Robinson v. State

• Decision Date: 07 December 2016
• Docket Number: No. 12A02–1603–PC–481.,12A02–1603–PC–481.
• Citation: Robinson v. State, 68 N.E.3d 1128(Table) (Ind. App. 2016)
• Parties: James E. ROBINSON, Appellant–Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Respondent.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

68 N.E.3d 1128 (Table)

James E. ROBINSON, Appellant–Petitioner,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Respondent.

No. 12A02–1603–PC–481.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Dec. 7, 2016.

James E. Robinson, Pendleton Correctional Facility, Pendleton, IN, Apppellant Pro Se.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Jodi Kathryn Stein, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

CRONE, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] James E. Robinson appeals the postconviction court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief ("PCR"). Robinson argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying his renewed motion to amend his PCR petition and by excluding certain exhibits at the evidentiary hearing. He also contends that the judge was biased against him. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Robinson's renewed motion to amend or by excluding certain exhibits. We also conclude that Robinson has failed to overcome the presumption that the postconviction judge was unbiased. Therefore, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 29, 2001, Robinson shot and killed his estranged wife Tina. On April 30, 2001, the State charged Robinson with murder. In July 2001, Robinson filed a notice of insanity defense. As required by Indiana Code Section 35–36–2–2, the trial court appointed two doctors, Drs. Richard Rahdert and Ned Masbaum, to examine Robinson to determine whether at the time of the offense he suffered from a mental disease or defect which rendered him unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.

[3] On July 9, 2002, Robinson pled guilty as charged pursuant to a plea agreement, which left sentencing to the trial court's discretion. At the change of plea hearing, Robinson acknowledged that, based on the doctors' examinations, he had decided not to pursue the insanity defense and believed that pleading guilty was in his best interest.¹ He also acknowledged that his plea was freely and voluntarily given. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State moved to dismiss six charges against Robinson pending under cause number 12C01–0009–CF–256, which included criminal confinement, intimidation, criminal recklessness, pointing a firearm, invasion of privacy, and domestic battery against Tina. The trial court found that there was a factual basis for the murder charge, took the plea agreement under advisement, and set the matter for sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Robinson to an executed term of sixty years. Robinson did not pursue a direct appeal.

[4] In September 2010, Robinson filed a PCR petition, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilty plea hearing because "counsel advanced pleading guilty without developing expert opinion" as to Robinson's mental health and that his plea agreement was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered because he was not competent to stand trial. Appellant's App. Vol. 1 at 24–25. The postconviction court denied Robinson's PCR petition without a hearing, and Robinson appealed. Another panel of this Court reversed the denial and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, concluding that Robinson had stated sufficiently specific factual allegations in support of his ineffective assistance claim and that the postconviction court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing and issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. Robinson v. State, No. 12D01–1009–PC–2, 2014 WL 2192756, at *3 (Ind.Ct.App. May 27, 2014).

[5] On September 23, 2015, the postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing on Robinson's PCR petition. Robinson represented himself. At the start of the hearing, he sought to introduce exhibits A through O. The State objected to all the exhibits, except exhibits C and D, based on lack of authenticity and relevance, and the trial court excluded those exhibits. The State did not object to exhibits C (the chronological case summary of the underlying case) and D (the transcripts of the guilty plea and sentencing hearings of the underlying case), and the postconviction court admitted them. At the end of the hearing, the postconviction court took the matter under advisement and requested the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

[6] On October 8, 2015, Robinson filed a motion to amend his PCR petition to conform to the evidence and an "Offer of Proof" for exhibits A and B and E through O. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 55–61. On October 28, 2015, the postconviction court issued an order denying Robinson's motion to amend, stating that he had not provided the specific amendments that he believed were necessary and that he should consider attaching a prepared amended pleading as an exhibit to any motion to amend. On December 7, 2015, Robinson filed a renewed motion to amend with the proposed amendments included as an exhibit. The proposed amendments included allegations that his attorney provided ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing by failing to proffer Robinson's mental health issues as a mitigating factor and that the sentencing court considered improper aggravating factors to enhance his sentence.

[7] On December 18, 2015, the postconviction court denied Robinson's Offer of Proof. On February 11, 2016, the postconviction court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Robinson's PCR petition. On February 18, 2015, the postconviction court denied Robinson's renewed motion to amend. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] The postconviction court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Indiana Post–Conviction Rule 1(6). Our review is limited to whether the findings are supported by the facts and the conclusions are supported by the law. Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind.2012). The petitioner seeking postconviction relief "bears the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence." Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 713 (Ind.2007). A judgment entered against a party bearing the burden of proof is a negative judgment. Burnell v. State, 56 N.E.3d 1146, 1149–50 (Ind.2016)"When a petitioner appeals from a negative judgment, he or she must convince the appeals court that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the trial court." Lambett v. State, 743 N.E.2d 719, 726 (Ind.2001), cert. denied (2002). Although Robinson is "proceeding pro se and lacks legal training, such litigants are held to the same standard as trained counsel and are required to follow procedural rules." Ross v. State, 877 N.E.2d 829, 833 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied (2008).

Section 1—The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying Robinson's renewed motion to amend his PCR petition.

[9] Robinson first contends that the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying his renewed motion to amend his PCR petition. Indiana PostConviction Rule 1(4)(c) provides,

At any time prior to entry of judgment the court may grant leave to withdraw the petition. The petitioner shall be given leave to amend the petition as a matter of right no later than sixty [60] days prior to the date the petition has been set for trial. Any later amendment of the petition shall be by leave of the court.

"[W]e review the post-conviction court's refusal to amend a petition for abuse of discretion because the Post–Conviction Rules state that any motion to amend made within 60 days of an evidentiary hearing may be granted only ‘by leave of the court.’ " Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581, 586 (Ind.2001) (quoting Ind. PostConviction Rule 1(4)(c) ).

[10] To support his argument that the postconviction court abused its discretion, Robinson relies on Indiana Trial Rule 15(B), which provides,

When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment, but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.

We note that the Indiana Trial Rules "generally only govern procedure and practice in civil cases." Corcoran v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (Ind.2006). However, we will consider their applicability in postconviction proceedings "on a case-by-case basis where the Indiana Rules of Procedure for Post–Conviction Remedies are silent." Id.

[11] The State contends that Post–Conviction Rule 1(4)(c) addresses the time frame for amendments to PCR petitions, and therefore the postconviction rules govern this issue and Trial Rule 15(B) is inapplicable. Although Post–Conviction Rule 1(4)(c) addresses the time frame for amendments, it does not directly address issues tried by express or implied consent of the parties. In Harrington v. State, 466 N.E.2d 1379 (Ind.Ct.App.1984), another panel of this Court cited Trial Rule 15(B) in concluding that although the State did not plead laches as an affirmative defense in postconviction proceedings, the issue was tried by consent and the State's answer was deemed amended to raise the laches issue. Id. at 1381.

[12] Assuming, without deciding, that Trial Rule 15(B) applies to the propriety of the postconviction court's decision to deny Robinson's renewed motion to amend his PCR petition, Robinson's argument is without merit. One of his proposed amendments was that his counsel provided ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing by failing to proffer his mental health issues as a mitigating factor. Robinson argues that at the evidentiary hearing, he admitted evidence regarding his mental health issues. However, that evidence was relevant to the issue of whether his counsel provided ineffective assistance during the guilty plea hearing and whether Robinson's plea was knowing and...