Robinson v. State, 48436

• Decision Date: 05 May 1975
• Docket Number: No. 48436,48436
• Citation: Robinson v. State, 312 So.2d 15 (Miss. 1975)
• Parties: Melvin Lamar ROBINSON v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 15

312 So.2d 15

Melvin Lamar ROBINSON v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 48436.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 5, 1975.

H. W. 'Sonny' Jones, Jr., Meridian, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Vera Madel Speakes, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Before RODGERS, INZER and WALKER, JJ.

INZER, Justice:

Appellant Melvin Lamar Robinson was indicted, tried and convicted in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County for the crime of burglary. He was sentenced to serve a term of four and one-half years in the State Penitentiary. From this conviction and sentence he appeals. We affirm.

At about 1 A.M. on April 16, 1974, the police of the City of Meridian discovered that Mooney Furniture Exchange had been burglarized. Mr. Mooney, the owner, was called to the scene. He testified at the trial that when he closed the store on the preceding afternoon it and the safe in the store were locked. When called by the policie, he went immediately to the store and found the back door had been pried open and numerous articles had been taken from his store. The safe had been peeled and broken open and some articles taken therefrom. He later identified some of the items taken from his store at the police station. The Police Department of the City of Meridian had information that appellant had escaped from the State Penitentiary, was in the area, and was driving a white Chevelle automobile. They also had information that caused them to suspect that appellant had been involved in several burglaries that had been committed in the city, including the Mooney burglary. On the afternoon of April 17, when city patrolman Thomas came on duty, he was advised by his superior of these facts and told to be on the lookout for Robinson and the automobile. An automobile answering the description came out of a aparking lot at a fast rate of speed. He stopped the car and found that it was being driven by a brother of the appellant. When questioned, the brother told Thomas that appellant was at the Blanks Motel. Thomas and Officers Milburn, Hattaway and Griffin proceeded to the motel where they located appellant in Room 6. They knocked on the door and it was opened by another brother of the appellant. They entered the room and found appellant, whom they arrested as an escaped convict. He was immediately handcuffed. The officers made a partial search of the room and observed some watches on the dresser. Appellant was then carried to the police station by two of the officers. The other officers continued the search of the room. They found numerous items of jewelry hidden in a mattress. A search was made of the attic of the room and there they found some money and a crow bar, which was later identified by Mooney as having been taken from his store.

Later that night, appellant, after having been warned of his Miranda rights, confessed to breaking into the Mooney Furniture Exchange. His statement was reduced to writing and he signed it.

Prior to trial appellant filed a motion to suppress the confession and the evidence obtained as a result of the search. It was alleged that the confession was not freely and voluntarily made and that the evidence was the result of an illegal arrest and an illegal search. The court after conducting a full-blown hearing on the motion, found that the motion was freely and voluntarily given and that the arrest and search were valid.

On appeal the appellant urges that the arrest without a warrant was illegal, that the search of his room without a warrant was likewise illegal, and that his confession was not freely and voluntarily given.

There can be no question as to the validity of the arrest. The appellant was an escaped convict and as such, the officers had not only the right, but the duty, to arrest him at any time without a warrant.

Insofar as the confession is concerned, the evidence on behalf of the state established that appellant made the confession after being fully advised of his Miranda rights and after having signed the waiver of those rights. All the officers who were present at the time the statement was made testified that no threats, promises or hope of reward were made. Appellant testified that on the day in question he had been taking a nerve depressant called qualudes and he did not remember signing the waiver of his rights or signing the statement. However, appellant said he did remember that the officers told him that if he confessed, his brothers would be released. Four prisoners who saw the appellant in the jail that night testified. They described his condition as 'looking like he had been on a bad trip,' 'shaking,' 'pretty well drunk,' and 'acting strange.' The officers who saw appellant that night testified that although appellant appeared to be nervous, jittery, and a little agitated, he was coherent and appeared to understand what he was doing. We find no merit in appellant's contention that his confession should have been excluded because he was under the influence of drugs at the time he confessed. The test is as stated in State v. Williams, 208 So.2d 172 (Miss.1968).

The fact that the accused is under the influence of liquor or drugs, which affect his recollection, does not make his confession inadmissible. The intoxicated condition of the accused at the time of making a confession does not, unless such intoxication goes to the extent of mania, affect the admissibility in evidence of such confession if it was otherwise a voluntary one, although the fact of intoxication may affect its weight and credibility with the jury. (208 So.2d at 175).

The trial court was justified in finding from the evidence that the confession was freely and voluntarily given and was admissible in evidence.

Appellant next urges that even though his arrest was legal, the search of his motel room without a warrant went beyond the scope of a limited search incident to arrest and the trial court was in error in failing to suppress the evidence obtained by the search. Appellant cites and relies upon the following statement by the Supreme...