Robinson v. Trustees of New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 April 1945
• Citation: 318 Mass. 121,60 N.E.2d 593
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: HORACE P. ROBINSON & another, trustees, v. TRUSTEES OF THE NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN AND HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY.

318 Mass. 121

60 N.E.2d 593

HORACE P. ROBINSON & another, trustees, v. TRUSTEES OF THE NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN AND HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

April 5, 1945

October 2, 3, 1944.

Present: FIELD, C.

J., LUMMUS, QUA & RONAN, JJ.

Practice, Civil Amendment; Parties; Exceptions: what is subject to exception. Carrier, Of goods. Jurisdiction, Federal question Reorganization proceeding, Receiver. Contract, Limitation of time for suit. Bankruptcy, Reorganization. Receiver.

In an action, begun in the name of a nonexistent corporation for damage caused by a railroad corporation to goods in an interstate shipment under a bill of lading issued in accordance with the interstate commerce act, the court had power, where the claim relied on remained the same, to allow an amendment to the writ substituting for the corporate name the names of individuals doing business under that corporate name as a trade name, although the amendment was not allowed until long after the expiration of a time limited in the bill of lading for the commencement of the action.

In an action for damage to goods shipped interstate by railroad under a bill of lading providing that such an action must be brought within two years and a day after disallowance by the railroad corporation of the claim for the damage, correspondence between representatives of the corporation and the plaintiff warranted a finding that the claim was not finally and definitely disallowed by the corporation until a date less than two years and a day before the action was begun and that therefore the action was not barred.

A cause of action for damage to goods in interstate shipment by railroad was complete upon the filing of a claim therefor in accordance with the requirement of a bill of lading issued under the interstate commerce act; a disallowance of the claim by the carrier under a further provision in the bill of lading, that an action to enforce it must be brought within two years and a day after its disallowance, was not a condition precedent to the right to sue.

Failure to obtain permission of the reorganization court to sue did not deprive a State court of jurisdiction of an action at law, for damage to goods while being transported by a railroad corporation in interstate commerce, brought against trustees of the railroad corporation appointed in reorganization proceedings begun under U.S.C. (1934 ed.) Sup. IV,

Title 11, Section 205, after the cause of action arose, where it appeared that the action was for the purpose of ascertaining and fixing the amount of the claim by prosecuting the action to a judgment which would be presented to the reorganization court to be dealt with as that court might deem appropriate, that the trustees voluntarily appeared and defended the action, that the plaintiff did not seek to establish any right or interest in any property of the railroad corporation, and that such an action had not been enjoined by the reorganization court.

The question, whether the evidence at the hearing of an action without a jury warranted a general finding made by the judge on oral testimony, cannot be raised by an exception to the finding.

CONTRACT. Writ in the Superior Court dated May 25, 1937. The allowance of the amendment to the writ, described in the opinion, was by Good, J. The case was heard on the merits by Spalding, J., without a jury.

A. W. Blackman, (R.

B. Atwood with him,) for the defendants.

C. W. O'Brien, for the plaintiffs.

RONAN, J. This is an action of contract or tort to recover damages for breakage and freezing alleged to have been sustained by thirteen carload shipments of string beans from Pompano, Florida, to Boston, in this Commonwealth, in January, February and March 1934. The defendants are the trustees appointed by the District Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut upon a petition filed by the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company on October 23, 1935, under Section 77 of the bankruptcy act, as amended by Act of August 27, 1935, c. 774, see U. S. C. (1934 ed.) Sup. IV, Title 11, Section 205. Two of the present trustees were appointed on November 26, 1935. One of the three original trustees having ceased to act as such, a new trustee was appointed in April, 1937. The initial carrier issued a uniform straight bill of lading for each shipment in which the Hammon Development Company was named as shipper. The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, hereinafter called the railroad, was the terminal carrier. Each bill of lading provided that the filing of a claim for loss, damage or delay within nine months after delivery was a condition precedent to recovery, and that suits should be instituted only within two years and one day from the day when notice in writing was given by the carrier that it had disallowed the whole or any part of the claim. These bills of lading were issued in accordance with the interstate commerce act, U. S. C. (1934 ed.) Title 49, Section 20 (11). This subsection in part provides that "any common carrier . . . delivering said property so received and transported shall be liable to the lawful holder of said receipt or bill of lading or to any party entitled to recover thereon . . . for the full actual loss, damage, or injury to such property." The case was referred to an auditor and was then heard upon the reports of the auditor and other evidence before a judge, who made a finding for the plaintiffs. The case is here upon the defendants' two bills of exceptions.

We consider the first bill of exceptions. In the writ the "plaintiff" was described as the "Hammon Development Company, a corporation duly organized and existing according to law and having an usual place of business in Pompano, Florida." It having appeared at the hearings upon the first reference to the auditor that there was no such corporation as that mentioned in the writ, the plaintiff, on June 6, 1941, was allowed to amend by striking out the words quoted and substituting therefor the words "Horace P. Robinson and Wallace A. Robinson, Trustees doing business under the name and style of Hammon Development Company." The exception to the allowance of this amendment is the subject matter of the first bill of exceptions. Upon a second reference to the auditor, he found that the Hammon Development Company was a trade name used by the plaintiffs Horace P. Robinson and Wallace A. Robinson, as trustees, in operating farmlands at Pompano, Florida, and in raising and shipping beans.

Our own statute, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, Section 51, authorizing the allowance of amendments, has been liberally construed, and the substitution of a new party plaintiff or a change in the capacity in which the original plaintiff brought the action has been frequently allowed. Lewis v. Austin, 144 Mass. 383 , 384. Drew v. Farnsworth, 186 Mass. 365 . Upson v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 211 Mass. 446 . Phipps v. Little, 213 Mass. 414 . Strout v. United Shoe Machinery Co. 215 Mass. 116 , 119. Richardson v. Bartlett, 223 Mass.

450. Attorney General v.

Henry, 262 Mass. 127 . Henri Peladeau, Lte. v. Fred Gillespie Lumber Co. 285 Mass. 10 . Boudreau v. New England Transportation Co. 315 Mass. 423 . There cannot, however, be any amendment to a proceeding that never had any vitality, as where an action is commenced in the name of a dead person or against one who has deceased. Brooks v. Boston & Northern Street Railway, 211 Mass. 277 . Bateman v. Wood, 297 Mass. 483 . Chandler v. Dunlop, 311 Mass. 1 . Although there was no corporation as described in the writ, the proceeding was not on that ground a nullity for the two plaintiffs from the beginning owned the claims that they were attempting to enforce under their trade name which, in the absence of fraud, they had the right to assume in transacting their business, William Gilligan Co. v. Casey, 205 Mass. 26; Liddell v. Middlesex Motor Co. 275 Mass. 346; American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Condon, 280 Mass. 517; Staples Coal Co. v. City Fuel Co. 316 Mass. 503; and the amendment in the instant case did no more than furnish a more accurate description of those who always had owned the cause of action since it came into existence. Lewis v. Austin, 144 Mass. 383. Drew v. Farnsworth, 186 Mass. 365 . Boudreau v. New England Transportation Co. 315 Mass. 423 .

The power of the Superior Court to allow the amendment cannot be determined solely by our own statute, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, Section 51, nor by our rules of practice, where, as here, we are dealing with the rights of parties created by bills of lading issued in interstate shipments in accordance with an act of Congress. The construction of such bills of lading and the determination of the rights of the parties thereunder are Federal questions whose final decision rests with the Supreme Court of the United States. Aradalou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 225 Mass. 235. Metz Co. v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 227 Mass. 307 . Fiske Rubber Co. v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 240 Mass. 40 . Lyon v. Canadian Pacific Railway, 264 Mass. 596 . Georgia, Florida & Alabama Railway v. Blish Milling Co. 241 U.

S. 190.

Chesapeake

& Ohio Railway v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209. Substantive rights created by an act of Congress cannot be destroyed by some procedural step in accordance with the practice adopted in a State court. Central Vermont Railway v. White, 238 U.S. 507. New Orleans & Northeastern Railroad v. Harris, 247 U.S. 367. If the effect of the amendment under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States was to substitute a new and independent cause of action long after the time for bringing action as prescribed in the bills of lading had expired, then there was error in...