Robinson v. Wands, Civil Action No. 11-cv-00815-BNB
| Decision Date | 16 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 11-cv-00815-BNB |
| Parties | HOWARD G. ROBINSON, Applicant, v. JULIE WANDS, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Applicant, Howard G. Robinson, is a prisoner in the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons at the Federal Correctional Institution in Florence, Colorado. Mr. Robinson initiated this action by filing pro se an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 claiming that he was being punished by prison officials because he was not making payments under the BOP Inmate Financial Responsibility Program ("IFRP") that he allegedly could not afford to make. Because it appeared that Mr. Robinson was challenging the conditions of his confinement rather than the execution of his sentence, Mr. Robinson was ordered to file an amended pleading using the Court's Prisoner Complaint form.
On June 3, 2011, Mr. Robinson filed a Prisoner Complaint again challenging the amount of money he is being directed to pay under the IFRP. Although it was not clear originally, based on Mr. Robinson's allegations in the Prisoner Complaint, it now appears that the payments he is being forced to make under the IFRP relate to court-ordered restitution in his criminal case. As a result, Mr. Robinson's claim doeschallenge the execution of his sentence and may be raised in a habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Davis v. Wiley, 260 F. App'x 66, 68 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008). Therefore, the Court will consider Mr. Robinson's claim in the context of § 2241.
The Court must construe the pleadings filed by Mr. Robinson liberally because he is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). If the pleadings reasonably can be read "to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, [the Court] should do so despite the plaintiffs failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements." Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. However, the Court should not be an advocate for a pro se litigant. See id. For the reasons stated below, the action will be dismissed.
Mr. Robinson does not challenge the BOP's authority to set restitution payments under the IFRP. Instead, he challenges the amount of the IFRP payments he must make in order to participate in the IFRP. More specifically, Mr. Robinson is "[s]eeking court intervention that would allow [him] to pay $25.00 quarterly payments and disallow defendant and or the subordinates thereof from pursuing any negative or adverse recourse against [him]" for failing to make larger payments as directed. (Doc. #6 at 8.) Mr. Robinson alleges that he has been threatened "to make larger payments by any means necessary or be placed into a failure status and receive negatives that would hinder [his] program placement and place [him] in a refusal status." (Id. at 3.) According to Mr. Robinson, he cannot afford to make the larger payments that he hasbeen directed to make under the IFRP.
The Court notes initially that the IFRP "serves a valid penological objective of rehabilitation by facilitating repayment of debts" and "is fully consistent with the Bureau of Prisons' authorization, under the direction of the Attorney General, to provide for rehabilitation and reformation." Johnpoll v. Thornburgh, 898 F.2d 849, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam); see Phillips v. Booker, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1192-93 (D. Kan. 1999); Prows v. Dep't of Justice, 704 F. Supp. 272, 274-75 (D.D.C. 1988); aff'd, 938 F.2d 274. The IFRP became effective in 1987 to encourage inmates to meet their "legitimate financial obligations." 28 C.F.R. § 545.10; see Prows v. Dep't of Justice, 938 F.2d 274, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam). Court-ordered restitution is included among the various obligations that are subject to collection through the IFRP. See 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a)(2). Although inmates are not required to participate in the IFRP, there are negative consequences for inmates who refuse to participate. See 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d).
Mr. Robinson does not identify the specific right that allegedly has been violated by the threat of sanctions if he fails to make the IFRP payments set by prison officials. As noted above, he does not challenge the BOP's authority to set restitution payments under the IFRP. Therefore, construing the pleadings liberally, the Court interprets Mr. Robinson's claim challenging the amount of the payments he is being directed to make under the IFRP as a constitutional due process claim.
The Constitution guarantees due process when a person is to be deprived of life, liberty, or property. See Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d 367, 369 (10th Cir. 1994). Mr.Robinson does not allege that he has been deprived of life or property. Therefore, he is entitled to due process only if he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest.
Mr. Robinson's liberally construed due process claim lacks merit because the threat of sanctions for refusal to participate in a voluntary program does not implicate a...
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