Robinson v. State
| Decision Date | 08 December 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 365,365 |
| Citation | 452 A.2d 1291,53 Md.App. 297 |
| Parties | Dwight Lamont ROBINSON v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Mark Colvin, Assigned Public Defender, for appellant.
Jillyn K. Schulze, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen. of Md., Arthur A. Marshall, Jr., State's Atty. for Prince George's County and Marjorie L. Clagett, Asst. State's Atty. for Prince George's County on the brief, for appellee.
Argued before MORTON, LOWE and WILNER, JJ.
On the afternoon of April 18, 1981, two men entered the office of the Automotive Moving Center in Prince George's County and, at gunpoint, helped themselves to money from the company's cash register and from the wallets of two employees, Joseph Foster and Donald Beauchert. On May 5, 1981, appellant was arrested in connection with another incident, and, as a consequence of that arrest, was routinely photographed. A month later that photograph was shown, as part of an array, to the two employee-victims of the April robbery. One of the employees--Mr. Foster--identified appellant from that array, whereupon appellant was arrested and charged with the armed robbery and various associated offenses.
Appellant was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County and convicted of two counts (each) of robbery with a deadly weapon, theft, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. From those convictions and the twenty-five year prison sentence imposed thereon, he brings this appeal raising seven issues. We shall address two of them:
(1) "Did the trial court err in allowing the prosecutor to question Appellant regarding the details of a prior conviction"; and
(2) "Did the trial court err in summarily rejecting Appellant's contention that any identification of him by Foster should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful arrest?"
The first of these we think must be answered in the affirmative. The court erred in permitting, over forceful objection, an extensive and unwarranted cross-examination regarding the circumstances of another crime of which appellant had been convicted. The error was of sufficient magnitude and prejudice as to require that we reverse the judgments and remand for a new trial. All but one of appellant's other complaints involve events occurring at his trial and are resolved by our reversal. The exception is the second issue noted above; that likely will surface again at retrial, as it involves the admissibility of evidence that the State apparently thinks is important.
Appellant testified in his own behalf. His defense was that of alibi; he claimed that on the day of the robbery he was at his father's home from ten in the morning to five in the evening. 1
Cross-examination was extensive. It ended with this colloquy:
"Q [By prosecuting attorney] And you were in fact convicted on December 9, 1977 in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County in Criminal Trials 18207 of daytime housebreaking, is that correct?
A [By appellant] Say that again, ma'am.
Q You were convicted in December 9, 1977, Circuit Court, Prince George's County, Criminal Trials 18207 for daytime housebreaking, is that correct?
A Yes, ma'am."
On redirect, defense counsel pursued the matter thusly:
"Q Mr. Robinson, when you were convicted in November, 1977, did you plead guilty?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you guilty?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you offered a chance to plead guilty to a less[e]r count in this case?
A Yes.
Q Did you refuse to take that plea?
A Yes, sir.
MRS. CLAGETT [Prosecuting attorney]: I'm going to object.
THE COURT: Sustained." (Emphasis supplied.)
On recross, the prosecutor returned to the subject again. This is what happened:
"Q Mr. Robinson, isn't it a fact the reason you pled guilty in Criminal Trials 18207 was the fact that you broke into a woman's home, took two fur coats and you were caught red-handed in that case, weren't you?
MR. NEAL [Defense attorney]: Objection.
Q You were not caught red-handed?
A No, ma'am.
Q Not caught as the security guard caught you as you came out?
All right, let's go, you opened the door.
(Whereupon, counsel returned to their respective trial tables.)
Q In fact, as you were leaving that apartment he tried to subdue you and you ran away, is that right?
Q Yes.
A (No response)
Q You want me to repeat the question?
A Security guard chased me?
Q Yes.
A Not that I know.
A I don't know.
Q In that case you also confessed to the crime, did you not?
A No.
Q You didn't confess to the crime?
Come up, please.
I just want to put my reasons. I don't mean to be argumentative.
THE COURT: You're a very experienced attorney. You were a Deputy State's Attorney in this county. You knew very well the question you asked on redirect was highly improper and you opened up the door. And I'm going to let her ask anything about why he pled guilty in this previous offense based on the question that you have asked.
Now go back and sit down.
(Whereupon, counsel returned to their respective trial tables.)
BY MRS. CLAGETT:
Q Now, Mr. Robinson, your nickname is Pee-Wee, isn't it?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Now, again I ask you, in the breaking and entering you pled guilty to, this is the house of Daisey Buggs, June 1st, 1977, were you not in fact stopped by security when you escaped with two fur coats?
Q And specifically, didn't you give a verbal confession to the investigating officer in that case?
The law is clear on this point. Md.Code Ann., Courts article, § 10-905(a) provides that "[e]vidence is admissible to prove the interest of a witness in any proceeding, or the fact of his conviction of an infamous crime." (Emphasis supplied.) In Huber v. State, 2 Md.App. 245, 257, 234 A.2d 264 (1967), we held that "the proper interpretation of [that provision] would permit only the fact of conviction for a specific crime to be permitted [sic, admitted] into evidence, and not the details of the commission of the crime." (Emphasis supplied.) We noted that:
"When the details of the commission of a prior crime by a witness are introduced into evidence, there is a danger that the jury may be misled into a conviction by evidence of an offense for which the defendant is not indicted ... and hence the introduction of such evidence should be subject to rigid scrutiny by the court...."
Id. See also Kable v. State, 17 Md.App. 16, 31, 299 A.2d 493, cert. den. 268 Md. 750 (1973). More recently, the Court of Appeals observed in Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 703, 436 A.2d 906 (1981), (Emphasis supplied.)
The questions allowed here obviously extended far beyond the nature of the charge and the fact of conviction. They included not only the "details of the commission of the crime," but the attempt at flight and an extra-judicial confession.
The trial judge allowed this line of inquiry on the ground that defense counsel had "opened the door" by asking whether appellant had pled guilty "because [he] got a deal." It would seem from this that, although not very well articulated, the court, in effect, was applying the doctrine of "curative...
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