Robinson v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.

• Decision Date: 23 April 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–0723 (PLF).
• Citation: 941 F.Supp.2d 61
• Parties: Darlene C. ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

941 F.Supp.2d 61

Darlene C. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

v.WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 11–0723 (PLF).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

April 23, 2013.

Charles C. Parsons, Charles Krikawa, IV, Charles C. Parsons & Associates, Chtd., Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Kathleen Ann Carey, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

OPINION

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Darlene Robinson initiated this action after sustaining an ankle injury while riding a Metrobus operated by defendant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”). Ms. Robinson alleges that her injury resulted from the negligent driving of WMATA's employee. After a five-day trial in June 2012, the jury returned a verdict in Ms. Robinson's favor. WMATA has filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the alternative, for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 50(b)(3), 59(a)(1)(A). Upon careful consideration of the parties' papers, the relevant legal authorities, the evidence and arguments presented at trial, and the entire record in this case, the Court will grant WMATA's motion for judgment and will dismiss as moot WMATA's motion for a new trial.¹

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Darlene Robinson testified at trial on her own behalf. She also called two expert witnesses to testify: Dr. Carl Berkowitz, a civil engineer specializing in public transportation safety engineering; and Dr. Jamie Williams, a biomedical and biomechanical engineer. In addition, Ms. Robinson called her treating physician, Dr. Andrew Siekanowicz; her sister, Shirleta Robinson Tyson; and her former co-worker, Karla Allen.

Defendant WMATA called as a witness Ronald Bumpass, the bus driver who was operating the bus on the morning of the incident. It also called two expert witnesses: Edward Harris, Service Director for Bus Transportation at WMATA; and Dr. Jeffrey Abend, an orthopedic surgeon.

Ms. Robinson testified that on the morning of April 16, 2008, she boarded the E2 WMATA bus at the intersection of Gallatin and 11th Streets, N.E., near her home in northeast Washington, D.C. June 6 PM Trial Tr. 31; see also June 7 AM Trial Tr. 8 (parties' stipulation). A 44–year–old economic analyst, Ms. Robinson was in good health and did not need any assistance to board the bus. June 6 PM Trial Tr. 28, 57–58. She swiped her SmarTrip card and greeted the bus driver, Ronald Bumpass. Id. at 31–32; see also June 7 AM Trial Tr. 8.

According to Ms. Robinson, she then proceeded down the center aisle of the bus while holding on to the handrails, passing several available seats. June 6 PM Trial Tr. 31–33, 68–70. While Ms. Robinson was walking down the aisle, Mr. Bumpass pulled the bus away from the bus stop. June 6 PM Trial Tr. 34. Mr. Bumpass acknowledged that he did not glance in his internal center mirror to check on the passengers before doing so, nor did he verbally alert the passengers that he was releasing the brakes and proceeding forward. June 7 AM Trial Tr. 49–50, 82–83; see also June 7 AM Trial Tr. 9 (parties' stipulation).

Ms. Robinson testified that shortly after Mr. Bumpass pulled away from the bus stop, and while Ms. Robinson was still walking down the center aisle, he slammed on the brakes but did not come to a complete stop. June 6 PM Trial Tr. 34, 60–62; see also June 7 AM Trial Tr. 49–51, 75–76 (testimony of Ronald Bumpass). According to Ms. Robinson, this deceleration caused her to lose her balance, fall and injure her left ankle. June 6 PM Trial Tr. 35, 66–67.

Another passenger on the bus alerted Mr. Bumpass that Ms. Robinson had fallen down. June 6 PM Trial Tr. 35–36 (testimony of Darlene Robinson); June 7 AM Trial Tr. 51 (testimony of Ronald Bumpass). Mr. Bumpass pulled over to the side of the street, stopped the bus, and went back to check on Ms. Robinson. June 6 PM Trial Tr. 36. Mr. Bumpass offered to take Ms. Robinson to the Fort Totten Metrorail station, but Ms. Robinson declined, explaining that she preferred to return to her house. Id. Mr. Bumpass helped Ms. Robinson off the bus, and she hobbled home. Id. at 36–37. Ms. Robinson alleges that Mr. Bumpass operated the bus in a negligent and unsafe manner, and that she was injured as a direct result of this negligence.

In addition to providing her own account of the incident at trial, Ms. Robinson's sister and former co-worker testified as to the authenticity and severity of her injury, as did Dr. Siekanowicz. Dr. Carl Berkowitz testified as an expert witness that the driver violated several national standards of care that morning, and Dr. Jamie Williams testified as an expert that Ms. Robinson's injury was caused by Ms. Robinson's loss of grip on the handrail and a lack of friction between her foot and the floor.

WMATA moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at the close of plaintiff's case and again at the conclusion of the evidence. See June 7 AM Trial Tr. 10–34; June 7 PM Trial Tr. 32. The Court reserved ruling on these motions and submitted the case to the jury in accordance with Rule 50(b). See June 7 AM Trial Tr. 34; June 7 PM Trial Tr. 32. The jury returned a verdict in Ms. Robinson's favor, finding that WMATA's employee, Mr. Bumpass, was negligent in his operation of the E2 bus on April 16, 2008, and that this negligence resulted in Ms. Robinson's injury. See Jury Verdict Form. The jury awarded Ms. Robinson $371,379.68 in compensatory damages and $33,333.60 in lost wages. Id.; Clerk's Judgment.

In its motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial, WMATA asserts that the expert testimony provided by plaintiff's experts was irrelevant and of no assistance to the jury, as well as lacking in foundation sufficient to support their expert opinions. It argues that the testimony of Dr. Williams and Dr. Berkowitz therefore should be stricken. WMATA contends that without this expert testimony, Ms. Robinson has failed to prove a prima facie case of negligence. In the alternative, WMATA asserts that two alleged incidents of juror misconduct warrant a new trial.

II. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

The Court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 only if it finds that “a reasonable jury would not have had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the [non-moving] party on that issue[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). “In making that determination, a court may not assess the credibility of witnesses or weigh the evidence.” United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 735 (D.C.Cir.1998) (quoting Hayman v. Nat'l Acad. of Sciences, 23 F.3d 535, 537 (D.C.Cir.1994)); see also Lloyd v. Ashcroft, 208 F.Supp.2d 8, 10 (D.D.C.2002). Moreover, the Court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. See Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 400 (D.C.Cir.1996); McGill v. Munoz, 203 F.3d 843, 845 (D.C.Cir.2000) (“Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and women could not have reached a verdict in [the non-moving party's] favor.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Pitt v. Dist. of Columbia, 404 F.Supp.2d 351, 353–54 (D.D.C.2005), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,491 F.3d 494 (D.C.Cir.2007) (same). That is not to say, however, that a mere scintilla of evidence will defeat a Rule 50 motion. “The question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the party against whom the motion is directed but whether there is evidence upon which the jury might reasonably find a verdict for that party.” 9b Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2524 at 250–57 (3d ed. 2008).

Under District of Columbia law, the plaintiff in a negligence action bears the burden of establishing three elements: “an applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and injury resulting from that deviation.” Scott v. Dist. of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 757 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also Varner v. Dist. of Columbia, 891 A.2d 260, 265 (D.C.2006); Allison v. Howard Univ., 209 F.Supp.2d 55, 61–62 (D.D.C.2002) (citing Hill v. Metro. African Methodist Episcopal Church, 779 A.2d 906, 908 (D.C.2001)).

A. Plaintiff Failed to Establish a Standard of Care through Expert Testimony

A plaintiff must introduce expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of care that is alleged to have been violated, unless the applicable standard is “within the realm of common knowledge and everyday experience,” Hill v. Metro. African Methodist Episcopal Church, 779 A.2d at 908, or within “the ken of the average layperson.” Briggs v. WMATA, 481 F.3d 839, 845 (D.C.Cir.2007) (internal quotation omitted). This exception is recognized, however, “only in cases in which everyday experience makes it clear that jurors could not reasonably disagree over the care required.” Id. at 845 (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Arnold & Porter, 756 A.2d 427, 433–34 (D.C.2000)). Thus, where a plaintiff seeks to establish standards regarding the specific procedures that public transit bus operators should follow—as in this case—a plaintiff must present expert testimony, as the standards governing the operation of city buses are distinctly related to an occupation that is “beyond the ken of the average layperson.” Id. (internal quotation omitted); see also Robinson v. WMATA, 858 F.Supp.2d 33, 39 (D.D.C.2012). Furthermore, the applicable standard of care in this sort of case is a national standard of care. Id. at 846–47 (applying national standard of care in negligence suit against WMATA); see also Dist. of Columbia v. Arnold & Porter, 756 A.2d at 433–34 (applying national standard of care with respect to...