Robinson v. Strauther

• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: REED, J.
• Citation: Robinson v. Strauther, 106 Miss. 754, 64 So. 724 (Miss. 1914)
• Decision Date: 30 March 1914
• Docket Number: 16446
• Parties: MARIA ROBINSON v. SARAH J. STRAUTHER

64 So. 724

106 Miss. 754

MARIA ROBINSON v. SARAH J. STRAUTHER

No. 16446

Supreme Court of Mississippi

March 30, 1914

APPEAL from the chancery court of Washington county, HON. E. N THOMAS, Chancellor.

Suit by Maria Robinson against Sarah J. Strauther. From a decree sustaining a demurrer to the bill, complainant appeals.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Reversed and remanded.

Walton Shields, for appellant.

The chancery court in which an estate is being administered has jurisdiction to hear and determine all demands against it of every kind by creditors under section 554 of Miss. Code of 1906. The original and amended bill states that the complainant (appellant) has a claim against the estate of which the defendant (appellee here) is administratrix because of the allegations; that the decedent in his lifetime borrowed from complainant (appellee here) certain sums of money and acting as her agent collected for her certain sums of money which he agreed to invest for complainant's benefit and for which he agreed to account to her.

It is also alleged that the decedent invested these moneys for complainant's benefit in lands and personal property, the title to which he took in his own name and that the defendant (appellee here) inherited this property from him, but that because of the facts stated in said bill, in equity said property belongs to complainant, or complainant has a right in equity to fasten a lien thereon for the reasons stated and for this reason the widow, the owner of the property by inheritance, is made a party to the bill. The same can be said of the allegations with reference to the investments by the decedent of the profits in the business (which belonged to complainant) in the property, the title to which he took in his own name.

Whether the statute of limitations of ten years, as provided in section 3125 of Miss. Code of 1906, in cases of express trusts, or the statute of three years, applies in this case (and we contend that the statute of ten years applies) clearly a great portion of the claim set out in the bill is still not covered by the bar of the statute of limitation.

The bill clearly shows that the moneys advanced to decedent were not a gift but were advanced with the express agreement that the said decedent was to account to complainant therefor.

It is immaterial whether the demand is legal or equitable so far as the demurrer is concerned. The bill, however, shows a plain case of equitable demand to which the ten-year statute should apply. See Patton v. Pinkston, 86 Miss. 651.

We respectfully submit that the demurrers to both the original and amended bills should have been overruled and the defendants (appellees) should have been required to answer.

Watson & Jayne, for appellee.

Where a son purchases land with money furnished by his mother and takes title in his own name, the money will be presumed to be a gift or advancement, and hence a resulting trust in favor of the mother, and against the person purchasing the land from the son with knowledge of the facts, can only be established by clear and satisfactory evidence.

Plaintiff gave her son money with which to buy a lot and the latter took a conveyance in his own name, although the vendor knew the money was furnished by the mother; but the deed was not recorded and was afterwards returned to the vendor, who repaid the purchase money to the son. Plaintiff testified that her son promised to help her improve the lot if she purchased it, but requested it to be conveyed to him so that it would become his property, and that she consented thereto, but told him it would not belong to him unless he helped to improve it. Held not sufficient evidence to establish a resulting trust in the lot in favor of plaintiff. 60 N.E. 56.

"Where a son purchases a farm, and takes title in his own name, with funds furnished to him by his mother for that purpose, without any agreement or understanding as to how the title was to be taken, or as to any interest of the mother in the land, and when the mother, with full knowledge of the facts, speaks of and treats the farm for many years as belonging to her son, and makes no complaint to him, or to others regarding the title, but acquiesced in what had been done, after the death of the son, it will be presumed that the deed conformed to the intentions of the parent and a resulting trust in favor of the mother will not be inferred." 64 P. 599.

We submit that the above authorities, in addition to warranting the decision of the court on that ground of the demurrer which alleged that any money advanced was as a gift or advancement, also sustains clearly the position that there can be no resulting trust in this property. The only trust that could be established, of course, would be a resulting trust as there is no claim whatever of an express trust. In support of the position that there would be no resulting trust, we refer the court to the following authorities: "To establish a resulting trust where one employs the money of another in the purchase of real estate, and where there is no valid agreement to purchase the property with the trust money, it is necessary that the money at the time of the purchase, was the fund of the party claiming it, and that it was used in the purchase of the property."

"Where the money was loaned by the wife to her husband to be paid, principal and interest, or invested in real estate for the use of the wife, and the husband subsequently promised verbally to purchase real estate to the amount of money received by him, and take the title in the name of the wife. Afterwards the husband purchased certain lands, which he was able to make alone through the money received from his wife, and took the title in his own name. Held: That these allegations were not sufficient to establish a resulting trust in favor of the wife, or her heirs in the lands purchased, and that the special promise did not create an express trust, because not in writing." 40 Miss. 788.

Resulting trust purchased with another's money: If a son, to whom his mother has intrusted money to complete the purchase of a tract of land for her, takes the title in his own name and then exchanges it for other lands with her consent, he holds the newly-acquired lands as trustee for her benefit. 57 Miss. 471.

In this case it will be observed that the conditions requisite for the purchase money trust were complied with, the loan being definite and certain and the agreement that the title should be taken in the name of the mother. In the case at bar none of these conditions appear.

Trust delivery of notes to third party for benefit of others. To create a trust in personal property, of the nature of a promissory note, it is essential that the property be delivered to the trustee with the purpose and intent of passing the legal estate to him, and vesting him with absolute control over the property, even as against the person creating the trust, subject only to the declared purpose of the trust, and if such person reserved to himself or herself the power to control the property and only vests in the trustee a possession without any intention of vesting the property in him, but simply for the purposes of constituting him an agent to do certain acts, no trust will be created. 22 N.W. 217.

This case, of course, covers only the personal property involved in this controversy. As to the bar of trust by the statute we refer the court to the authorities quoted in George's Digest, page 481, sections 43, 44 and 45. There is no allegation of fraud in the instant case.

REED, J. SMITH, C. J., expressed no opinion.

OPINION

REED, J.

Appellant, the mother of John W. Strauther, filed her bill in equity against appellee, his widow, and the administratrix of his estate, to recover property and money which appellant claims to be entitled to by reason of having intrusted to her son certain money and property for his management and investment for her benefit. Demurrers were filed to the original and to the amended bills, and sustained. We state the case as it is contained in the amended bill.

John W. Strauther died in October, 1910, intestate and childless, leaving his widow, the appellee, as his sole heir at law. She qualified as the administratrix of his estate. Appellant in due time probated her claim for the amount owing her by Strauther, five thousand five hundred and eighty-seven dollars, against his estate. She alleged that about the 1st of July, 1899, at the request of her son, she turned over to him certain personal property and money aggregating three hundred and sixty-five dollars upon the agreement that he was to use the same in his undertaking business in the city of Greenville and account to her therefor whenever she demanded, and pay to her when she required him to do so one-half of the profits arising out of the business. He succeeded in business, and large profits were derived therefrom, which were assets of his estate at the time of his death.

Appellant in her bill, alleged that she owned certain houses in the city of Greenville, the rents from which were collected by her son, as her agent, upon the agreement that he would invest the same for her benefit, and that he would manage and control the investments from the rents, and account to her whenever demand was made by her. The exact amount of the rent of each of the houses is stated, the total of which amounted to five thousand three hundred and two...