Rocha v. Thaler
| Decision Date | 09 September 2010 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 05-70028, 09-70018.,s. 05-70028, 09-70018. |
| Parties | Felix ROCHA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Rick THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
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Kathryn M. Kase, David R. Dow (argued), Houston, TX, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Edward Larry Marshall (argued), Office of Atty. Gen., Postconviction Lit. Div., Austin, TX, for Respondent-Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
Federal habeas petitioner Felix Rocha confessed to the murder of Rafael Fuentes-a security guard found shot to death outside the Houston nightclub where he worked-but later pled not guilty and proceeded to trial. Texas indictments charged both Rocha and a co-defendant, Virgilio Maldonado, with capital murder, though each defendant was tried separately. A jury convicted Rocha and on its answer to the sentencing questions he was sentenced to death. State courts affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct review. Over the course of the next eight years, Rocha filed four state habeas applications and one federal habeas petition. All failed. The federal district court denied relief but held an evidentiary hearing and granted Rocha a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on his claim under Brady v. Maryland, a claim we now examine. Before this court Rocha also renews his request for a COA on two additional questions: whether he is entitled to review on the merits of his punishment-phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Wiggins v. Smith; and whether the state violated an individually-enforceable right under the Vienna Convention by failing to inform Rocha that he was entitled, as a Mexican citizen, to contact his country's consulate. We affirm the district court, deny relief on Rocha's Brady claim, and deny Rocha's request for a COA on his claim under the Vienna Convention. We also hold that Rocha was not entitled to have a federal court review the merits of his Wiggins claim, but we grant his request for a COA on that question.
Rocha's federal petition is subject to the heightened standard of review set out in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). In the review of state proceedings, AEDPA proscribes federal habeas relief unless the state court's adjudication on the merits (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 1 “A state court decision is ‘contrary to ... clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases.’ ” 2 “A state-court decision will also be contrary to ... clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from reme Court precedent.” 3 “A state-court decision involves an unreasonable application of reme Court precedent if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case.” 4 AEDPA requires us to presume state-court findings of fact to be correct “unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” 5 We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, “applying the same standards to the state court's decision as did the district court.” 6
After the state courts affirmed his conviction on direct and habeas review, Rocha learned that one of the officers who had testified at his trial, Jaime Escalante, had a disciplinary record and was romantically involved with the sister of the lone eyewitness, Reynaldo Muñoz. Now on federal habeas, he says the state suppressed this information in violation of Brady v. Maryland. 7 Rocha claims he would have used the information to impeach the trial testimony of both Officer Escalante and eyewitness Muñoz. The district court, as we have noted, denied relief but granted a COA. We affirm the district court's denial of habeas relief because the information was immaterial to the jury's decision to convict.
A successful Brady claim has three elements: “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” 8 Rocha procedurally defaulted on this claim by failing to present it in any of his four state habeas petitions so in federal court he must demonstrate “cause and prejudice” to qualify for habeas relief, unless failure to do so would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 9 When a habeas petitioner brings a Brady claim, the “cause and prejudice” requirements of the procedural default doctrine parallel the last two elements of the alleged constitutional violation itself. 10 That is, a petitioner shows “cause” when the reason for his failure to develop facts in state-court proceedings was the state's suppression of the relevant evidence, while “prejudice” exists when the suppressed evidence is “material” for Brady purposes. 11 On appeal, we assume without deciding both that the asserted evidence is at least nominally favorable to Rocha and that the state suppressed the evidence. Our focus here is on materiality.
The parties do not dispute the relevant facts. At Rocha's trial-again, conducted separately from co-defendant Maldonado's-eyewitness Muñoz testified that he was checking on some coin-operated pool tables he owned at the nightclub when he saw two men-one taller, and one shorter-approach Fuentes, the eventual victim. The taller of the two men lifted his arms as if to permit a frisk. According to Muñoz, the shorter man then pointed a gun at Fuentes before demanding and reaching for Fuentes's own holstered firearm. Muñoz fled the scene without seeing what happened next. He did, however, hear two or three gunshots as he ran. At Rocha's trial, Muñoz identified Maldonado as the taller man who had approached Fuentes the night of the murder. Muñoz never pinned the murder on Rocha, saying only that his physical features “fit[ ] the description” of the shorter man.
But the state's case against Rocha did not rise and fall on eyewitness testimony-Rocha had confessed. The prosecution sought to lay a foundation for this confession through the testimony of Officer Escalante and a second police officer, Xavier Avila. Escalante began by testifying that after the shooting he “made the scene” at the nightclub. There he interviewed “five or six Spanish-speaking witnesses.” From then on he “[took] charge ... of investigating leads and following up on things [he] learned during that initial visit.”
Escalante's testimony continued: With no arrests made nearly a year and a half after the murder, police arrested Rocha and Maldonado on unrelated bank robbery and capital murder charges. Two days later, officers Escalante and Avila went to see Rocha and Maldonado in detention, suspecting that the attempted bank robbers also had something to do with the Fuentes murder. Their hunch seemed to bear fruit: Rocha made an uncounseled waiver of his Miranda rights with both officers present but requested that they come back the next day, at which time he would allow them to record his statement.
When the officers returned, they split up: Avila interviewed Rocha; Escalante took Maldonado. After about fifteen to thirty minutes, Maldonado confessed to the murder and implicated Rocha. This success in hand, Escalante interrupted Avila's interview with Rocha-which up to this point had been unproductive-to share the news. He presented an audio recording of Maldonado's confession and prompted Avila to use a particular segment as a tool to speed Rocha's interview along. Avila, working alone, resumed his questioning of Rocha, eventually making an audio recording of Rocha's full confession. 12 Escalante took no direct part in Rocha's interview.
Escalante's trial testimony then turned to his interactions with eyewitness Muñoz. He explained that he first met Muñoz during the investigation and that in November 1994 he showed Muñoz two photo spreads, neither depicting Maldonado or Rocha. Muñoz did not identify anyone on the two spreads, noting only that two photos “looked like” the taller man. Much later, in 1997, Escalante again showed Muñoz a series of photographs-this time with Maldonado's photograph included. Muñoz identified Maldonado as the taller of the two men who had approached Fuentes.
Officer Avila's trial testimony confirmed Escalante's account of their initial visit to Rocha. Avila testified in greater detail, answering questions regarding Rocha's mental state, physical well-being, and apparent ability to understand his waiver of Miranda rights. He then stepped the jury through his interrogation of Rocha.
On federal habeas review, the district court held an evidentiary hearing before rejecting Rocha's Brady claim; Muñoz, Escalante, and others were deposed. In his deposition, Escalante disclosed, for the first time, that he had freelanced for the owner of the nightclub-Maria Medeles-during the Fuentes investigation and that their relationship had turned romantic by the time of Rocha's trial. He testified that their professional relationship began sometime after the murder when Medeles hired him as an...
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