Robinson v. The Missouri Pacific Railway Company

• Decision Date: 06 June 1903
• Docket Number: 13,193
• Citation: 72 P. 854,67 Kan. 278
• Parties: JAMES ROBINSON et al. v. THE MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

72 P. 854

67 Kan. 278

JAMES ROBINSON et al. v. THE MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY

No. 13,193

Supreme Court of Kansas

June 6, 1903

Decided January, 1903.

Error from Shawnee district court; Z. T. HAZEN, judge.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

JUSTICE'S COURT--Jurisdiction of Railway Company. A railway company that maintains only a station for the accommodation of local business in a city where a city court has been created does not reside in such city within the meaning of that provision of section 5228, General Statutes of 1901 which provides that in any county in which a city court has been or shall be created, justices of the peace outside of the city wherein such court is located shall not have jurisdiction of cases in which any defendant resides in such city."

Adrian F. Sherman, for plaintiffs in error.

Waggener, Doster & Orr, for defendant in error.

GREENE J. All the Justices concurring.

OPINION

GREENE, J.:

This is a proceeding to reverse a judgment of the district court of Shawnee county granting a temporary injunction restraining the plaintiffs in error from enforcing the collection of a judgment obtained by them against the defendant in error by the consideration of L. G. Disney, a justice of the peace of Topeka township, Shawnee county. The defendant was a railway corporation, and it appears from the record that its principal office in Kansas was in Wyandotte county. It had a line of road running through Shawnee county, and had stations and station agents in Topeka, Tevis, and Berryton, in said county. The justice of the peace before whom the action was brought and who rendered judgment resided outside the city of Topeka. The summons was served on the defendant's agent in the city of Topeka. The defendant did not appear at the trial. It is claimed that the defendant was a resident of the city of Topeka when the summons was served, and that inasmuch as said city had a city court, it could not be sued in Shawnee county outside the city of Topeka; that judgment rendered against it by a justice of the peace in Shawnee county outside the city of Topeka on service made within the city of Topeka was without jurisdiction.

A determination of the question depends on the construction of section 5228, General Statutes of 1901, and its application to defendant. This section reads:

"The jurisdiction of justices of the peace in civil actions shall be coextensive with the county wherein they may have been elected, and wherein they shall reside; provided, that in any county in which a city court has been or shall be created, justices of the peace outside of the city wherein such court is located shall not have jurisdiction of cases in which any defendant resides in such city."

Did the defendant reside in the city of Topeka within the meaning of that section? The residence contemplated by the statutes is synonymous with domicile, and means that place where the habitation is fixed and permanent. If applicable to railroad companies at all, it could only apply to the home office where its general corporate business is conducted, not to its several stations maintained for the transaction of local business. Under the provisions of the section quoted, jurisdiction of justices of the peace is coextensive with the county wherein they may have been elected and wherein they may reside. Section 4501, General Statutes of 1901, providing for service of summons on railroad or stage companies or corporations, reads:

"Such process may be served on any local superintendent of repairs, freight agent, agent to sell tickets or station-keeper of such company or corporation in such county."

It appears from this section that the legislature intended to confer upon a justice of the peace jurisdiction to issue original process to any part of the county in actions against such companies or corporations, and if the process should be served on any of the persons so designated within the county such court would then acquire jurisdiction of such company or corporation. This is special, and is controlling of the manner in which jurisdiction may be obtained of these corporations. As expressed by Chief Justice Kingman in M. K. & T. Railway Co. v. Crowe, 9 Kan. 496, 500: "This statute makes a material change in the laws as to service of process on corporations, and so far as it makes such change supersedes the provisions of the General Statutes."

It was conceded on the argument that if the original process had been served on the defendant's agent at either of its other stations in Shawnee county, such service would have given the justice of the peace jurisdiction. If that be true then the defendant was not within the provisions of the statute. The statute is a limitation upon the power of justices of the peace outside the corporate limits of a city possessing a city court to acquire jurisdiction of a resident of such city by any sort of process or service. It is as impossible for a corporation to have two or more residences at the same time in the same state as it is for an individual. The defendant in error may have a residence in Kansas within the meaning of this section, but it can have but one; and if it can have such residence it must be in the city where its general offices are located and its corporate business conducted. It is not contended in this case that such general office was maintained in the city of Topeka. The theory advanced by the defendant in error would give it as many residences in Kansas as there are cities possessing city courts through which...