Robles v. Doors

• Decision Date: 20 June 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 11-2707-JAR-DJW
• Parties: GABRIEL M. ROBLES, Plaintiff, v. AMARR GARAGE DOORS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

GABRIEL M. ROBLES, Plaintiff,

v.AMARR GARAGE DOORS, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 11-2707-JAR-DJW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

Dated: June 20, 2012

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Gabriel M. Robles, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed an employment discrimination complaint against Defendants Amarr Garage Doors ("Amarr"), United States Attorney General Eric Holder, State of Kansas, and City of Lawrence, Kansas, based on four claims: (1) Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), (2) the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), (3) the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), and (4) Defendants' conspiracy "'under color of law' to violate Plaintiff's rights."

This matter is currently before the Court on several motions: Defendant City of Lawrence's Motion to Dismiss Separate Defendant City of Lawrence, Kansas (Doc. 16), Defendant State of Kansas's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20), Defendant Amarr's Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27), Defendant Holder's Dispositive Motion Seeking Dismissal of All Claims Against Him (Doc. 42), and Plaintiff's Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 54). The motions are fully briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule. As explained more fully below, the Court grants each of Defendants' motions and denies Plaintiff's motion. Additionally, the Court sua sponte dismisses Plaintiff's ADA claim against Defendant Amarr forlack of subject matter jurisdiction and allows Plaintiff leave to amend his Title VII and ADEA claims against Defendant Amarr because Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

I. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

The Court will first address Plaintiff's "Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment." Plaintiff proceeds pro se, and so his pleadings are to be construed liberally and not held to the standard applied to an attorney's pleadings.¹ If a pro se plaintiff's motion can be reasonably read to state a valid claim on which he could prevail, a court should do so despite a failure to cite proper legal authority or follow normal pleading requirements.² It is not, however, "the proper function of the district court to assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant."³ For that reason, the court shall not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's claims or construct a legal theory on his behalf.⁴

While titled a motion for summary judgment, the Court finds that Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court's Memorandum and Order issued on May 3, 2012 that denied Plaintiff's motion for default judgment. In Plaintiff's instant motion, Plaintiff states the following: "The Plaintiff files this Motion for Summary Judgment giving the Court the benefit of the doubt that the rulings issued with regard to Plaintiff's previous Motions for Default against the defendant's [sic] were based on incomplete and unknown facts of the case due to thevoluminous pleadings of both the Plaintiff and the defendants." Plaintiff further discusses the Court's May 3, 2012 Memorandum and Order and argues that "a ruling in favor of the Plaintiff was lawfully in order." Plaintiff goes on to rehash the arguments he presented to the Court when briefing his motion for default judgment. Considering the substance of Plaintiff's instant motion, the Court construes it as a motion for reconsideration of the Court's May 3, 2012 Memorandum and Order.

A party seeking reconsideration of a non-dispositive order must show that the motion is based on "(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice."⁵ Plaintiff has not made any of the required showings. Plaintiff does not argue that there has been any change in the controlling law. Nor has Plaintiff shown the availability of new evidence. Although he argues that the Court's Memorandum and Order was based on incomplete and unknown facts, Plaintiff has not brought forth any facts or evidence not before the Court when it decided to deny Plaintiff's motion for default judgment. In fact, Plaintiff merely argues that based on the evidence before the Court, the Court should have granted Plaintiff's motion for default judgment. To the extent Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider based on the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice, Plaintiff has similarly failed to meet his burden. The Court has reviewed the parties' briefs and has determined that its earlier ruling is correct and that there is no need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Thus, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.

II. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Court next considers Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants Holder, State of Kansas, and City of Lawrence move to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII, ADEA, and ADA claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. These three Defendants argue that because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his Title VII, ADEA, and ADA claims against them, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. Defendants Holder and State of Kansas also move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for Plaintiff's last claim—conspiracy under color of law to violate Plaintiff's right—based on sovereign immunity.

A. Legal Standard

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, as such, must have a statutory or constitutional basis to exercise jurisdiction.⁶ A court lacking jurisdiction must dismiss the case, regardless of the stage of the proceeding, when it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.⁷ The party who seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that such jurisdiction is proper.⁸ "Thus, plaintiff bears the burden of showing why the case should not be dismissed."⁹ Mere conclusory allegations of jurisdiction are not enough.¹⁰

Generally, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction takes one of two forms: a facial attack or a factual attack. "First, a facial attack on the complaint's allegations as to subject matter jurisdiction questions the sufficiency of the complaint. In reviewing a facial attack on the complaint, a district court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true."¹¹ "Second, a party may go beyond allegations contained in the complaint and challenge the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends. When reviewing a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, a district court may not presume the truthfulness of the complaint's factual allegations. A court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts under Rule 12(b)(1)."¹²

B. Administrative and Procedural History

Plaintiff filed two charges of discrimination with the EEOC. In Plaintiff's first charge, filed on November 30, 2010, Plaintiff lists Defendant Amarr as "the Employer, Labor organization, Employment Agency, Apprenticeship Committee, or State or Local Government Agency" that discriminated against him. Defendant does not list any other Defendants in the charge. Plaintiff then checked the boxes indicating that the discrimination was based on race, color, religion, national origin, retaliation, and age. In the narrative portion of the charge, Plaintiff explained that he had been subjected to discrimination based on age in violation of the ADEA and based on race, national origin, color, and religion in violation of Title VII. Plaintiff also included examples of specific conduct of his employer, which he believed demonstrateddiscrimination.

In his second EEOC charge, filed March 28, 2011, Plaintiff again named Defendant Amarr and checked the boxes indicating discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, retaliation, and age. In the narrative portion, Plaintiff explained that after filing his November 3, 2010 charge, he was terminated on March 21, 2011. Plaintiff stated that he was discharged on the basis of his age in violation of the ADEA and his race, national origin, color, and religion in violation of Title VII. He further explained that he believed he had been discharged in retaliation for his early complaints of ADEA and Title VII discrimination.

The EEOC mailed Plaintiff a right to sue notice on September 29, 2011. The letter only named Defendant Amarr. Plaintiff filed his Complaint with this Court on December 27, 2011, asserting discrimination against Defendants Amarr, Holder, State of Kansas, and City of Lawrence asserting violations of Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA and claiming Defendants conspired under the color of law to violate his rights.

C. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

1. Title VII Claim

Plaintiff brought his first claim under Title VII. Title VII makes it unlawful for any employer to discriminate against its employees on the basis of race, color, national origin, or religion or to retaliate against a person for filing a charge of discrimination.¹³ Before a person can file a discrimination or retaliation lawsuit against an employer under Title VII, the person must exhaust the administrative remedies.¹⁴ To exhaust administrative remedies, the personmust file a charge of discrimination with either the EEOC or an authorized local agency such as the KHRC and receive a right to sue letter based on that charge.¹⁵ The charge must identify the type of discrimination complained of, the alleged harasser, and an approximate time period to be minimally sufficient to satisfy the requirements for the content of the charge and the purposes of the notice requirement.¹⁶ The requirement that a Title VII claimant exhaust administrative remedies serves the purpose of 'giv[ing] the agency the information it needs to investigate and resolve the dispute between the employee and the employer.'"...