Robinson v. Trustees of New York

Decision Date05 April 1945
Citation318 Mass. 121,60 N.E.2d 593
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
PartiesROBINSON et al. v. TRUSTEES OF NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. CO.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Good, Judge.

Action of contract or tort by Horace P. Robinson and another, trustees, against the trustees of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, to recover damages for breakage and freezing alleged to have been sustained by shipment of string beans from Florida to Boston. The case was referred to an auditor and was then heard upon the reports of the auditor and other evidence before a judge who made a finding for plaintiffs. On defendant's exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

Before FIELD, C. J., and LUMMUS, QUA, and RONAN, JJ.

C. W. O'Brien, of Boston, for plaintiffs.

A. W. Blackman, of Boston, for defendant.

RONAN, Justice.

This is an action of contract or tort to recover damages for breakage and freezing alleged to have been sustained by thirteen carload shipments of string beans from Pompano, Florida, to Boston, in this Commonwealth,in January, February and March, 1934. The defendants are the trustees appointed by the District Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut upon a petition filed by the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company on October 23, 1935, under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended by Act of August 27, 1935, c. 774, see U.S.C. (1934 Ed.) Sup. IV, Title 11, § 205, 11 U.S.C.A. § 205. Two of the present trustees were appointed on November 26, 1935. One of the three original trustees having ceased to act as such, a new trustee was appointed in April, 1937. The initial carrier issued a uniform straight bill of lading for each shipment in which the Hammon Development Company was named as shipper. The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, hereinafter called the railroad, was the terminal carrier. Each bill of lading provided that the filing of a claim for loss, damage or delay within nine months after delivery was a condition precedent to recovery, and that suits should be instituted only within two years and one day from the day when notice in writing was given by the carrier that it had disallowed the whole or any part of the claim. These bills of lading were issued in accordance with the Interstate Commerce Act, U.S.C. (1934 ed.) Title 49, § 20(11), 49 U.S.C.A. § 20(11). This subsection in part provides that ‘any common carrier * * * delivering said property so received and transported shall be liable to the lawful holder of said receipt or bill of lading or to any party entitled to recover thereon * * * for the full actual loss, damage, or injury to such property.’ The case was referred to an auditor and was then heard upon the reports of the auditor and other evidence before a judge, who made a finding for the plaintiff. The case is here upon the defendants' two bills of exceptions.

We consider the first bill of exceptions.

The plaintiff was described in the writ as the ‘Hammon Development Company, a corporation duly organized and existing according to law and having an usual place of business in Pompano, Florida.’ It having appeared at the hearings upon the first reference to the auditor that there was no such corporation as that mentioned in the writ, the plaintiff, on June 6, 1941, was allowed to amend by striking out the words quoted and substituting therefor the words Horace P. Robinson and Wallace A. Robinson, Trustees doing business under the name and style of Hammon Development Company.’ The exception to the allowance of this amendment is the subject matter of the first bill of exceptions. Upon a second reference to the auditor, he found that the Hammon Development Company was a trade name used by the plaintiffs Horace P. Robinson and Wallace A. Robinson, as trustees, in operating farmlands at Pompano, Florida, and in raising and shipping beans.

Our own statute, G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 51, authorizing the allowance of amendments, has been liberally construed, and the substitution of a new party plaintiff or a change in the capacity in which the original plaintiff brought the action has been frequently allowed. Lewis v. Austin, 144 Mass. 383, 384, 11 N.E. 538;Drew v. Farnsworth, 186 Mass. 365, 71 N.E. 783;Upson v. Boston & Maine R.R., 211 Mass. 446, 98 N.E. 32;Phipps v. Little, 213 Mass. 414, 100 N.E. 615;Strout v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 215 Mass. 116, 119, 102 N.E. 312; Richardson v. Bartlett, 223 Mass. 450, 111 N.E. 965;Attorney General v. Henry, 262 Mass. 127, 159 N.E. 539;Henri Peladeau, Lte., v. Fred Gillespie Lumber Co., 285 Mass. 10, 188 N.E. 380;Boudreau v. New England Transportation Co., 315 Mass. 423, 53 N.E.2d 92. There cannot, however, be any amendment to a proceeding that never had any vitality, as where an action is commenced in the name of a dead person or against one who has deceased. Brooks v. Boston & Northern Street R., 211 Mass. 277, 97 N.E. 760;Bateman v. Wood, 297 Mass. 483, 9 N.E.2d 375;Chandler v. Dunlop, 311 Mass. 1,39 N.E. 969. Although there was no corporation as described in the writ, the proceeding was not on that ground a nullity for the two plaintiffs from the beginning owned the claims that they were attempting to enforce under their trade name which, in the absence of fraud, they had the right to assume in transacting their business. William Gilligan Co. v. Casey, 205 Mass. 26, 91 N.E. 124;Liddell v. Middlesex Motor Co., 275 Mass. 346, 175 N.E. 737;American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Condon, 280 Mass. 517, 183 N.E. 106;Staples Coal Co. v. City Fuel Co., 316 Mass. 503, 55 N.E.2d 934; and the amendment in the instant case did no more than furnish a more accurate description of those who always had owned the cause of action since it came into existence. Lewis v. Austin, 144 Mass. 383, 11 N.E. 538;Drew v. Farnsworth, 186 Mass. 365, 71 N.E. 783;Boudreau v. New England Transportation Co., 315 Mass. 423, 53 N.E.2d 92.

The power of the Superior Court to allow the amendment cannot be determined solely by our own statute, G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 51, nor by our rules of practice, where, as here, we are dealing with the rights of parties created by bills of lading issued in interstate shipments in accordance with an act of Congress. The construction of such bills of lading and determination of the rights of the parties thereunder are Federal questions whose final decision rests with the Supreme Court of the United States. Aradalou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R., 225 Mass. 235, 114 N.E. 297;Metz Co. v. Boston & Maine R.R., 227 Mass. 307, 116 N.E. 475;Fiske Rubber Co. v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 240 Mass. 40, 132, N.E. 714;Lyon v. Canadian Pacific R., 264 Mass. 596, 163 N.E. 180, 60 A.L.R. 1247;Georgia, Florida & Alabama R. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190, 36 S.Ct. 541, 60 L.Ed. 948; Chesapeake & Ohio R. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 51 S.Ct. 453, 75 L.Ed. 983. Substantive rights created by an act of Congress cannot be destroyed by some procedural step in accordance with the practice adopted in a State court. Central Vermont R. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 35 S.Ct. 865, 59 L.Ed. 1433, Ann.Cas.1916B, 252;New Orleans & Northeastern R. v. Harris, 247 U.S. 367, 38 S.Ct. 535, 62 L.Ed. 1167. If the effect of the amendment under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States was to substitute a new and independent cause of action long after the time for bringing action as prescribed in the bills of lading had expired, then there was error in allowing the amendment. Renaldi v. New York Central R., 256 Mass. 337, 152 N.E. 373;Hughes v. Gaston, 281 Mass. 292, 183 N.E. 752;Union Pacific R. v. Wyler, 158 U.S. 285, 15 S.Ct. 877, 39 L.Ed. 983;Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Renn, 241 U.S. 290, 36 S.Ct. 567, 60 L.Ed. 1006;Davis v. L. L. Cohen & Co., Inc., 268 U.S. 638, 45 S.Ct. 633, 69 L.Ed. 1129;Mellon v. Weiss, 270 U.S. 565, 46 S.Ct. 378, 70 L.Ed. 736;Mellon v. Arkansas Land & Lumber Co., 275 U.S. 460, 48 S.Ct. 150, 72 L.Ed. 372. The present amendment, it seems to us, went no farther than to substitute the legal names of the plaintiffs for their trade name. All the facts alleged as constituting the cause of action remained the same. The real parties in interest continued to prosecute the action. It was said by Holmes, J., in New York Central & Hudson River R.R. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 346, 43 S.Ct. 122, 123, 67 L.Ed. 294, where a complaint in such form as to permit a recovery under either a State statute or the Federal Employers' Liability Act was amended by alleging that the parties were engaged in interstate commerce, that ‘when a defendant has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff sets up and is trying to enforce a claim against it because of specified conduct, the reasons for the statute of limitations do not exist, and we are of opinion that a liberal rule should be applied.’ In Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. v. Wulf, 226 U.S. 570, 33 S.Ct. 135, 57 L.Ed. 355, a mother who had brought suit in her own name under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq., for the death of her son was allowed after the statute of limitations had run to substitute herself as administratrix of his estate, that being the only capacity in which she could maintain the action. She was the sole heir and, like the plaintiffs in the present case, was the only party plaintiff in interest. The amendment in the case cited was held not to introduce a new cause of action and was said, at page 576 of 226 U.S., at page 137 of 33 S.Ct.,57 L.Ed. 355, to effect a change ‘in form rather than in substance.’ We think the amendment in the case at bar was not contrary to these Federal decisions and that there was no error in allowing it. See Bixler v. Pennsylvania R., D.C., 201 F. 553;Wilson v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Co., 68 Colo. 105, 187 P. 1027;Lanis v. Illinois Central R., 140 La. 1, 72 So. 788, affirmed sub nomine Illinois Central R. v. Lanis, 246 U.S. 652, 38 S.Ct. 334, 62...

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3 cases
  • Robinson v. Trustees of New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.
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    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
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  • Manganaro Drywall, Inc. v. Penn-Simon Const. Co.
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    ...it cannot ask us to review the case on the basis of facts not placed before the trial court. Robinson v. Trustees of New York, N.H. & H.R.R. Co., 318 Mass. 121, 134, 60 N.E.2d 593, and cases cited. Helgesson v. Helgesson, 295 F.2d 37 (1st Cir.). Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Hazeltine Re......
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    ...Greene v. Greene, 2 Gray 361, 366 (1854). Davis v. Leary, 177 Mass. 526, 529, 59 N.E. 191 (1901). Robinson v. Trustees of the N.Y., N.H. & H.R.R., 318 Mass. 121, 134, 60 N.E.2d 593 (1945), and cases cited. Contrast Old Colony Trust Co. v. Porter, 324 Mass. 581, 585--589, 88 N.E.2d 135 Decre......

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