Rocca v. United States, 27-70.

• Decision Date: 19 July 1974
• Docket Number: No. 27-70.,27-70.
• Citation: 500 F.2d 492
• Parties: C. M. ROCCA Sr., et al. v. The UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

500 F.2d 492

C. M. ROCCA Sr., et al. v. The UNITED STATES.

No. 27-70.

United States Court of Claims.

July 19, 1974.

James E. Cox, Martinez, Cal., attorney of record for plaintiffs, C. M. Rocca, Sr., J. Diane Rocca, C. M. Rocca, Jr., and Rosemary Rocca.

Richard C. Cahoon, Salt Lake City, Utah, attorney of record for Verda M. (Forester) Williams and A. E. Miller, Trustee in Bankruptcy for the Estates of G. F. Forester, C. M. Rocca, Jr., and Rosemary Rocca, third-party plaintiffs.

Howard O. Sigmond, Washington, D. C., with whom was Asst. Atty. Gen. Wallace H. Johnson, for defendant; Joseph J. Leahy, III, Washington, D. C., of counsel.

Angelo A. Iadarola, Washington, D. C., attorney for amicus curiae, Georgia-Pacific Corp.; Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker and Philip A. Nacke, Washington, D. C., of counsel.

Before COWEN, Chief Judge, and SKELTON and KUNZIG, Judges.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

This case comes before the court on the parties' exceptions to the recommended decision filed October 31, 1973, by Trial Judge Lloyd Fletcher, pursuant to Rule 134(h), having been submitted to the court on the briefs and oral argument of counsel. Upon consideration thereof, since the court agrees with the recommended decision, with modifications by the court, as hereinafter set forth, it hereby affirms and adopts the same, as modified, as the basis for its judgment in this case. Therefore, judgment is entered for the plaintiffs as set forth in the conclusion of law which follows the findings of fact, except for litigation expenses which are denied.

Opinion of Trial Judge

FLETCHER, Trial Judge:

As Mr. Justice Rehnquist recently observed in another connection, this case "might be said to abound in parties." Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 704, 92 S.Ct. 1344, 1348, 31 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). Descriptive of this is the following summary. Some of the plaintiffs filed their petitions under the Redwood National Park Act, Pub.L. 90-545, approved October 2, 1968, 82 Stat. 931. They alleged that on October 2, 1968, they owned land described in Exhibit A thereto, which was the same as parcels numbered 03-137, 03-139, and 03-141. Plaintiffs also alleged that they held beneficial interest in various deeds of trust covering lands described in Exhibit B to the petition which described parcels 03-138, 03-140, 03-142, and 03-143.

Because of the fact that plaintiffs alleged to own a beneficial interest in parcels No. 03-138, 03-140, 03-142, and 03-143, defendant moved to join additional parties plaintiff to appear and assert their interests, if any, in the last numbered parcels. Some of the record owners of those parcels appeared and asserted their claims.

The record owner of parcels 03-138 and 03-140 appeared to be Lane W. Crossley, et ux. Mrs. Crossley filed a claim on April 19, 1971, alleging that her husband died on or about October 15, 1970, and stated that she was the surviving tenant. Mrs. Crossley claimed the right to recover compensation for parcels 03-138 and 03-140.

The record owner of parcel 03-142 appeared to be G. S. Forester and Verda M. Forester, his wife. G. F. Forester filed his petition on July 12, 1971, alleging that on October 2, 1968, he was the owner of an undivided one-half interest in the property described. Also, on July 12, 1971, Verda M. Forester Williams filed her petition alleging that on April 9, 1970, a final judgment of dissolution of the marriage of Verda M. Forester and G. F. Forester was entered by the Superior Court of California, County of Shasta, and that the judgment provided for the property described to be held by the parties as tenants in common, and a trustee was appointed to manage the property. Verda Forester Williams alleged that she was the owner of a one-half interest in parcel 03-142 and had an interest in one-eighth of the proceeds in excess of $1,000,000 received by C. M. Rocca, Sr. and C. M. Rocca, Jr. in the property described in the Rocca petition.

The record owner of parcel 03-143 appeared to be Paul L. Muth and Genevieve Muth, his wife. Both parties were served with notice but neither Paul L. Muth nor Genevieve Muth filed a petition in this court.

In addition to the record title holders, there were also certain mortgagees or trust deed holders whose interests related to all of the lands involved. The Federal Land Bank of Berkeley, California, held a trust deed as a lien against all of the lands involved and also Lawrence Crivelli and his wife Hazel Crivelli held a lien against all of the lands involved. There were also holders of power line easements and tax liens. These parties were notified that the case was pending and either forced to appear or stipulated as to their interest. A cross claim was filed by defendant with relation to a Federal tax lien against the Rocca interest.

At the time of a pretrial conference held in San Francisco, on March 20, 1972, it appeared that A. E. Miller was acting not only as receiver for the property of G. F. Forester and Verda Forester Williams, but also as trustee in bankruptcy for G. F. Forester and C. M. Rocca, Jr. and Rosemary Rocca, his wife. It also appeared that C. M. Rocca, Sr. and J. Diane Rocca were divorced subsequent to October 2, 1968.

At the time of trial a stipulation of settlement was filed relating to the interest of Yvonne C. Crossley out of which payment was made for the interest of Eugene Luhr & Co., plaintiff in case No. 297-70 which was consolidated with this case. Payment was also provided to discharge the lien interest held by Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association as assignee of C. M. Rocca, Sr., and C. M. Rocca, Jr., and the remainder was paid to Yvonne C. Crossley. Stipulations were also entered into with the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley, and Lawrence Crivelli and Hazel Crivelli, his wife, to discharge the liens held by those parties.

During the trial it appeared that on September 14, 1971, Paul L. Muth and Genevieve Muth executed a deed to the land described as parcel 03-143 to G. F. Forester and Verda M. Williams, as joint tenants. In a letter addressed to Verda Forester Williams, Paul Muth stated that even though a deed to the land was issued in his name, he had not paid for the land and since the property was involved in this litigation, he had deeded it back to the former owners. In view of the fact that no consideration had been paid for the land, defendant was willing to consider the deed back to the former owners as a transfer of title in the nature of a resulting trust by operation of law which would be an exception to the nonassignment statute. In the final analysis, it was considered that the Muths were fully aware of the situation and their rights and they refused to participate and were thus foreclosed from further payment for any interest in parcel 03-143.

The Issue of Valuation

Except for an issue relating to reimbursement of attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses, discussed below, the only issue in dispute herein is the value of the property described as parcels 03-137, 03-139, and 03-141, formerly owned by C. M. Rocca, Sr., et ux., and C. M. Rocca, Jr., et ux. (subject to certain liens), and also, the value of parcels 03-142 and 03-143, formerly owned by G. F. Forester and Verda Forester Williams subject to an outstanding deed of trust. A plethora of expert witnesses testified on behalf of each party to this litigation and the testimony of these numerous witnesses is set forth with particularity in the findings of fact below. In order to prevent undue repetition, the testimony and conclusions of these many expert witnesses will not be repeated in this opinion. This is because I have singled out from all the expert testimony the evidence presented by one expert whose testimony was found to be based upon very meticulous, painstaking, and, in my view, thoroughly reliable testimony.

It will be recalled that there is no issue in this case regarding the Government's liability, a point which defendant concedes under the Act as provided in § 3(b)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 79c(b)(2), stating that:

The United States will pay just compensation to the owner of any real property taken by paragraph (1). * * * Any action against the United States for the recovery of just compensation for the land and interests therein taken by the United States by this subsection shall be brought in the Court of Claims.

The latest word by the United States Supreme Court on the determination of just compensation or fair market value, is United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 93 S.Ct. 801, 35 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). The Court had the following to say at p. 490, 93 S.Ct. at p. 803, 35 L.Ed.2d 16:

Our prior decisions have variously defined the term "just compensation" which the Fifth Amendment requires to be made when the Government exercises its power of eminent domain. The owner is entitled to fair market value, United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 63 S.Ct. 276, 87 L.Ed. 336 (1943), but that term is "not an absolute standard nor an exclusive method of valuation." United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 81 S.Ct. 784, 790, 5 L.Ed.2d 838 (1961). The constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as much content from the basic equitable principles of fairness, United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 70 S.Ct. 547, 549, 94 L.Ed. 707 (1950), as it does from technical concepts of property law.

Starting from these general principles, I now proceed to a consideration of what I regard to be the best expert analysis of the proper valuation contained in this record. The most impressive expert, in my judgment, was H. Rich Bramwell, whose testimony and extensive preparation were obvious throughout those portions of the record in which Bramwell's testimony may be found. In Bramwell's view, the highest and best use of the Rocca property as of October 2, 1968, was as an investment for further gain. In his testimony, he took into account reasonably nearby...