Robotham v. State, S-89-811
| Decision Date | 04 September 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. S-89-811,S-89-811 |
| Citation | 488 N.W.2d 533,241 Neb. 379 |
| Parties | Eugene L. ROBOTHAM, on Behalf of Himself and As Parent and Next Friend of Mark Lee Robotham, a Minor Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Nebraska et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Constitutional Law: Declaratory Judgments: Statutes. An action to declare a statute unconstitutional is more akin to relief through an equity action than to relief through a law action.
2. Equity: Appeal and Error. In an appeal of an equity action, this court tries factual questions de novo on the record and reaches a conclusion independent of the findings of the trial court.
3. Declaratory Judgments: Appeal and Error. Where a declaratory judgment action presents questions of law, an appellate court has an obligation to reach its conclusion
independent from the conclusion reached by the trial court with regard to these questions.
4. Statutes: Due Process: Equal Protection. In any challenge to a statute under either the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, the degree of judicial scrutiny to be focused on the statute is a dispositive question.
5. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Proof. Unless laws create suspect classifications or impinge upon constitutionally protected rights, it need only be shown that they bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.
6. Constitutional Law: Statutes. When a fundamental right or suspect classification is not involved in legislation, the legislative act is a valid exercise of the police power if the act is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.
7. Constitutional Law. Generally, the constitutional right to privacy pertains only to matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.
8. Constitutional Law. Nebraska does not recognize a right to privacy, based on our Constitution, broader than the narrow federal constitutional right.
9. Constitutional Law: Statutes. The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
10. Constitutional Law: Statutes. Statutes which classify by race, alienage, or national origin will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Likewise, statutes which classify by gender or illegitimacy must be substantially related to, respectively, either a sufficiently important governmental interest or a legitimate state interest.
11. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Equal Protection. Where individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement, the Equal Protection Clause requires only a rational means to serve a legitimate end.
12. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Equal Protection. Under the Nebraska Constitution, in an equal protection challenge under article III, § 18, classifications that do not involve a suspect class or fundamental right are tested for rational basis.
13. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Equal Protection. The protection of motorcycle riders from serious injury and the concomitant protection of society from the repercussions of such injuries is a legitimate legislative aim.
14. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Legislature: Intent. An unconstitutional portion of a statute may be severed if (1) absent the unconstitutional portion, a workable statutory scheme remains; (2) the valid portions of the statute can be enforced independently; (3) the invalid portion was not an inducement to the passage of the statute; and (4) severing the invalid portion will not do violence to the intent of the Legislature.
15. Constitutional Law: Statutes. A severability clause, while it indicates that the Legislature contemplated the possible judicial partitioning of the statute and passed it anyway, is not necessary for severability.
16. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Statutes. Generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
17. Criminal Law: Statutes. A crime and its elements must be so clearly expressed that an ordinary person can intelligently choose in advance what course of conduct he or she may lawfully pursue.
18. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Proof. Where a law reaches no constitutionally protected conduct, one challenging the law for vagueness must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.
19. Administrative Law: Statutes. The Legislature can delegate to an administrative agency the power to make rules and regulations to implement the policy of a statute.
20. Administrative Law: Statutes. In order to be valid, a rule or regulation must be consistent with the statute under which the rule or regulation is promulgated.
Charles F. Noren, Hickman, and W. Travis Burney, Lincoln, for appellant.
Robert M. Spire, Atty. Gen., Charles E. Lowe, and David Edward Cygan, Lincoln, for appellees.
Eugene L. Robotham, individually and as parent and next friend of Mark Lee Robotham, his 5-year-old son, brought this action against the State of Nebraska and various officials thereof. Robotham sought a declaration that 1988 Neb.Laws, L.B. 428, was unconstitutional in several respects, and also sought related injunctive relief. The district court found in favor of the State and dismissed Robotham's petition. Robotham now appeals.
An action to declare a statute unconstitutional "is more akin to relief through an equity action than to relief through a law action." State v. Nebraska Assn. of Pub. Employees, 239 Neb. 653, 657, 477 N.W.2d 577, 581 (1991). " 'In an appeal of an equity action, this court tries factual questions de novo on the record and reaches a conclusion independent of the findings of the trial court....' " Id. Where a declaratory judgment action presents questions of law, this court " 'has an obligation to reach its conclusion independent from the conclusion reached by the trial court' " with regard to these questions as well. State Bd. of Ag. v. State Racing Comm., 239 Neb. 762, 767, 478 N.W.2d 270, 273 (1992).
Robotham is a licensed motorcycle operator, a motorcycle owner, and, by his own description, a "frequent" motorcycle rider. Robotham owns a motorcycle helmet, which he does not wear while riding. Mark Lee Robotham is occasionally a passenger on his father's motorcycle. Robotham has made no attempt to find a helmet to fit his son.
In 1988, the Legislature passed L.B. 428, which is now codified at Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 39-6,210 to 39-6,214 (Reissue 1988) and Neb.Rev.Stat. § 39-669.26(13) (Reissue 1988) (hereinafter the "helmet law"). The helmet law requires any motorcycle or moped operator or passenger on Nebraska's highways after January 1, 1989, to wear a "protective helmet." § 39-6,211. The helmet law requires the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles to publish a noninclusive list of helmets "which meet the requirements of section 39-6,211." § 39-6,212. The helmet law further provides that "[a]ny person using a protective helmet purchased prior to July 9, 1988, which is labeled to show that it conforms with applicable federal motor vehicle safety standards shall be deemed to be in compliance with section 39-6,211." § 39-6,213. Those persons violating the helmet law "shall be fined fifty dollars." § 39-6,214. "[M]otorcycle or moped protective helmet violations" are not included within the driver's license point system established elsewhere in the rules of the road. § 39-669.26(13).
Robotham's petition alleged several deficiencies in the helmet law under both the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions: (1) that the helmet law is vague; (2) that the helmet law "deprives Plaintiffs of liberty in the form of their constitutional right to be let alone;" (3) that the helmet law works a taking without just compensation in that it requires Robotham to pay money for a helmet; (4) that the helmet law denies Robotham equal protection of the laws; and (5) that the helmet law improperly delegates legislative authority to the Department of Motor Vehicles. The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment as to all claims except vagueness. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the State. Following a full hearing, the court dismissed the vagueness claim as well, with an additional finding that the helmet law in its entirety was constitutional.
Robotham's first two assignments of error are that the district court erred in finding that the helmet law did not violate due process of law or equal protection. In any challenge to a statute under either the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, the degree of judicial scrutiny to be focused on the statute is a "dispositive question." Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 1594, 104 L.Ed.2d 18 (1989). See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2569, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (). Robotham argues that a " 'compelling' " state interest is necessary to justify the statute. Brief for appellant at 22. This is the standard of strict scrutiny. However, "[u]nless laws 'create suspect classifications or impinge upon constitutionally protected rights,' ... it need only be shown that they bear 'some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.' " (Citations omitted.) Stanglin, ...
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