Robinson v. State

• Decision Date: 26 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 92-KA-00444-SCT,92-KA-00444-SCT
• Parties: Timothy B. ROBINSON v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 1100

662 So.2d 1100

Timothy B. ROBINSON v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 92-KA-00444-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Oct. 26, 1995

.

David N. Gillis, Jackson, for appellant.

Michael C. Moore, Attorney General, W. Glenn Watts, Sp. Asst. Attorney General, Jackson, for appellee.

Before HAWKINS, C.J., and SULLIVAN and McRAE, JJ.

McRAE, Justice, for the Court:

Timothy Robinson was convicted by a jury of the Hinds County Circuit Court on March 11, 1992, on two counts of kidnapping and one count of aggravated assault. Finding no merit to his allegations of jury tampering or to his arguments that evidence should not have been admitted, that instructions about the child's testimony should have been given, and that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, we affirm the jury's decision.

I.

Timothy Robinson and Brenda Rand lived together in the White Rock apartment complex in Jackson. On July 26, 1991, Robinson came home from work, bathed and ate the meal Rand had prepared. While Rand was washing the dishes, she was stabbed in the back. The only other person in the room was Robinson.

Rand's nine-year old daughter, Nicole, ran into the kitchen and saw her mother lying on the floor in a pool of blood. She began screaming and Robinson told her to "shut the f--- up" or he would finish her mother off and stab her, too. He ordered Rand to get up, but she had no feeling in her legs and could not move. He told Rand he would take her to the hospital and before leaving to get his car, directed Nicole to put all the knives in the apartment, including the bloody one on the floor, in the clothes dryer.

Robinson and the child dragged Rand down the stairs and into the car. Rather than taking her to the hospital, Robinson took Rand against her will to Belzoni, his hometown. On the way, when Rand fell from the back seat onto the floorboard, Robinson allegedly told her to get up or he would jump out and drive the car off the Yazoo Bridge. Once in Belzoni, they stopped at a bar called The Ranch, drove around town looking for Robinson's brother, and then returned to The Ranch, where Pat Magee, a friend of Rand's, came out to the car. Magee and her brother then drove Rand to the hospital. Robinson later called Rand's sister, Rebecca Hughes, to determine what hospital she was in because he wanted to "finish her up."

Robinson was indicted during the September, 1991 term by a grand jury of the First Judicial District of the Hinds County Circuit Court on one count of aggravated assault and two counts of kidnaping. He was examined by a state-appointed psychiatrist at the request of his attorney, but apparently found competent to stand trial. The case was tried on March 10 and 11, 1992, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts. Robinson was sentenced to life in prison on each of the kidnapping charges and twenty years for the aggravated assault charge, with the three sentences to run consecutively. His motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, or in the alternative, for a new trial, was denied. Thereafter, he timely perfected this appeal.

II.

Robinson first asserts that the circuit court erred in admitting his February 5, 1992 letter to Rand and further, in denying his motion for a mistrial on grounds that the letter was not timely disclosed to the defense.

During the course of the trial, the State offered into evidence a letter that Robinson had written to Rand a month before the trial. In the letter, he apologized for the pain he had caused, asked for her forgiveness and expressed his love for her. Robinson's attorney objected to admission of the letter on grounds that it was not produced in discovery. The prosecution claimed that it had only learned of the letter from Rand on the day before the trial. At that time, the defense was notified. The State's attorney showed the letter to Robinson's attorney, who immediately handed it back without comment. The circuit court noted that no objections were made to the letter prior to trial. The State's attorney stated in court that:

I told Mr. Gillis after talking with Ms. Rand yesterday morning and learning of its existence and generally what was said in it.

And the way it came about, I had asked Ms. Rand whether or not this Defendant, as many defendants do in cases, had made any attempt to contact her or to communicate with her. She told me that he had, that he had written a letter. I told her I would like to see it.

* * * * * *

During the interim period of time, I did have a conversation with Mr. Gillis. I told him or reminded him that in previous discovery that it was referred--that photographs were referred to, that I had those photographs, as well as the knife in question, in my office if at anytime he wanted to come look at it.

He did come to my office. And in looking at the photographs, I explained to him the existence of the letter but I did not have the letter itself yet. I explained to him it was my understanding that basically the letter was an admission by his client that he had done this and that he was sorry for doing it, and that I would make the letter available to him as soon as I had it.

Rule 4.06 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice requires the prosecutor to exercise due diligence in discovering unknown written or recorded statements of the defendant. Rule 4.06(a)(2) provides:

(a) Upon written request by the defendant, the prosecution shall disclose to each defendant or to his or her attorney, and permit him or her to inspect, copy, test, and photograph, without the necessity of court order, the following which is in the possession, custody, or control of the State, or the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the prosecution:

(2) Copy of any written or recorded statement of defendant and the substance of any oral statement made by the defendant;

Robinson's attorney filed a Motion For Discovery requesting any such statement be provided. "[E]ven the most meticulous discovery is useless if not timely. Discovery, to be sufficient, must be made at a time far enough in advance of trial to give the defense a 'meaningful opportunity to make use of it.' " Stewart v. State, 512 So.2d 889, 892 (Miss.1987).

This Court has noted that "Rule 4.06 and the Box guidelines are designed to avoid 'ambush' or unfair surprise to either party at trial." Holland v. State, 587 So.2d 848, 866-67 (Miss.1991). As articulated in Davis v. State, 530 So.2d 694 (Miss.1988), the guidelines for discovery set out in Box v. State, 437 So.2d 19 (Miss.1983), provide as follows:

(1) Upon the defense's objection, the trial court should give the defendant a reasonable opportunity to become familiar with the undisclosed evidence by interviewing the witness, inspecting the physical evidence, etc.

(2) If after this opportunity for familiarization, the defendant believes he may be prejudiced by lack of opportunity to prepare to meet the evidence, he must request a continuance. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the issue.

3) If the defendant does request a continuance the State may choose to proceed with trial and forego using the undisclosed evidence. If the State is not willing to proceed without the evidence the trial court must grant the requested continuance.

Davis v. State, 530 So.2d 694, 698 (Miss.1988), citing Box v. State, 437 So.2d at 23-26). Outside the presence of the jury, Robinson's attorney asserted that the letter was extremely prejudicial to his client and asked for a mistrial, which, we have stated, may serve as the "functional equivalent" of a motion for continuance. West v. State, 553 So.2d 8, 16 n. 6 (Miss.1989). The circuit court denied the motion and asked if the State was satisfied that the Box requirements had been met.

The circuit court then ordered a short recess, allowing Robinson to further examine the letter. "Where the state is tardy in furnishing discovery which it was obligated to disclose, the defendant is entitled upon request to a continuance or postponement of the proceedings [sic] reasonable under the circumstances." Stewart v. State, 512 So.2d 889, 892-93 (Miss.1987). We further have stated, "By no means does this mean invariably that the defendant will be entitled to a continuance until the next term of court. There will no doubt be cases where postponement of a day or two, or in some cases even an hour or two, will suffice." Id. Robinson's counsel was allowed a reasonable period of time in which to review the letter. We cannot say that he was ambushed or prejudiced by this letter since there is no indication that it would have made any difference if the attorney had known of the letter sooner. Accordingly, we find no merit to this assignment of error.

III.

Based on the voir dire of one potential juror who was stricken from the venire panel by the State, Robinson raises allegations of jury tampering. When the State queried potential jurors about family members or close friends who had been victims of crime, venireman Stacy Brown responded that his mother had been shot and killed. During the course of questioning, the following exchange took place between Assistant District Attorney Bobby Delaughter and Brown:

Q. The person that was convicted in that case, Mr. Brown, do you remember his name?

A. Yes, sir?

Q. What was that?

A. Curtis. Well, it was out of town. Curtis Dent.

Q. Okay. This was in Chicago?

A. Yes, sir.

Although he raised no objections at trial and made no mention of the exchange in his post-trial motions, Robinson now argues that the prosecution could not have known that Brown's mother was murdered in Chicago unless there were prior conversations with him. He further suggests that if there was communication with Brown, then there could have been communication with other venire members. However, we have said that a trial judge cannot be put in error when he was not given the opportunity to address the...