Rocha v. City of Tampa Commercial Risk Mgmt., CASE NO. 1D11-6261
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
| Writing for the Court | PER CURIAM |
| Parties | STEVE ROCHA, Appellant, v. CITY OF TAMPA COMMERCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT, Appellees. |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1D11-6261 |
| Decision Date | 10 October 2012 |
STEVE ROCHA, Appellant,
v.
CITY OF TAMPA COMMERCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT, Appellees.
CASE NO. 1D11-6261
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
Opinion filed October 10, 2012
An appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims. Doris E. Jenkins, Judge.
Date of Accident: November 3, 2009.
Kelli Biferie Hastings of the Law Office of Kelli B. Hastings, PLLC, Orlando, Paul Hawkes, Tallahassee, and Tonya Oliver of Bichler, Kelley, Oliver, Port Richey, for Appellant.
James H. Shimberg, Jr., City Attorney, and Toyin K. Aina-Hargrett and L. Gray Sanders, Assistant City Attorneys, Tampa, for Appellees.
PER CURIAM.
In this workers' compensation case, Claimant appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) finding his hypertension not compensable and
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denying benefits. We hold the JCC erred as a matter of law, reverse the ruling, and remand the case, for the following reasons.
Claimant, in seeking workers' compensation benefits for his hypertension, relies on the presumption of occupational causation in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009). The JCC found, and the Employer/Carrier (E/C) agrees, that Claimant meets most of the statutory prerequisites for the presumption: he is a firefighter, he has the sort of hypertension addressed by the statute, and he underwent a "pre-employment" physical examination that failed to reveal any evidence of his hypertension (permitting an inference that his hypertension arose during the course of his employment). The E/C argues that Claimant did not prove the final statutory prerequisite for the presumption: he did not show that the hypertension "result[ed] in total or partial disability or death."
Claimant argues that he was "disabled," for purposes of section 112.18, while he was medically restricted from working as a firefighter. Specifically, on November 3, 2009, during his annual physical, Claimant underwent a cardiac stress test, the results of which were abnormal; the doctor who performed that physical immediately restricted Claimant to light-duty work and expressly prohibited him from firefighting. On November 11, 2009, Claimant underwent a cardiac assessment with a different doctor, who adjusted Claimant's medication
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and kept him off work until November 21, 2009. Although below Claimant asserted the period of disability lasted from November 3 to 21, on appeal he limits the alleged period of disability to November 3 through 11.
To resolve a conflict in medical opinions, the JCC appointed an expert medical advisor (EMA) to provide his opinion as to what disability Claimant may have experienced. After receiving the EMA's deposition, the JCC ruled that the EMA "did state that it was reasonable to restrict Claimant's activities pending assessment by a cardiologist; however, this does not equate to a finding that Claimant was incapable of performing his duties due to his hypertension." The JCC found that the work restriction "was precautionary, only," and concluded Claimant had not established a period of disability so as to entitle him to rely on the section 112.18 presumption of occupational causation. This ruling was error as a matter of law.
Section 112.18, Florida...
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