Robinson v. State
| Citation | 789 N.E.2d 965 |
| Decision Date | 09 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 45A03-0209-PC-303.,45A03-0209-PC-303. |
| Parties | Jesse E. ROBINSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Jesse E. Robinson, Bunker Hill, IN, Appellant pro se.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Zachary J. Stock, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Jesse E. Robinson ("Robinson") was found guilty of attempted murder,1 a Class A felony, after a jury trial in the Superior Court of Lake County and sentenced to thirty years executed in the Department of Correction. Robinson, pro se, appealed raising one issue, which was whether the trial court properly denied his motion to correct erroneous sentence. We issued our opinion in this case on February 27, 2003 reversing the trial court. On March 28, 2003, the State of Indiana filed a Petition for Rehearing arguing that the trial court does not have the authority to grant or deny credit time, and that we erred when we held that the trial court should have the jurisdiction to determine credit time earned prior to the defendant being sentenced. Appellant Robinson, pro se, filed his self-styled motion to dismiss petition for rehearing on April 3, 2003, and we considered that petition as the appellant's brief in response to the State's petition for rehearing. Because we are now convinced that the trial court properly denied Robinson's motion to correct erroneous sentence, we grant the State's petition for rehearing and withdraw our previous opinion.
Robinson was found guilty of attempted murder, a Class A felony, after a jury trial, and on February 26, 1986, the trial court sentenced him to thirty years executed in the Department of Correction. The trial court also stated:
He's to be given credit for service of his sentence for one hundred eighty-seven days spent in confinement as a result of the criminal charge for which this sentence is imposed, and the court recommends said credit of days be considered in assessing credit for good time conduct, as provided by law.
On July 23, 2002, Robinson filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, claiming that the trial court improperly credited his sentence with time served and credit time. The motion was denied. On August 12, 2002, Robinson filed a motion to correct error, which was also denied. Robinson filed his notice of appeal on August 22, 2002, and this court issued an opinion on that appeal on February 27, 2003. In our initial opinion, we held that the trial court erred when it denied Robinson's motion to correct erroneous sentence because we determined that the trial court should have the jurisdiction to determine credit time earned up to the time of sentence. The State now petitions for rehearing.
Although the preferred procedure for presenting a sentencing error is a petition for post-conviction relief, a motion to correct erroneous sentence may be used to correct those errors where the sentence is erroneous on its face. Funk v. State, 714 N.E.2d 746, 748-49 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. A trial court may correct an erroneous sentence when a sentence is facially defective. Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1243 (Ind.2000); Ind.Code § 35-38-1-15(1998). A sentence is facially defective if it violates express statutory authority at the time it is imposed. Id. A trial court's ruling on a motion to correct erroneous sentence is subject to appeal by normal appellate procedures. Id. On appeal, we defer to the trial court's factual findings, but we review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo. Id.
In its petition for rehearing, the State argues that the trial court's denial of Robinson's motion to correct erroneous sentence should be affirmed in all aspects because trial courts do not have the authority to either grant or deny credit time; the Department of Correction and the local jailing authority are the only authorized entities for determination of credit time. The State relies on Campbell v. State, 714 N.E.2d 678 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) for this contention. In Campbell, this court stated, "it is evident that the deprivation or restoration of a person's credit time is a discretionary matter entrusted not to the courts but to the administrators of the DOC." Id. at 683-84. Campbell also pointed out that Indiana Code section 11-11-5-3 expressly gives the DOC authority "to deprive a prisoner of earned credit time under [Indiana Code section] XX-XX-X-X(a) as a disciplinary action for violating the rules of the DOC or a penal facility." Id. at 683.
Importantly, a prisoner must be accorded a hearing to determine his guilt or innocence and must be given procedural due process protections before a deprivation of credit time may occur. Ind.Code § 35-50-6-5(b) (1998). In Campbell, after a review of the procedural safeguards provided for in Indiana Code section 35-50-6-4(c), this court noted that the legislature intended that the DOC conduct this hearing. 714 N.E.2d at 683. Therefore, Campbell held that the statutory scheme provided that the legislature intended that the grant or denial of credit time be the province of the DOC and not the trial court. Id. at 683-84.
The State contends that the distinction made in our original opinion between a trial court's post-sentence grant of credit time and its categorization of pre-sentence incarceration time should not change the Campbell analysis. Kindred v. State, 771 N.E.2d 760 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) held that it was outside the statutory jurisdiction of the sentencing court to enter an order granting Class I credit time classification to the defendant, "effectively granting him one day of credit time for each day of incarceration ... regardless of any disciplinary actions." Id. at 764. This was because "[t]he legislature invested the Department [of Correction], rather than the trial court, with the responsibility of determining, denying or restoring credit time." Id....
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Robinson v. State
...N.E.2d 1206 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003). On rehearing, however, it withdrew its previous opinion and affirmed the trial court. Robinson v. State, 789 N.E.2d 965 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). Because of the need to address recurring issues regarding pre-sentence credit time and the availability of recourse to c......
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Portee v. State, 02A04-0212-PC-595.
...issues raised by the instant appeal were previously addressed by this court with conflicting results. Compare, e.g., Robinson v. State, 789 N.E.2d 965 (Ind.Ct. App.2003) (holding the trial court lacked authority to grant or deny defendant credit time), vacated, Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d......
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Jackson v. State
...("DOC") to determine whether a defendant is entitled to good time credit. To support its argument, the State cites Robinson v. State, 789 N.E.2d 965 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. granted. In Robinson, another panel of this court held the trial court had no authority to grant or deny good time c......
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Jackson v. State, No. 45A03-0305-CR-194 (Ind. App. 12/4/2004), 45A03-0305-CR-194
...("DOC") to determine whether a defendant is entitled to good time credit. To support its argument, the State cites Robinson v. State, 789 N.E.2d 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. granted. In Robinson, another panel of this court held the trial court had no authority to grant or deny good tim......