Robinson v. UAW LOCAL 1196
| Decision Date | 31 January 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:90-CV-1949.,1:90-CV-1949. |
| Parties | Carol ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. UAW LOCAL 1196, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
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Mark D. McGraw, Cleveland, OH, for plaintiff.
Mark V. Webber, Carl E. Cormany, Bernard S. Goldfarb, Goldfarb & Reznick, Cleveland, OH, for defendant.
Plaintiff Carol Robinson originally brought this "hybrid § 301/fair representation" case against both her ex-employer, Central Brass Manufacturing Company ("Central Brass"), and her union, Local 1196 of the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America ("the Union"). Robinson claimed that she had been discharged improperly from Central Brass for absenteeism, and further claimed that the Union had breached its duty to represent her fairly in the grievance process.
During earlier proceedings in this case, both Central Brass and the Union moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. Judge White granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants.1 Robinson then appealed Judge White's Orders. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Judge White had properly applied the statute of limitations to Robinson's claim against Central Brass, but that the statute of limitations had been tolled as against the Union. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in Central Brass's favor, but reversed Judge White's grant of summary judgment against the Union. See Robinson v. Central Brass Mfg. Co., 987 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir.1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 92, 126 L.Ed.2d 60 (1993).
On remand, the Union has again moved for summary judgment (docket no. 43). This time, the Union proffers three alternative grounds for its argument that Robinson cannot prevail as a matter of law: (1) Robinson failed to exhaust her internal union remedies; (2) the Union did not breach its duty of fair representation; and (3) Central Brass did not breach its labor agreement when it discharged Robinson. Because the Court finds that at least two of these grounds are well-taken, the Union's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Many of the facts of this case are set out in Robinson v. Central Brass Mfg. Co., 987 F.2d 1235, 1237-38 (6th Cir.1993). Additional facts are set out below. These facts must be viewed against the legal backdrop that, although Robinson can now proceed only against the Union, it is still true that "to prevail ... she must show both that the employer discharged her in violation of the collective bargaining agreement and that the Union breached its duty of fair representation during the grievance process." Robinson, 987 F.2d at 1239 (some emphasis added). Thus, Robinson's claim must fail if Central Brass did not violate its labor agreement when it terminated her, or if the Union represented her adequately during the grievance process. The Union attacks both of these prongs in its motion for summary judgment.
Regarding the first prong, the Union notes (and it is not disputed) that Robinson was absent from her job 29% of the time under the "old" attendance policy. Under a "new" attendance policy, made effective February 15, 1989, Robinson was absent 14% of the time. Admitting that this absence rate showed improvement, the Union argues that Robinson's absence rate was still unacceptable under Central Brass's new policy, and thus that Central Brass did not violate its collective bargaining agreement when it discharged her. A referee with the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Board of Review later found that Robinson was discharged for just cause.
Regarding the second prong, the Union notes (and again it is not disputed) that Robinson did not exhaust her internal union appeal remedies: "Robinson did not appeal to the last step, the UAW's Public Review Board." Robinson, 987 F.2d at 1237. The Union argues that this failure to exhaust her internal union appeals precludes Robinson from recovery in this case. Robinson answers that she was not required to exhaust her internal union appeal remedies when, as here, she has alleged that such an appeal would be futile.
The Union also argues, under the second prong, that as a matter of law and undisputed fact, it represented her adequately during the grievance process. Robinson does not deny that: (1) immediately after she was terminated, two representatives of the Union met with her to determine how she wanted to proceed; (2) one or more of the Union representatives conducted an investigation into all of Robinson's absences and made sure she had been informed of, and understood, the "new" attendance policy; and (3) the Union sent six representatives to a Central Brass Management Shop Committee meeting on November 1, 1989, where they argued unsuccessfully for Robinson's reinstatement. Thereafter, the Union Shop Committee members voted not to pursue Robinson's claim further (through arbitration) because they believed her grievance lacked merit and that ultimately she would lose. The Union argues that these actions on behalf of Robinson were not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith, and thus that it did not breach its duty to represent her fairly.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) governs summary judgment motions and provides:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law ...
Rule 56(e) specifies the materials properly submitted in connection with a motion for summary judgment:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein ... The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denial of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.
However, the movant is not required to file affidavits or other similar materials negating a claim on which its opponent bears the burden of proof, so long as the movant relies upon the absence of the essential element in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
While all evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, summary judgment is appropriate whenever that non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). See also Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478.
In this context, moreover, "the trial Court no longer has a duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Street at 1479-80, citing Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1034 (D.C.Cir.1988). The trial court need not seek out factual disputes nor speculate on the possibility that, under some yet unstated scenario, a meaningful factual dispute might somehow arise. The non-moving party is under an affirmative duty to point out specific facts in the record as it has been established which create a genuine issue of material fact. See Fulson v. City of Columbus, 801 F.Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.Ohio 1992). Further, the non-movant must show more than a scintilla of evidence to overcome summary judgment; it is not enough for the non-moving party to show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts. Id.
As noted, there is no dispute regarding whether Robinson exhausted all of her internal union remedies of appeal — she did not. Rather than taking the last step available in her quest to overturn the Union's decision not to arbitrate her discharge (the last step being an appeal to the UAW's Public Review Board), Robinson filed this case. The Union now argues that, as a necessary predicate to recovery on her claim in this case, she must have exhausted all of her internal union appeals.
The law is well-settled that "exhaustion of grievance procedures is mandatory, unless resort to union appeal procedures is demonstrated to be futile." Ryan v. General Motors Corp., 929 F.2d 1105, 1110 (6th Cir.1989) (citing United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987)). The Sixth Circuit "requires a clear and positive showing of futility before excusing a failure to exhaust." Terwilliger v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 882 F.2d 1033, 1039 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 946, 110 S.Ct. 2204, 109 L.Ed.2d 531 (1990) (internal quotations omitted). The factors for determining whether exhaustion would be futile are: (1) hostility on the part of union officials; (2) whether such appeals procedures would be adequate either to "reactivate" the grievance or to award the "full relief" sought; and (3) the delay that would occur if the procedures were followed. Monroe v. International Union, UAW, 723 F.2d 22, 24-25 (6th Cir.1983) (citing Clayton v. International Union, UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 689, 101 S.Ct. 2088, 2095, 68 L.Ed.2d 538 (1981)).
In weighing these factors, the balance falls in favor of requiring exhaustion. Id. If ...
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