Robinson v. State
| Decision Date | 07 March 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 72,72 |
| Citation | 238 A.2d 875,249 Md. 200 |
| Parties | William Carr ROBINSON v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Franklin Somes Tyng, Bel Air, for appellant.
Frank A. DeCosta, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Edwin H. W. Harlan, Jr., State's Atty. for Harford County and Donald G. Smith, Deputy State's Atty., Bel Air, on the brief), for appellee.
Before HAMMOND, C. J., and BARNES, McWILLIAMS, FINAN and SINGLEY, JJ.
Because the trial judge sentenced appellant to death he is entitled to have reviewed by this Court, rather than the Court of Special Appeals, his conviction of the crimes of double murder larceny and assault with intent to rape. Code, Art. 5, § 12 (1967 Cum.Supp.). The recital of what happened makes a gory story, almost as incredible as it is revolting.
Late in the afternoon of Friday, 2 April 1965, the bodies of Florence Bond, 48, and James Edward Bond, her brother, 46, were discovered on the kitchen floor of their home near Bel Air, in Harford County. Florence, naked from the waist down, was lying on her back. The medical examiner 'found a multitude of stab wounds and incised wounds of her neck' one of which had opened the jugular vein. There were stab wounds which penetrated the abdomen, some of which were made after death. Spermatozoa were found 'in her vagina and also, to a lesser degree, in her rectum.' There were at least 22 stab wounds in the left side of Edward Bond's face and neck, one of which had opened his jugular vein. There were severe stab wounds in his chest and 'a huge cut across the abdomen.' There was a stab wound 'through this opening into the liver.' Some of these wounds appeared 'to have been set after death.' There was a 'defense wound' on the palm of Florence's right hand and similar wounds on both of Edward's hands. A massive air embolism was the principal cause of death in each case. Edward's blood contained 0.28% alcohol indicating intoxication at the time of death. No alcohol was found in the blood of Florence.
Appellant, 26, a farm hand, was related by marriage to Florence and Edward. They knew each other well. Florence told her sister, Mary Berry, that appellant-she called him 'Piggy'-had been at her house 'for two mornings in a row' and that 'she was afraid of him.' Since childhood he has suffered from neurofibromatosis, a disease which manifests itself by the eruption of tumors requiring frequent surgical intervention. His older brother said his schooling had been interrupted periodically for the surgical removal of tumors on his face, that he 'went only to the fourth grade * * * and finally left school at age 14.' Set forth below is the letter of Dr. John M. Hamilton, the superintendent of Clifton T. Perkins State Hospital (Perkins) to the trial judge:
'The Honorable Harry E. Dyer, Jr
Judge
Circuit Court for Harford County
Court House
Bel Air, Maryland
RE: ROBINSON, William Carr Hospital #1404
'Dear Judge Dyer:
'The above named patient was committed to our hospital on May 17, 1965, by an Order of your Court, for a pre-trial mental examination.
'In a letter to the Honorable Court, dated September 17, 1965, I indicated that our evaluation would be delayed because of the necessity for Mr. Robinson's undergoing major surgery at the University Hospital, because of a chest-neck mass which had to be removed. This surgery has recently been completed and Mr. Robinson has been returned to our hospital; and, we are now able to render our report to the Court.
'Since being in the Clifton T. Perkins State Hospital, Mr. Robinson has received a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation with psychological testing, social service investigation, electroencephalography and other pertinent clinical and laboratory studies. He was presented before a Medical Staff Conference, on September 14, 1965, at which time it was the unanimous opinion of our Medical Staff, and I concur, that Mr. Robinson is currently competent to stand trial. Two of the staff physicians giving opinions in this case, Doctors Michael J. Pescor and Juliette M. Simmons, felt that Mr. Robinson was of such mental capacity and reason at the time of the alleged offenses so as to be properly able to distinguish between right and wrong, and to know the nature and consequences of his acts as applied to himself; and, therefore, felt that he was responsible for his actions at the time of the alleged offenses. I do not concur in this opinion because of the relatively severe pathology which our evaluation disclosed.
'I found Mr. Robinson to be suffering from a Chronic Brain Syndrome of Unknown Cause (in view of his long history of neurofibromatosis, it is quite possible that there has been an invasion of the brain and central nervous system of the neurofibromata though this is something that we have not unquestionably established); and, I found his intellectual capacity impaired to the extent that he now functions at the Moderately Defective level of intelligence, with a fullscale score of 56 on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. I have real concern that Mr. Robinson was able to appreciate the nature, quality and consequences of his acts at the time of the alleged offenses. It seems evident he had some appreciation that what he was doing was an illegal act but even this is on the borderline. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the members of the Medical Staff who gave the opinions of responsibility and it is my own personal opinion that Mr. Robinson was probably not responsible for his actions at the time of the alleged offenses in that he did not have the mental capacity or reason to appreciate the nature, quality or consequence of his acts at that time, because of the brain disease and mental deficiency from which he suffers.
'In view of the above opinions, we would appreciate it if you would make arrangements for Mr. Robinson's return to your custody, as soon as possible, since our evaluation has been completed. If there is any other information that you might require concerning our evaluation of Mr. Robinson's course in our hospital, please do not hesitate to request it of us.
Sincerely,
JOHN M. HAMILTON, M.D.
Superintendent
'cc: The Honorable Edwin H. W. Harlan, Jr.
Dr. Wilfried R. Freinek' When Dr. Hamilton was produced as a witness on behalf of appellant he said:
'It is my opinion that at the time of the alleged offenses, Mr. Robinson was of such mental incapacity and reason so as not to be able to properly distinguish between right and wrong, nor know the nature and consequences of his acts as applied to himself.'
Appellant was taken into custody on 7 April. He was transported to Maryland State Police Headquarters at Pikesville where he confessed to the murders and the larceny of $3.00 which was taken from Florence's pocketbook. His trial, before Dyer, J., and a jury, began on 28 February 1966. On 8 March the jury declared him to be sane at the time of trial and sane at the time of the alleged offenses. The jury, on the same day, also found him guilty of first degree murder without capital punishment in both cases, guilty of petty larceny, and guilty of assault with intent to rape, with no recommendation as to capital punishment. On 30 March, Judge Dyer imposed a sentence of 18 months in the larceny case and life imprisonment in each of the murder cases. Death by the administration of lethal gas was the sentence in the assault case.
We shall deal with appellant's 10 contentions in the order in which they were presented by his court-appointed counsel, stating such additional facts as may be necessary.
Appellant contends his conviction of the first degree murder of Florence was a felony murder based on Code, Art. 27, § 410 (Repl.Vol.1967) which makes a murder committed in an 'attempt to perpetrate any rape * * *' murder in the first degree. The doctrine of merger, he argues, precludes his conviction of assault with intent to rape, thereby nullifying the sentence of death. No decisions of this Court flatly supporting his contention are cited 1 but there are cases in other jurisdictions which seem to have adopted the general principle advanced by appellant. 2 So that appellant's contention can be considered in its proper context it is necessary to examine the instructions given to the jury by the trial judge. After having directed a judgment of acquittal of the charge of rape the trial judge instructed the jury, in part, as follows:
'As to the crime of First Degree Murder, the Code of Maryland states, (Article 27, Section 407)-'All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, or by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing shall be Murder in the First Degree."
'Our Code (Article 27, Section 410) also provides that 'All murder which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any rape, sodomy, mayhem, robbery, burglary, shall be Murder in the First Degree."
'Now to justify a conviction of Murder in the First Degree the Jury must find the actual intent, the fully formed purpose to kill, with enough time for deliberation and premeditation to convince them that the purpose to kill is not the immediate offspring of rashness and impetuous temper and that the mind has become fully conscious of its own design.
'For a homicide to be 'willful' as required for a conviction of First Degree Murder, there must be a specific purpose and design to kill. To be 'deliberate' there must be a full and conscious knowledge of the purpose to kill. And to be 'premeditated' the design to kill must have preceded the killing by an appreciable length of time; that is, time enough to be deliberate. It is not, however, necessary that deliberation and premeditation shall have been conceived or shall have existed for any particular length of time before the killing.
If the killing is not the instant effect of impulse, if there is hesitation or doubt to be overcome, a choice made as a...
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