiary hearing on claims I, II, III, IV, and V. The evidentiary hearing on those claims was held on August 29, 30, and 31, 1994. The trial court subsequently denied all relief on June 8, 1995.

affirmed his first-degree murder, kidnaping, armed robbery, and sexual battery convictions, but vacated all sentences, including his sentence of death, and remanded for resentencing because "[t]he prosecutor's comments and the questions [to Robinson's medical expert] about the race of the victims of [Robinson's] prior crimes ... easily could have aroused bias and prejudice on the part of the jury." Id. at 7. Upon resentencing, the jury again returned an advisory verdict recommending the death sentence, which the trial court imposed. We affirmed the death sentence on direct appeal. Robinson v. State, 574 So.2d 108 (Fla.1991).

APPEAL

Robinson raises eleven claims of error in this appeal, 1 several of which we find may be disposed of summarily. 2 We address the remaining issues in turn.

NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE

First, Robinson claims that he is innocent of first-degree murder in the death of Beverly St. George because the only contrary evidence was co-defendant Clinton Fields' testimony, which he has allegedly repudiated in a sworn affidavit. However, it is undisputed that Robinson confessed to the crime, originally claiming that he "accidentally" shot the victim first when she resisted his sexual advances, but then intentionally shot her again, saying that he "had to" because no one would believe "I accidentally shot a white woman." He now argues that Fields' trial testimony was the only direct evidence to support significant aggravators and to rebut the defense We recently reiterated the proper standards by which a trial court must evaluate both newly discovered evidence and recanted testimony. First, to qualify as newly discovered evidence, "the asserted facts 'must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his counsel could not have known them by the use of diligence.' " Blanco v. State, 702 So.2d 1250, 1252 (Fla.1997) (quoting Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 916 (Fla.1991)). If the proffered evidence meets the first prong, to merit a new trial the evidence must substantially undermine confidence in the outcome of the prior proceedings or "the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial." Blanco, 702 So.2d at 1252 (quoting Jones, 591 So.2d at 915).

                argument that Robinson did not commit an intentional murder.  Robinson also asserts that Fields' oral statement to Captain Porter was entirely consistent with his affidavit and supported an accidental shooting defense. 3  We find no error in the trial court's denial of relief on this claim following an evidentiary hearing at which Fields did not testify
                

In assessing recanted testimony, we have stressed caution, noting that it may be unreliable and trial judges must "examine all of the circumstances in the case." State v. Spaziano, 692 So.2d 174, 176 (Fla.1997) (citing Armstrong v. State, 642 So.2d 730, 735 (Fla.1994)). Accordingly, "[r]ecantation by a witness called on behalf of the prosecution does not necessarily entitle a defendant to a new trial." Spaziano, 692 So.2d at 176 (quoting Armstrong, 642 So.2d at 735). That is the purpose of an evidentiary hearing. 4

First and foremost, we note that Fields' new version of events has never been subjected to adversarial testing since he has pointedly refused on several occasions to expose himself to cross-examination. The absence of direct testimony by the alleged recanting witness is fatal to this claim. In the end, therefore, Fields' unauthenticated, untested affidavit proffered by Robinson is nothing more than hearsay, i.e., an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, which is inadmissible because Robinson does not claim, nor do we find, that it comes within any hearsay exception.

We addressed this issue in Lightbourne v. State, 644 So.2d 54 (Fla.1994). There, the defendant sought to introduce several affidavits and letters into evidence at a 3.850 evidentiary hearing in support of his Brady 5 claim. Offered as evidence was Theodore Chavers' affidavit made in 1989, almost eight years after trial. Id. at 56. Chavers, who had testified at trial regarding incriminating statements made by Lightbourne while they were incarcerated together, stated in his affidavit that investigators told him that several charges against him would be dropped if he informed against Lightbourne and that state attorneys urged him to lie at trial about his jailhouse conversation with Lightbourne. The trial court declined to admit any of the proffered evidence, including Chavers' 1989 affidavit, after finding that none of the hearsay statements fell within any exception to the hearsay rule. Id.

On appeal, we examined section 90.804(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1991), 6 the Although Chavers states in his affidavit and in one of the letters that he lied at trial, it cannot be said that a reasonable person would believe they were subject to a perjury penalty eight years after providing testimony at a trial. As the lower court pointed out, the statute of limitations had run so that Chavers could no longer be prosecuted for perjury. See §§ 775.15(2)(b) and 837.02, Fla. Stat. (1991). In any event, the hearsay evidence relating to Chavers lacks the necessary indicia of reliability. First, Chavers' statements were made several years after the trial. More importantly, at the evidentiary hearing Chavers feigned a memory loss and would not answer questions pertaining to his statements, thereby severely undermining the credibility of his statements.

                statement against interest hearsay exception, 7 and found no error in the trial court's refusal to admit the hearsay statements into evidence.  Id. at 57.   We reasoned that
                

Id. (emphasis added).

As in Lightbourne, we find that the hearsay evidence presented in this case does not expose Fields to criminal liability 8 and lacks the requisite indicia of reliability for admission under section 90.804(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1993). 9 As stated by Professor Ehrhardt, this requirement "insures that a confession by a third party will not be admissible when there are serious questions as to its reliability." Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 804.4, at 749 (1997 ed.). Fields' belated change of story and his repeated refusal to expose himself to cross-examination on this issue severely erode the reliability of his 1993 affidavit and bars its admission as competent evidence.

Moreover, unlike Spaziano, there is no "independent corroborating evidence" that supports Fields' new version of events. 692 So.2d at 176. As will be addressed in greater detail below, no specific mention of an "accidental" shooting appears in Captain Porter's deposition. Further, Fields related to Porter that Robinson "raped" the victim and that he, Fields, did not rape the victim. This rendition is plainly inconsistent with the version in Fields' affidavit that "we had sex with the lady." (Emphasis added.) In Spaziano, we also noted that "[c]ommon sense dictates that the trial judge, in order to make a just decision, must be able to look at all the evidence presented in the case that affects the testimony of the recanting witness. The context in which the statements are made is crucial to gauge the credibility of the witness." Id. at 177. Unlike Spaziano, the trial judge here was not provided the direct testimony of the alleged recanting witness. Even so, the trial judge looked at the totality of the circumstances surrounding Fields' alleged recantation; he also presided over Robinson's original trial and had found Fields' original testimony "highly credible." Therefore, we do not find that the trial judge abused his discretion in viewing Fields' affidavit with "great suspicion," in refusing to allow the affidavit into evidence, or in denying Robinson relief on this issue. Lightbourne; see also Sliney v. State, 699 So.2d 662 (Fla.1997) (finding competent, substantial evidence in record supporting trial judge's finding of insufficient corroborating circumstances to establish...

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