Robson v. Texas Eastern Corp., 36A01-0407-CV-292.
| Decision Date | 15 August 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 36A01-0407-CV-292.,36A01-0407-CV-292. |
| Parties | Michael J. ROBSON and Linda S. Robson, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. TEXAS EASTERN CORPORATION; Texas Products Pipeline Company; Teppco Partners, L.P.; TE Products Pipeline Company, Limited Partnership; Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation; Panhandle Eastern Corporation d/b/a Panenergy Corp.; Crown Central Petroleum Corporation; LaGloria Oil and Gas Company; Kenneth Gillaspy; and Leonard Bruce, Appellees-Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Roger L. Pardieck, The Pardieck Law Firm, Seymour, Keith Guthrie, Elizabethtown, for Appellants.
Max W. Hittle, Jr., Anthony W. Mommer, Krieg DeVault LLP, Indianapolis, for Appellees.
Michael and Linda Robson's ("the Robsons") personal injury claims against Texas Eastern Corporation, et al ("TEC") were dismissed pursuant to TEC's Motion for Summary Judgment in Jackson Circuit Court. The Robsons appeal, raising the following restated issues for review:
I. Whether the Robsons' personal injury claims are barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel; and,
II. Whether the Robsons have standing to pursue their personal injury claims.
Concluding that (1) the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel or the doctrine of standing to the facts and circumstances of this case would expand either doctrine beyond the boundaries recognized by any case cited by TEC or found pursuant to this court's independent research and (2) inferences from the undisputed facts of this case do not support the application of either doctrine, we reverse and remand to the trial court.
Between April 1993 and October 1999, the Robsons and their children resided at 10963 East County Road 975 North, Seymour, Indiana. The Robsons' residence was directly south of the La Gloria petroleum truck loading facility, which is owned and operated by Crown Central Petroleum Corporation.
In late summer 1999, the Robsons were allegedly advised to leave their home as soon as possible because noxious contaminants were leaking from the La Gloria facility and were the cause of the Robsons' and other nearby residents' illnesses. Appellants' App. pp. 14-25, 415-16.
On August 25, 1999, the Robsons filed for federal bankruptcy protection under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. On the following day, the Robsons' attorney sent their two largest creditors, Firstar Home Mortgage ("Firstar") and Republic Bank ("Republic"), a letter that stated in part:
I represent the Robsons in connection with a claim for personal injury and property damage against Texas Eastern Corporation and Crown Petroleum Corporation, which will be the subject of a lawsuit in the near future. The companies have operated a fuel truck loading facility immediately across the road from the Robson home for a number of years. As a result of health problems associated with exposure to emissions of toxic vapors from that facility, the Robsons have been advised to vacate their house as soon as possible. Given the known air pollution and underground contamination, it is quite likely that there is no market for the Robson property. For this reason, one count of Mr. and Mrs. Robson's claim will seek compensation for the loss of the fair market value of the house.
* * *
The Robsons cannot afford to keep up the payments and at the same time pay the costs of relocating their family. They would like to avoid accrual of late fees and interest charges pending resolution of their claim.
Pursuant to their Chapter 13 filing, the Robsons completed a schedule that listed their assets, including their claim against TEC. This schedule stated in part:
Mike and Linda Robson vs. Crown Oil Co.
Pollution lawsuit for environmental damages to debtors' residential property. Appellants' App. p. 150 (emphasis added). No creditor party to the Robson bankruptcy ever requested a copy of this schedule. Appellants' App. p. 381.
On September 1, 1999, the Robsons filed a complaint against TEC for personal injury and property damage. Appellants' App. pp. 14-26. The Robsons' complaint also alleged injuries to their children as a result of exposure to noxious contaminants. Id.
A Chapter 13 creditors meeting was held on October 21, 1999. This meeting was attended by the Robsons, their attorney, United States Bankruptcy Trustee Joseph Black, Jr. ("Black"), and Senior Accounting Clerk Natalie Jordan. None of the Robsons' creditors attended this meeting. Appellants' App. p. 378.
The notes taken from this meeting indicate that the Robsons' personal injury claims against TEC were discussed, and Black was specifically aware of the Robsons' personal injury claims. Appellants' App. pp. 378-79.
In formulating the Robsons' Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, Black determined that it was in the best interest of the Robsons' creditors to waive "any interest the estate had in independently controlling the Robsons' litigation against TEC on behalf of the bankruptcy estate because of the likely time and expense involved in its pursuit." Appellants' App. pp. 401-02. On October 28, 1999, the bankruptcy court issued its order confirming the Robsons' Chapter 13 plan.
In conformance with the Robsons' Chapter 13 plan, the Bankruptcy Trustees Office prepared a document entitled "Debtor's Motion for Order Appointing Counsel, Fixing Fees, and for Disposition of Settlement Proceedings." Appellants' App. p. 176. The Trustees Office's document advised the bankruptcy court in part:
Come now Debtors, by counsel, and advise the Court that the Debtors have a cause of action for environmental damage allegedly caused to their residential real estate by a third party.
1. Debtors have suffered environmental damage to their residential real estate as the result of acts of the Texas Eastern Products Pipeline Corporation, and have filed suit against Texas Eastern Products Pipeline Corporation in Jackson Circuit Court under Cause No. 36C01-9909-CP-120. * * *
4. Upon recovery from settlement or suit, Debtors would propose that counsel should be required to immediately report such result to both the court and the Chapter 13 Trustee ....
5. As regards to any net proceeds remaining in the hands of the Trustee, Debtors would propose that Chapter 13 counsel and the Trustee submit to the Court a proposal fixing the amount Debtor should be allowed to retain and amount available for plan creditors in the Chapter 13 case; further, Debtors would request that any such distribution proposal be noticed to all creditors and parties of interest before the Court's final approval of same.
At some point during the Robsons' bankruptcy proceedings, Firstar requested a copy of the Robsons' complaint against TEC. On November 23, 1999, the Robsons complied with Firstar's request and faxed them a copy of their complaint, which specifically referenced their personal injury allegations. Appellants' App. p. 393.
During bankruptcy proceedings, the Trustees Office provides a computer-based phone system for creditors to call and receive information regarding open bankruptcy estates. The information a creditor would have received concerning the Robsons' lawsuit against TEC stated:
Order appoint counsel for environmental damage claim. Counsel to supply court/trustee with notice of settlement or proceeds. Counsel to deduct contingency fee/necessary expense incurred. Net proceeds to be forwarded to Trustee for report to Court on final distribution.
On June 6, 2003, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Indiana entered its final decree discharging the Robsons' trustee and closing the Robson bankruptcy estate. Appellants' App. p. 184. On June 26, 2003, the same court found that the Robsons had fulfilled all of their requirements under their bankruptcy plan and discharged their debts. Appellants' App. p. 187.
On November 10, 2003, TEC moved for partial summary judgment, asserting that the Robsons lacked standing to pursue their personal injury claims and that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred the Robsons' personal injury claims because the Robsons did not properly disclose their personal injury claims in their Chapter 13 bankruptcy schedules. On April 5, 2004, the trial court granted TEC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and dismissed the Robsons' personal injury claims. The trial court did not issue findings of fact or conclusions of law with its order.
On May 5, 2004, the Robsons filed a motion to correct error. The trial court did not rule on this motion, and the motion was deemed denied on June 20, 2004. The Robsons now appeal.
On appeal, the standard of review of a summary judgment ruling is the same as that used by the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C) (2005); Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 150, 152 (Ind. 2005). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are construed in favor of the non-moving party. Id. The review of a summary judgment motion is limited to those materials designated to the trial court. Trial Rule 56(H); Gunkel, 822 N.E.2d at 152. Motions for summary judgment must be ruled upon carefully so as not to deprive litigants of their day in court. Id.
Judicial estoppel is a judicially created doctrine that seeks to prevent a litigant from asserting a position inconsistent with one asserted in the same or a previous proceeding. Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358 (3rd Cir.1996). Judicial estoppel is not intended to eliminate all inconsistencies; rather, it is designed to prevent litigants from playing "fast and loose" with the courts. Id. The primary purpose of judicial estoppel is not to protect...
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