Robinson v. Sweeney

• Decision Date: 29 March 2022
• Docket Number: 19-cv-0356-bhl
• Parties: QUELLE ROBINSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ERIC SWEENEY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

QUELLE ROBINSON, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
ERIC SWEENEY, et al., Defendants.

No. 19-cv-0356-bhl

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin

March 29, 2022

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BRETT H. LUDWIG, United States District Judge

On April 8, 2018, during a routine traffic stop, Milwaukee police officers arrested Jalen Copeland when he defied their orders to exit the passenger seat of the Chevy Malibu in which he was riding. This case is about what happened to the Malibu's other occupants. In the aftermath of his arrest, officers seized Jalen's girlfriend and her two sisters, searched their vehicle, and subjected them to pat downs. Forty-five minutes after the initial stop, having uncovered nothing more sinister than a wooden broom handle, officers finally allowed the sisters to go on their way. The three women later filed this suit, alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights. The defendant officers have moved for summary judgment, insisting their conduct complied with the Fourth Amendment and, if it didn't, they are entitled to qualified immunity. While the officers' conduct was not entirely without problems, the record reveals no triable issues of material fact, and their motion will be granted.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND^[1]

On April 8, 2018, at approximately 9:43 p.m., City of Milwaukee Police Officers Eric Sweeney, Rolando Franco, and Matthew Van Drisse pulled over a silver Chevrolet Malibu traveling through downtown Milwaukee without its headlights on. (ECF No. 27 at 2; ECF No. 30 at 2.) The car contained four occupants: driver Adea Dunn, Jalen Copeland, Quelle Robinson, and

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minor P.I. (ECF No. 30 at 1-2.) Copeland was Dunn's then-boyfriend and seated in the front passenger seat. (Id.) Robinson is Dunn's older sister and was seated in the driver's side backseat. (Id.) P.I. is Dunn's younger sister and was seated in the passenger's side backseat. (Id. at 2.) Neither Adea nor Jalen were wearing seatbelts. (ECF No. 27 at 4.)

Officer Sweeney approached the driver's side window and asked Adea for identification, which she provided. (Id.) Officer Franco, at the passenger side window, asked Jalen to produce identification as well because he was not wearing a seatbelt. (Id. at 5.) Jalen stated that he had no identification on him, so Officer Franco asked him to exit the vehicle. (Id. at 5-6.) Jalen refused. (Id. at 6.) After asking an additional six times, Officer Franco decided to remove Jalen from the vehicle himself. (Id. at 6-7.) A struggle ensued, and both Officer Franco and Jalen went to the ground. (Id. at 7.) Together with Officers Sweeney and Van Drisse, Officer Franco handcuffed Jalen and seated him on the curb. (Id. at 8.)

Once Jalen had been subdued, Officer Sweeney searched the front passenger seat area of Adea's car. (ECF No. 30 at 3.) Both Adea and Quelle challenged Officer Sweeney's authority to conduct this search. (ECF No. 27 at 11.) Officer Sweeney's search uncovered a wooden broom handle, about one inch thick and 18 inches long. (Id.) Adea testified that her mother put the broom handle in her car for her to use as protection while entering and exiting the vehicle. (Id. at 12.) Officer Sweeney did not think it likely that Jalen's resistance was related to something as innocuous as a broom handle, so he continued his search, assisted by Officer Franco. (Id.) Officer Franco claimed that he was concerned that Jalen had passed a weapon off to either Adea or Quelle. (Id. at 13.) For this reason, the officers summoned Officer Karlee Cabral, a female, to conduct a pat down search of Adea and Quelle. (Id. at 14.) Officer Cabral arrived at approximately 9:52 pm. (Id.) She then performed the requested pat downs of Adea and Quelle, which revealed no weapons. (Id. at 16.)

In total, the search and pat down took about 13 minutes to complete. (ECF No. 20, Exhibit SL-4 at 13:30.) The officers held onto Adea's driver's license much longer than this, however. (ECF No. 30 at 6.) Because Officer Franco used force to arrest Jalen, his supervisor, Sergeant Raymond Brock was dispatched to conduct a mandatory use-of-force investigation. (ECF No. 27 at 17.) Sergeant Brock spoke with the officers, Jalen, and finally Plaintiffs. (Id.) After they spoke with Sergeant Brock, and approximately 30 minutes after the search and pat downs were

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completed, Adea's license was returned, and Plaintiffs were permitted to leave. (Id. at 17; ECF No. 30 at 7.) None of the plaintiffs received a citation. (ECF No. 30 at 7.)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

“Summary judgment is appropriate where the admissible evidence reveals no genuine issue of any material fact.” Sweatt v. Union Pac. R. Co., 796 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). Material facts are those under the applicable substantive law that “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of “material fact is ‘genuine' . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. If the parties assert different views of the facts, the Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2000). But “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs allege defendants violated the Fourth Amendment in six ways: (I) the officers arrested Plaintiffs without probable cause; (II) Officer Sweeney violated the Fourth Amendment by threatening violence against Adea for objecting to an unlawful search; (III) Officer Franco violated Section 1983 when he improperly requested that Officer Cabral conduct pat downs of Adea and Quelle (IV); Officers Sweeney and Franco violated the Fourth Amendment by performing a warrantless search of Adea's car; (V) Officer Cabral's execution of the pat downs violated the Fourth Amendment; and (VI) Officer Van Drisse violated Section 1983 by failing to intervene and stop the alleged misconduct of the other three officers.^[2] In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue that their actions were consistent with the Constitution, and, in any case, they are protected by qualified immunity. Because the undisputed facts confirm there were no constitutional violations concerning claims II-V, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on those claims. And because qualified immunity applies to the two remaining claims (I and VI), summary judgment will be granted on those contentions as well.

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I. Defendants Are Entitled to Summary Judgment on Claims II-V.

A. Plaintiffs Have Abandoned their Claim Against Officer Sweeney for Threatening Violence.

In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Officer Sweeney violated the Fourth Amendment by threatening violence against A.D. for objecting to the unlawful searches of the car. (ECF No. 1 at ¶23.) The record shows that during Officer Sweeney's first search of the passenger compartment, Quelle reached forward and attempted to pull Jalen's jacket off of the passenger seat. (ECF No. 27 at 9.) Officer Sweeney told Quelle to “sit down” unless she wanted “to be next.” (Id. at 9-10.)^[3] In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants argued that Officer Sweeney's statements could not possibly constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. (ECF No. 14 at 27-29.) Plaintiffs' response does not address this issue.

Because Plaintiffs do not take issue with Defendant's summary judgment arguments, they have waived their claim, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. See De v. City of Chicago, 912 F.Supp.2d 709, 734 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“Failure to set forth any evidence or to develop any arguments in opposition to the moving party's summary judgment motion results in waiver of the nonmoving party's arguments and an abandonment of his claims.” (citing Palmer v. Marion Cnty., 327 F.3d 588, 597-98 (7th Cir. 2003); Laborers' Int'l Union v. Caruso, 197 F.3d 1195, 1197 (7th Cir. 2003); Donelson v. City of Chi., 272 F.Supp.2d 717, 726 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Oak Brook Hotel Co. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am., 846 F.Supp. 634, 641 (N.D. Ill. 1994))).

B. There is No. Dispute that Officer Franco Lawfully Ordered Officer Cabral to Conduct a Pat-Down Search.

Plaintiffs next seek to hold Officer Franco liable for effecting Officer Cabral's allegedly unconstitutional pat downs. (ECF No. 1 at ¶27.) Section 1983 imposes liability on anyone who causes a constitutional deprivation while acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiffs argue that Officer Franco's decision to call in Officer Cabral to execute Terry frisks “set in motion a series of events that [he] knew or should reasonably have known would cause others to deprive the plaintiff[s] of [their] constitutional rights.” Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 396-97 (7th Cir. 1988). Based on this theory, they insist, Officer Franco is liable for the deprivation under Section 1983.

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The Supreme Court has held that “where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, ” he may, for his safety and that of others, conduct a limited frisk. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). But “[a]lthough the confrontation between a police officer and a citizen stopped for a traffic violation can be fraught with danger, this fact alone does not justify a pat-down, and the caselaw does not support the view that ‘an officer may frisk the occupants of any car stopped for a traffic violation.'” United States v. Brown, 188 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal citations...