Rocchi v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Glastonbury

• Decision Date: 29 October 1968
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Claudia ROCCHI et al. v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF the TOWN OF GLASTONBURY et al.

Page 922

248 A.2d 922

157 Conn. 106

Claudia ROCCHI et al. v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF the TOWN OF GLASTONBURY et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Oct. 29, 1968.

Edward R. Smoragiewicz, Hartford, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Edward C. Wynne, Glastonbury, for appellees (defendants).

Before KING, C.J., and ALCORN, HOUSE, THIM and RYAN, JJ.

THIM, Associate Justice.

On February 24, 1966, the defendant town of Glastonbury applied to the defendant zoning board of appeals, hereinafter referred to as the board, for a special exception to locate a sanitary landfill operation on a portion of a fifty-five-acre tract of undeveloped land on which the town had an option to purchase. Section 3.0.2 of the Glastonbury building zone regulations permits a special exception for a sanitary landfill disposal area when the board determines that the public welfare will be served and the appropriate use of neighboring property will not be substantially or permanently injured. ¹ A public hearing was held on March 9, 1966, at which time the town officials encountered strenuous opposition to the sanitary landfill proposal from people who lived in the vicinity of the selected site. Following the hearing, the board denied the application on the ground that the properties immediately adjacent to the access road would be permanently and substantially injured.

The town submitted a second application on April 4, and a hearing was conducted on April 20. This second application was a modification of the first proposal, although it pertained to the same site. On May 3, the board concluded, in granting the special exception, that the sanitary landfill operation as modified by the second application would serve the public welfare and would not permanently or substantially injure the neighboring property. The plaintiffs, who are owners of property in proximity to the tract, appealed the decision to the Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed the appeal. From the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, the plaintiffs have taken the present appeal.

The plaintiffs claim that the sanitary landfill operation will constitute a public nuisance. We are unable to agree with this contention. The record discloses that less than one-half of the more than fifty-acre site will be used for disposal purposes; the remainder of the tract will be open land and buffer space. No disposal operations will be carried on within 850 feet of the New London Turnpike or within 150 feet of a brook which flows through the land. The sole access road is to be bordered with evergreens and fencing for its full distance. The operation is to be conducted in accordance with standards and requirements specified by the state health department and the water resources commission. No burning or scavenging will be permitted, and the landfill area shall be open from 8:30 a.m. to 4 p.m., Monday through Saturday. The town proposes to surround the disposal area with trees and plantings, which, in the opinion of the town manager, would effectively screen it from any of the neighboring residents. In addition, the zoning regulations require that all refuse deposited during each day be compacted and covered with six inches of clean fill. Glastonbury Ordinances § 1396 (1962). Upon complete utilization of a section, it is to be covered with at least twenty-four inches of clean fill and seeded to prevent water and wind erosion. Id. §§ 1397, 1398.

We have recently held that a well-operated sanitary landfill disposal area does not constitute a public nuisance. Wood v. Town of Wilton, 156 Conn. 304, 310-312, 240 A.2d 904. The record in the case before us discloses that the town will expend considerable effort to mitigate many of the unsavory conditions which are normally associated with a refuse disposal area. Obviously, the compacting and covering of refuse is calculated to reduce if not eliminate filth, odors, rodent infestation and air pollution. The sanitary landfill operation is a sensible solution to the pressing social problem of refuse disposal, and, when properly operated, it represents a vast improvement over the old-fashioned dump. The trial court did not err in upholding the board's decision that this sanitary landfill disposal area, which is to be operated in accordance with the Glastonbury ordinances and state standards, will not constitute a public nuisance. Furthermore, we reject the plaintiffs' claim that the conditions which circumscribe the operation of the sanitary landfill proposal are so vague that they cannot be enforced.

The gravamen of the plaintiffs' appeal is that the court erred in concluding that the board did not act illegally, arbitrarily and in the abuse of its discretion in granting the special exception. The basic question before this court is whether the board's action is reasonably supported by evidence in the record. George LaCava & Sons, Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 154 Conn. 309, 311, 225 A.2d 198. The burden is on the plaintiffs to prove that the board has not acted fairly, with proper motives and upon valid reasons. We should be cautious about disturbing the decisions of the local board where it appears that an honest judgment has been reasonably and fairly exercised after a full hearing. Devaney v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn. 322, 325, 326, 122 A.2d 303.

It is unnecessary to summarize the testimony of the many witnesses who appeared before the board. It is sufficient to note that, although there was conflicting testimony about land values, water pollution, rodent infestation and related issues, the record discloses ample evidence to support the board's conclusion that the sanitary landfill operation would serve the general public and would not permanently or substantially injure neighboring property. The conclusions of the board are vindicated by the record and cannot be disturbed by us.

The plaintiffs further contest the court's judgment on the ground that the board's action involved a reversal of its prior decision in the absence of a substantial change in circumstances. We have often said that a zoning board of appeals acts in an administrative capacity. Florentine v. Town of Darien, 142 Conn. 415, 425, 115 A.2d 328; Executive Television Corporation v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 138 Conn. 452, 455, 85 A.2d 904. As a general rule, an administrative tribunal, such as a zoning board of appeals, is not permitted to reverse itself unless a change of circumstances intervenes which materially affects the merits of the case....