Robinson v. State, 56987
| Decision Date | 17 July 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 56987,No. 2,56987,2 |
| Citation | 482 S.W.2d 492 |
| Parties | Ronnie Lee ROBINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Robert S. Davis, St. Louis, for appellant.
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., G. Michael O'Neal, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
HOUSER, Commissioner.
This is an appeal from a judgment denying Ronnie Lee Robinson's Criminal Rule 27.26, V.A.M.S., motion to vacate sentences of 7 years' imprisonment for attempted robbery in the first degree by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon and 5 years' imprisonment for carrying a concealed weapon, entered upon pleas of guilty.
I.
The first question is whether the sentencing court failed to develop from accused that there was a factual basis for the pleas of guilty. Appellant contends that due process requires that the court elicit from an accused facts showing that he had actual knowledge of the crime to which he pleads guilty; that the record must show that accused gave a full description of the facts upon which the charge is made.
In determining this question we look not only to the 13-page transcript of the proceedings at the time the pleas of guilty were entered but also to the transcript of the 27.26 hearing. State v. Mountjoy, Mo.Sup.,420 S.W.2d 316; State v. Sayre, Mo.Sup., 420 S.W.2d 303; State v. Davis, Mo.Sup., 438 S.W.2d 232; Drew v. State, Mo.Sup., 436 S.W.2d 727; State v. Grimm, Mo.Sup., 461 S.W.2d 746(2); Brodkowicz v. State, Mo.Sup., 474 S.W.2d 822, 828--829(6); Schuler v. State, Mo.Sup., 476 S.W.2d 596(3); Flood v. State, Mo.Sup., 476 S.W.2d 529, 533(2). We are convinced from a reading of the entire record that there was a factual basis for the pleas of guilty; that accused had actual knowledge of and fully understood the facts upon which these charges were made; that accused in open court, accompanied by his counsel, withdrew previously entered pleas of not guilty and entered pleas of guilty after thoroughly discussing all phases of both cases with family and counsel on several occasions; that accused entered these pleas voluntarily, knowingly and with full appreciation of the implications and possibilities of going to trial or entering pleas of guilty; that the sentencing judge had a sufficient basis upon which to satisfy himself that there was a factual basis for the pleas, and that he was so satisfied.
It is true that the accused, when asked at the beginning of the hearing at which he entered guilty pleas whether the holdup occurred in a house or on the street or where, answered, 'Judge, I couldn't say,' and that accused at first declared his innocence of the charge of carrying a concealed weapon and maintained that he had nothing to do with the attempted robbery. It is clear from the record, however, that in spite of these initial protestations of innocence it was finally his firm will and desire to enter pleas of guilty (whether with conscious knowledge of guilt he was confessing to the truth or whether he was not guilty but was consenting to the imposition of prison sentences as a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternatives open to him, according to his conception of his best interests, in the situation of the accused in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162).
There is no question that accused was informed of the charges. The indictments were read to him in open court. In addition, the assistant circuit attorney in open court in the presence of accused, gave the following brief background of the facts relating to the attempted robbery: Thereupon accused acknowledged that the indictment on the charge of attempted robbery was substantially correct; that he did what was 'set out and charged in there,' and admitted 'doing that.' In answers to questions asked by the court accused affirmed that he desired to plead guilty as charged; that he had no doubts about that 'at this time'; that he was 'sure of that'; that he was 'positive'; that he had discussed the matter with his attorney, who had advised and 'explained the whole situation' to him, and that he still desired to plead guilty. He acknowledged that he realized that he had 'a right to a full and complete trial by jury' but was waiving that right; that he was pleading guilty of his own free will. Counsel for accused advised the court that he had read and explained the indictments to him and discussed the matter thoroughly with him; that accused wanted to withdraw his previous pleas of not guilty and plead guilty as charged.
Although accused's responses to the question propounded to him by the court (reported in the 13-page transcript) were simply 'yes' and 'no' answers, and notwithstanding he did not in his own words frame narrative answers demonstrating per se that there was a factual basis for the pleas, the trial judge's actions may not be declared clearly erroneous on this basis. That an accused understands charges with which he is confronted may be deduced from yes and no answers as well as from descriptive factual recitals by accused. Whether accused was telling the truth when he proclaimed his innocence at the beginning of the hearing or later when he confessed his guilt, in either event the record is clear that there was a factual basis for the pleas of guilty, and that the pleas were entered by accused voluntarily, knowingly and understandingly, and to the satisfaction of the judge accepting the pleas.
Buttressing these conclusions are the following facts, gleaned from the 27.26 transcript: Robinson conceded that his counsel conferred with him several times before the pleas of guilty were entered; that he was aware of what was going on--aware of what he was doing when he pleaded guilty--aware that if he was found guilty by a jury he 'might have a harsher sentence'--that if found guilty by a jury it would 'go harder' on him because he had a prior conviction. Appellant testified that he pleaded guilty voluntarily, 'under advisement' by his counsel, who advised him to plead guilty; that he accepted the advice and had no complaint about the services rendered by his attorney. At the 27.26 hearing the attorney testified that he and Robinson discussed the facts several times; that Robinson told him a story so improbable that he could not believe it (to the effect that Robinson was walking towards Taylor and Easton Avenues, generally east of the place where the shooting took place; that a man he saw running threw a package into a hedge along the sidewalk; that the man crossed the street and disappeared; that accused retrieved the package because he 'did not want the children to get it and be hurt by a gun that might be in it,' and that the police came by and found him carrying this gun). The attorney...
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