Roblez v. Cent. New Mexico Corr. Facility
Decision Date | 16 December 2015 |
Docket Number | NO. 33,786,33,786 |
Parties | THOMAS ROBLEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CENTRAL NEW MEXICO CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF VALENCIA COUNTY
Grisham & Lawless, P.A.
Thomas L. Grisham
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellant
Jarmie & Associates
Mark D. Standridge
Las Cruces, NM
for Appellee
{1} Plaintiff, Thomas Roblez, appeals the district court's dismissal of his negligence complaint against Defendant, Central New Mexico Correctional Facility (Central), based on its determination that Plaintiff failed to provide Central with actual notice of the claim within the ninety-day time limit imposed under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (TCA). See NMSA 1978, § 41-4-16(A) (1977). Plaintiffraises three issues on appeal: first, whether statements Plaintiff made in an affidavit in response to Central's motion to dismiss were inadmissible hearsay; second, whether Plaintiff should have been allowed more time to conduct discovery prior to the district court's ruling on the motion; and third, whether the issue of actual notice was a factual question that precluded dismissal. We conclude that the statements in Plaintiff's affidavit are not hearsay, Plaintiff did not preserve his discovery argument, and Plaintiff's affidavit created a factual issue that required an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
{3} At the hearing on the motion, the parties' counsel provided legal argument butpresented no evidence. Central's attorney argued that the statements in Plaintiff's affidavit were "not enough" to provide actual notice under the TCA and contended that these statements were inadmissible hearsay. The district court granted Central's motion to dismiss based upon Plaintiff's "failure to comply with the statutory notice provisions of the [TCA]." The district court's order also stated in pertinent part, "The [c]ourt having reviewed the parties' submissions and heard the parties' arguments, . . . [finds]: . . . As a threshold matter, Plaintiff did not meet the statutory notice requirements of the [TCA]" and that Central "did not have actual notice of Plaintiff's claims." The order did not address Central's assertion that Plaintiff's affidavit contained inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiff appeals.
{4} On appeal, Plaintiff first asserts that the statements in his affidavit "to the effect that [Plaintiff] said he was hurt and intended to sue" were not hearsay because He also argues that the statement in the affidavit describing how the lieutenant responded was not hearsay because it We agree.
{5} We note that the district court did not expressly state in its order whether it considered the statements in Plaintiff's affidavit or disregarded them based upon Central's assertion that the statements were inadmissible hearsay. Because we are remanding this case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing, we expect that this hearsay issue will be raised again. Therefore, we proceed by assuming that the district court did not consider the statements made in Plaintiff's affidavit because it concluded those statements were inadmissible hearsay.
{6} We review the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, ¶ 25, 147 N.M. 542, 226 P.3d 641. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Hearsay is "a statement that (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing, and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement." Rule 11-801 (C) NMRA. But "if an out-of-court statement is offered in evidence merely for the purpose of establishing what was said at the time, and not for the truth of the matter,the testimony is not hearsay." State v. Reyes, 2002-NMSC-024, ¶ 29, 132 N.M. 576, 52 P.3d 948 (, )abrogated on other grounds by, Allen v. LeMaster, 2012-NMSC-001, 267 P.3d 806 . Furthermore, "[e]xtrajudicial statements or writings may properly be received into evidence, not for the truth of the assertions therein contained, . . . but for such legitimate purposes as that of establishing knowledge, belief, good faith, reasonableness, motive, effect on the hearer or reader, and many others." State v. Rosales, 2004-NMSC-022, ¶ 16, 136 N.M. 25, 94 P.3d 768 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). And "the evidence must have some proper probative effect upon or relevancy to an issue in the case in order to be admissible." State v. Bullcoming, 2010-NMSC-007, ¶ 34, 147 N.M. 487, 226 P.3d 1, rev'd on other grounds, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2719 (2011).
{7} Here, Plaintiff's statements that he told the lieutenant and several caseworkers that he was going to sue Central were not hearsay because they were offered into evidence merely for the purpose of establishing that a conversation about the incident between Plaintiff and the lieutenant and caseworkers took place; it was not offered to prove that Plaintiff truly intended to sue. See Reyes, 2002-NMSC-024, ¶ 29. Plaintiff'sstatements that the lieutenant "said he saw the incident" and responded to Plaintiff by saying, "[I]f I were you I would sue on this matter as well" were also not hearsay. The lieutenant's response was not offered to prove that the lieutenant would sue Central if he were in Plaintiff's position. Instead, it was offered to establish that the lieutenant heard Plaintiff's statements and thus had actual knowledge of the occurrence and the potential for litigation over it. See id.; Rosales, 2004-NMSC-022, ¶ 16. And each of the statements in Plaintiff's affidavit is relevant to the issue of actual notice. Bullcoming, 2010-NMSC-007, ¶ 34. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district court's exclusion of these statements, assuming they were indeed excluded, was "against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the case" and "clearly untenable or not justified by reason." See Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, ¶ 25.
{8} Plaintiff next asserts that he "was never given an opportunity to conduct any meaningful discovery" to develop further facts about whether Central had actual notice. Plaintiff states that he served interrogatories and requests for production on Central on February 26, 2014, the day before the scheduled hearing on the motion. Plaintiff asserts that, had he received a response to these requests, "he would have had far more information with regard to actual notice[,]" and that "[b]y filing an immediate motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer to the complaint, . . . [Central]avoided any opportunity for ...
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