Robson Ranch Mountains v. Pinal County

• Decision Date: 18 July 2002
• Docket Number: No. 2 CA-CV 2002-0054, No. 2 CA-CV 2002-0060.
• Citation: 51 P.3d 342,203 Ariz. 120
• Parties: ROBSON RANCH MOUNTAINS, L.L. C., a Delaware limited liability company; FVR Land Investment Company, an Arizona corporation, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. PINAL COUNTY, a body politic; Gilbert Hoyos, in his official capacity as Pinal County Director of Elections; Laura Dean-Lytle, in her official capacity as Pinal County Recorder, Defendants/Appellees, Pinal Citizens for Sustainable Communities, Inc., an Arizona corporation, Intervenor/Appellee. Anam, Inc., an Arizona corporation; Elaine Helzer, a citizen and qualified elector of Pinal County, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Pinal County, a body politic; Gilbert Hoyos, in his official capacity as Pinal County Director of Elections; Laura Dean-Lytle, in her official capacity as Pinal County Recorder, Defendants/Appellees, Pinal Citizens for Sustainable Communities, Inc., an Arizona corporation, Intervenor/Appellee.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

51 P.3d 342

203 Ariz. 120

ROBSON RANCH MOUNTAINS, L.L. C., a Delaware limited liability company; FVR Land Investment Company, an Arizona corporation, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. PINAL COUNTY, a body politic; Gilbert Hoyos, in his official capacity as Pinal County Director of Elections; Laura Dean-Lytle, in her official capacity as Pinal County Recorder, Defendants/Appellees, Pinal Citizens for Sustainable Communities, Inc., an Arizona corporation, Intervenor/Appellee.

Anam, Inc., an Arizona corporation; Elaine Helzer, a citizen and qualified elector of Pinal County, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Pinal County, a body politic; Gilbert Hoyos, in his official capacity as Pinal County Director of Elections; Laura Dean-Lytle, in her official capacity as Pinal County Recorder, Defendants/Appellees, Pinal Citizens for Sustainable Communities, Inc., an Arizona corporation, Intervenor/Appellee.

Nos. -0054, -0060.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division Two, Department B.

July 18, 2002.

Review Denied October 4, 2002.

Fennemore Craig, By Andrew M. Federhar and Theresa Dwyer, Phoenix, for Plaintiffs/Appellants Robson Ranch Mountains, L.L.C., and FVR Land Investment Company.

Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P., By Marc G. Simon, Jeffrey Willis, and Wade R. Swanson, Tucson, for Plaintiffs/Appellants Anam, Inc., and Elaine Helzer. Robert Carter Olson, Pinal County Attorney, By William H. McLean, Florence, for Defendants/Appellees.

Raven & Awerkamp, P.C., By Anne C. Graham-Bergin, Tucson, for Intervenor/Appellee.

OPINION

PELANDER, J.

¶ 1 In these two consolidated appeals, plaintiffs/appellants Robson Ranch Mountains, L.L.C., and FVR Land Investment Company (collectively, Robson) in case number CV 2002-0054 and plaintiffs/appellants Anam, Inc., and Elaine Helzer (collectively, Anam) in case number CV 2002-0060 appeal from the trial court's rulings denying their requests for declaratory and injunctive relief against placing two referenda, both initiated by intervenor/appellee Pinal Citizens for Sustainable Communities, Inc. (PCSC), on the November 2002 general election ballot. The referenda challenge several rezoning and development-related ordinances enacted by the Pinal County Board of Supervisors (the Board). These cases were consolidated on appeal because they present two identical legal issues:

1. For purposes of A.R.S. § 19-142, when does the thirty-day time period commence for filing a referendum petition that challenges a county rezoning ordinance: when the ordinance is enacted and executed by a county board of supervisors or, only later, when a county's elections director obtains the ordinance and provides it to the referendum applicant?

2. When, as here, the county adopts two separate but related ordinances, one of which rezones property and the other of which approves a specific planned area development (PAD) overlay for the rezoned property, may both ordinances be challenged in a single referendum petition without violating the so-called "single measure" rule? See Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(9); A.R.S. § 19-101(A); cf. Korte v. Bayless, 199 Ariz. 173, 16 P.3d 200 (2001).

¶ 2 We conclude that the PCSC referendum petitions were untimely filed and, therefore, are void. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's rulings on that basis and direct entry of judgment for Robson and Anam on their complaints. In view of this disposition, we do not address the second issue.

BACKGROUND

I. The Robson Case (No. CV 2002-0054)

¶ 3 The parties in this case stipulated to the pertinent facts. In February 2000, Robson applied to rezone 2, 528 acres of land from general rural to various other classifications to permit higher density residential development and a golf-oriented, adult master-planned resort community known as Saddle-Brooke Ranch. In a separate application, Robson requested a PAD overlay for the property, essentially seeking the county's approval of Robson's specific, intended development plan and of several requested zoning variances. After a public hearing in August 2000, the county's Planning and Zoning Commission recommended approval of the requested rezoning and Robson's proposed PAD.

¶ 4 On November 1, 2000, the Board heard the Commission's recommendations and public comment on the proposed rezoning and PAD. The Board unanimously approved both the rezoning and PAD by enacting Ordinance Nos. PZ-033-00 and PZ-PD-033-00. Immediately after the hearing, the Board and its clerk executed the official version of each ordinance.

¶ 5 PCSC sponsored a single referendum petition on both ordinances. On November 2, a PCSC representative telephoned the Pinal County Director of Elections, Gilbert Hoyos, informing him that PCSC intended to refer the SaddleBrooke rezoning to a public vote and asking him when the materials for circulation would be available. After several inquiries and attempts by PCSC representatives over the next few days to obtain the "materials for circulation" from Hoyos, his office first provided PCSC a packet of materials, including the two ordinances, on November 7. On that same day, PCSC filed an application with Hoyos that resulted in the issuance to PCSC of a single referendum petition with an official serial number. In a space labeled "FOR OFFICE USE ONLY" on the application, Hoyos inserted December 4, 2000, as the filing deadline for the petition.

¶ 6 After circulating the petition and obtaining approximately 5,880 signatures, PCSC submitted the petition sheets to Hoyos on December 4, 2000. In January 2001, the Pinal County recorder determined that the petitions contained an adequate number of valid signatures.

¶ 7 In October 2001, Robson filed this action against the county, requesting the trial court to enjoin placement of PCSC's referendum on the November 2002 general election ballot and to declare PCSC's referendum petition void as a matter of law. Pursuant to stipulation, PCSC intervened in the action. Robson moved for summary judgment, contending that PCSC unlawfully had referred two ordinances in a single referendum petition and that the petition had been untimely filed in violation of § 19-142. The trial court denied Robson's motions and ultimately denied Robson relief on the merits. This appeal followed.

II. The Anam Case (No. CV 2002-0060)

¶ 8 Viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling, Sabino Town & Country Estates Ass'n v. Carr, 186 Ariz. 146, 148-49, 920 P.2d 26, 28-29 (App. 1996), the pertinent facts in this action are as follows. Around October 2000, Anam, the owner and leaseholder of land known as Willow Springs Ranch in Pinal County, applied to rezone some of its property. PCSC opposed the rezoning plan. After Anam scaled down its proposed project, the Pinal County Planning and Zoning Commission approved the rezoning request and Anam's proposed PAD and forwarded the recommendation to the Board.

¶ 9 At a scheduled meeting and public hearing on May 16, 2001, over PCSC's opposition, the Board unanimously approved the revised rezoning of approximately 4,600 acres of the Willow Springs Ranch property by enacting and executing two ordinances, one for the rezoning (PZ-006-01) and the other for the PAD overlay for that property (PZ-PD-006-01). The parties stipulated that copies of both ordinances were immediately available from the clerk of the Board on May 16 and that PCSC never requested them from the clerk.

¶ 10 On May 16, PCSC applied to Hoyos, the county's Director of Elections, for a petition to refer the ordinances for a public vote. Although Hoyos gave PCSC representatives a synopsis of the law relating to referendum petitions and a specific petition serial number, Hoyos told PCSC he could not provide the "materials for circulation" with the petition because of his belief, ultimately determined to be erroneous, that the official minutes of the Board's May 16 meeting also had to be attached to any petition. A week later, Hoyos told a PCSC representative that the "materials for circulation" were still not available.

¶ 11 At its next scheduled meeting on May 30, the Board approved the minutes of the May 16 meeting. On May 30, a PCSC representative had several telephone conversations with Hoyos, who checked but stated the materials still were not available. The next day, PCSC obtained from Hoyos copies of the two ordinances and the approved minutes of the May 16 Board meeting. Hoyos calculated and wrote July 2, 2001, as the filing deadline for the petition in a box labeled "FOR OFFICE USE ONLY" on PCSC's previously submitted application for a referendum serial number. PCSC attached both the ordinances and minutes to its petition, which PCSC then circulated from June 1 through July 2. On Monday, July 2, PCSC filed with Hoyos its petition sheets that contained approximately 5,870 signatures.

¶ 12 Over Anam's protest on July 12 that PCSC's petition had been untimely filed, the county processed and certified the petition. Anam then filed this action against the county for declaratory and injunctive relief. As in the Robson case, PCSC intervened in the action pursuant to stipulation. After denying Anam's motion for summary judgment and conducting a brief bench trial, the trial court denied Anam's requested relief. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction over both appeals, which we have expedited pursuant to Rule 3, Ariz. R. Civ.App. P., 17B A.R.S. See A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1); Perini Land & Dev. Co. v. Pima County, 170 Ariz. 380, 382, 825 P.2d 1, 3 (1992).

DISCUSSION

¶ 13 Our review in this case is de novo because the trial court's rulings hinge on "mixed questions of law and fact and pure questions of law, including matters of statutory interpretation and constitutional issues." In re United States Currency of $26,980.00, 193 Ariz. 427, ¶ 5, 973 P.2d 1184, ¶ 5 (App. 1998). "When construing statutes, our foremost goal is to effectuate the legislature's intent." State v. Huskie, 202 Ariz. 283, ¶ 5, 44 P.3d 161, ¶ 5 (App.2002). If the statutory language...