Robinson v. Vannoy
| Decision Date | 09 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 3:19-CV-00660 SEC P |
| Parties | TERRESZ L ROBINSON #376930 v. DARREL VANNOY |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Pro se petitioner Terresz L. Robinson, an inmate incarcerated at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 23, 2019. Robinson attacks his February 17, 2014, convictions and the resulting sentence imposed by the Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita, State of Louisiana. This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing orders of the Court. Because none of the claims affected the outcome of Robinson's trial given the results of DNA evidence and the strength and credibility of the testimony of a multitude of witnesses, Robinson is lawfully detained. Thus, his petition for writ of habeas corpus should be denied.
On February 17, 2014, Robinson was convicted of six counts: two counts of aggravated rape, one count of second degree kidnapping, one count of attempted second degree kidnapping, one count of felony theft of an automobile, and one count of carjacking.1 The trial judge sentencedRobinson to the maximum sentence on all counts, resulting in two consecutive life sentences plus a consecutive 20 years. Robinson appealed, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v. Robinson, supra. Robinson then applied for writs with the Louisiana Supreme Court, which were denied on April 15, 2016. State v. Robinson, 2015-0924 (La. 4/15/16) 191 So.3d 1034.
On October 18, 2016, Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief in the Fourth Judicial District Court. (R. pp. 1485-1592). Therein, he argued the following claims relevant to this petition:
On December 13, 2016, the trial court denied some of Robinson's claims because "they were previously ruled upon on direct appeal," denied other claims on their merits, ordered the District Attorney to respond to certain claims, and ordered Robinson to address the remainingclaims. (R. pp. 1593-1594). On March 24, 2017, the trial court dismissed all of Robinson's claims. (R. pp. 1595-1596).
On April 26, 2017, following Robinson's new filing, the trial court "vacated and set aside" the March 24, 2017, ruling and ordered Robinson to address certain claims. (R. pp. 1617-1619). On September 11, 2017, the trial court issued a "Second Supplemental Ruling," dismissing some claims and ordering the District Attorney to address three remaining claims. (R. pp. 1620-1627). On November 2, 2017, the trial court dismissed Robinson's remaining claims. (R. p. 1634).
On December 11, 2017, Robinson applied for writs with the Second Circuit Court of Appeal. (R. pp. 1636-1647). On March 8, 2018, the Appellate Court denied Robinson's writ application. (R. p. 1648). Robinson took writs to the Louisiana Supreme Court. On April 22, 2019, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Robinson's writ. (R. pp. 1701-1702).
On May 22, 2019, Robinson filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [doc. #1-2, p. 31]. On June 20, 2019, the Court ordered Robinson to demonstrate that he had exhausted three of his twelve claims: "Claim 4," "Claim 9," and "Claim 12." [doc. # 7]. On June 28, 2019, Robinson responded to the Court's order by abandoning and therefore voluntarily dismissing those claims. [doc. # 8, doc. #1-2, pp. 17, 25, 31]. On August 6, 2019, the Court ordered the clerk to prepare summons and serve the defendant. [doc. # 9]. On October 16, 2019, the State filed its response. [doc. # 15]. The motion is ripe.
Federal courts may provide habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Under Section 2254(d), after a state court has adjudicated a prisoner's claims on themerits, an application for a writ of habeas corpus may be granted only if the petitioner shows that the adjudication:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
Federal review under 2254(d)(1) is "limited to the record that was before the state court." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). A decision is "contrary to" clearly established law if the state court "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or "confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] but reaches a different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). A decision involves an "unreasonable application" of clearly established law "if the state court applies [the Supreme Court's] precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner." Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08). "Clearly established law" refers to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.
Section 2254(d)(2) involves a challenge to factual determinations made by state courts. Hoffman v. Cain, 752 F.3d 430, 437 (5th Cir. 2014). Federal courts presume such determinations to be correct; however, a petitioner can rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(1).
The AEDPA has put into place a deferential standard of review, and a federal court must defer to a state court adjudication on the merits. Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 950 (5th Cir. 2001). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must showthat the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). An adjudication is "on the merits" when "the state court resolves the case on substantive grounds, rather than procedural grounds." Id. at 946-47. A federal court reviews de novo a claim not adjudicated on the merits in state court. Hoffman, 752 F.3d at 437.
When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has summarily denied relief without a statement of reasons, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits, in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 99 (2011). A habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported, or could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fair-minded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court. Id. at 102. Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief. Id. at 98.
Robinson raises five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) failure to object to an alleged hearsay statement from Dorian Harris and to subpoena her coworker Joy; (2) failure to present the security video of the ULM campus which would have exonerated him; (3) failure to challenge a juror who knew a State's witness; (4) failure to file a motion for continuance after the State's second amendment of the indictment; and (5) failure to object and file a motion for an intoxication plea. To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a petitioner (1) "must show thatcounsel's performance was deficient" and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be considered under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Clark v. Thaler, 673 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2012); Amos v. Thornton, 646 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 2011). A failure to prove either prong defeats the claim. Green v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 1029, 1035 (5th Cir. 1998). A court need not analyze the prongs of this test in any particular order or even address both prongs if the defendant fails to make a sufficient showing on one. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Further, "[m]ere conclusory allegations in support of a...
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