Robinson v. State
| Decision Date | 01 September 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 972,972 |
| Citation | 508 A.2d 159,67 Md.App. 445 |
| Parties | Killes ROBINSON v. STATE of Maryland. , |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Bradford C. Peabody, Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender), Baltimore, for appellant.
Richard B. Rosenblatt, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Kurt L. Schmoke, State's Atty. for Baltimore
City and Olga Bruning, Asst. State's Atty. for Baltimore City on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.
Submitted Before MOYLAN, WEANT and GARRITY, JJ.
After a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, appellant Killes Robinson stands convicted of rape and related charges. On appeal, Robinson presents three questions:
1. Did the trial court err in accepting the Appellant's [waiver] election of a jury trial?
2. Did the trial court err in permitting a suggestive identification, in court?
3. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the Appellant's convictions?
At trial, Rosalind Canada, the prosecuting witness, testified that she awoke during the night of 9 July 1984 to find a man, whom she later identified as Robinson, standing over her with his penis in one hand and a screwdriver in the other. When he attempted to force her legs apart, she told him, "not here, my son is going to wake up." Robinson told her to bring her infant son into the back bedroom where he ordered her to strip. As she complied, the baby began to cry. Her assailant told her to "shut him up" and pointed the screwdriver at the infant; she took the child in her arms and quieted him. As she held her son, Robinson proceeded to rape her while continuing to point the screwdriver at her. Ms. Canada testified that she tried to remain calm and "go along with it" because she had read that that was the best course of action in a rape situation.
Robinson left by the back window through which he had apparently arrived. Investigating officers found that a small screen, which had held the window open, had been removed and placed inside the back bedroom.
Ms. Canada positively identified a photograph of Robinson, testifying that she was "absolutely sure" that it was he who had assaulted her. Canada also identified Robinson in court.
Appellant's first question has to do generally with just what information under Md.Rule 4-246(b) 1 must be given a criminal defendant in order that his waiver of a jury trial be "knowing and voluntary." Stated precisely, the issue before us is: Must a defendant, before a waiver of jury trial is accepted, be advised specifically that whether trial is by jury or by the court, his guilt must be found to be beyond a reasonable doubt? Because we think that the cases upon which appellant relies are no longer controlling, and because we think that the record in this case shows that appellant's waiver of a jury trial was knowing and voluntary, we answer this question in the negative.
On the first day of appellant's trial, the following colloquy took place in open court:
[Defense Counsel]: We are familiar with the allegations of the other charges. Waive the reading of those charges. The pleas are not guilty generally and a court trial is prayed; is that right, sir?
[Appellant]: Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: I have explained to you that you have an absolute right to be tried by a jury; do you understand that?
[Appellant]: Yes, I do.
[Defense Counsel]: And if you had asked for a trial by jury, that jury would have been composed of twelve citizens male and female, black and white, each taken from the voter's list of Baltimore City. Each of those persons would have had to have agreed that you were guilty of these offenses before you could be found guilty of them; do you understand that?
[Appellant]: Yes, I do.
[Defense Counsel]: You understand that if even one is [sic] those persons disagreed on one or both of these charges as to whether you were guilty or innocent, you could not then be found guilty and that would be a mistrial and then the State would decide whether to try the case over again; you understand that?
[Appellant]: Yes, sir, I do.
[Defense Counsel]: Now, you and I have discussed this and I will represent to the court I have talked to his mother and father about it and are you in agreement that you want to have a court trial?
[Appellant]: Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: You understand it is your decision; you understand that?
[Appellant]: Yes, I do.
Missing from defense counsel's explanation is any reference to the standard of proof in a criminal trial--guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant contends that because of this omission, the trial court's acceptance of his waiver was error. As authority for this proposition, appellant relies upon Hunt v. State, 286 Md. 541, 408 A.2d 392 (1979) and State v. Ricketts, 290 Md. 287, 429 A.2d 1025 (1981), in both of which cases convictions were overturned as a result of just such an omission.
Hunt and Ricketts relied upon Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444, 408 A.2d 1302 (1979). The issue in Countess was what would satisfy the requirement of former Rule 735(d) 2 (from which current Rule 4-246(b) is derived) that a defendant's oral election of a court trial be made "with full knowledge of his right to a jury trial." To decide this question, the Court looked to former Rule 735, subsection (b), 3 which provided for a written election of a court or jury trial that contained a defendant's express acknowledgment that he understood certain specific aspects of a jury trial, including the reasonable doubt standard. The Court then stated:
What the Rule contemplates is that the defendant have a basic understanding of the nature of a jury trial. We think that this understanding is generally satisfied when the defendant entitled to a jury trial knows that he has the right to be tried by a jury of 12 persons or by the court without a jury; that whether trial is by a jury or by the court, his guilt must be found to be beyond a reasonable doubt; that in a jury trial all 12 jurors must agree that he is so guilty but in a court trial the judge may so find.
286 Md. at 455, 408 A.2d at 1308.
Thus, the specific requirements of a written election contained in former Rule 735(b), including the reasonable doubt language, became the standard by which oral waivers under former Rule 735(d) were measured. The Countess Court made it clear that the petitioners there in no way challenged the constitutional effectiveness of the waiver and that its decision was based exclusively on the requirements of former Rule 735 which if complied with, said the Court, at least satisfied the constitutional standard. 286 Md. at 453 n. 7, 408 A.2d at 1307 n. 7 and accompanying text.
Hunt and Ricketts then, relied expressly upon Countess and its construction of former Rule 735 in holding that a jury trial waiver accepted in the absence of a specific advisement concerning the reasonable doubt standard would be vitiated by that omission.
The respective parties in Ricketts made substantially the same policy arguments presented to us today. The State's position was (and is) that because the reasonable doubt standard applies equally to a jury or nonjury trial, there is no need to advise a defendant that the jurors must find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant argues that the concept of reasonable doubt is different in a jury trial, and that it should be understood that, when taken with the unanimity requirement, the reasonable doubt standard means that one may avoid conviction if that degree of doubt is raised in the mind of just one of twelve jurors as opposed to one judge.
The Ricketts Court declined to opine on those arguments, stating that "regardless of our views on the policy argument made by the State, we may not disregard the clear intent expressed in Rule 735." 290 Md. at 292, 429 A.2d at 1027. The Court then said that if, as the State argued, the rule was unnecessary or inadvisable, the proper remedy was for the Legislature or the Court of Appeals, in its rule making capacity, to change the rule. Id. at 293, 429 A.2d at 1028. In this regard, the Court noted that the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure was then in the process of reviewing and revising the rules applicable to criminal causes, and the Court invited the parties to communicate their views to the Committee.
Effective 1 January 1982, former Rule 735 was substantially revised. Revised Rule 735 eliminated the provisions for a written waiver that were specifically relied upon by Countess and, in turn, Ricketts. Revised Rule 735(b), which sets out the procedure for acceptance of a waiver, provided as follows:
A defendant may waive the right to a trial by jury at any time before the commencement of trial. The court may not accept the waiver until it determines, after an examination of the defendant by the court or by the State's Attorney or by the attorney for the defendant on the record in open court, that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived a jury trial.
This is substantially the same language as current Rule 4-246(b), supra n. 1.
The report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure reveals that the Committee's recommendation was that section (b) of the Rule explicitly set forth those specific points a defendant must understand in order to knowingly waive a jury trial. These points were (1) the defendant has the right to be tried by a jury of 12 persons or by the judge without a jury; and (2) before a finding of guilty in a jury trial, all twelve jurors must agree that the defendant is guilty. The Committee specifically eliminated the requirement that a defendant be advised that both a judge and jury would be required to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, stating that it was doing so because the standard is the same in a court and a jury trial. Seventy-fifth Report of the Standing...
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