Rochkind v. Stevenson, 76, Sept. Term, 2016
| Decision Date | 11 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 76, Sept. Term, 2016,76, Sept. Term, 2016 |
| Parties | Stanley ROCHKIND v. Starlena STEVENSON |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by Thomas J. Cullen, Jr. (Constantine J. Themelis, Goodell, DeVries Leech & Dann, LLP of Baltimore, MD; M. Natalie McSherry, Christopher C. Jeffries, Kramon & Graham, P.A. of Baltimore; Ronald D. Getchey, Charles A. Danaher, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP of San Diego, CA) on brief, for Petitioner
Argued by Scott E. Nevin (The Law Offices of Peter T. Nicholl of Baltimore, MD) and Suzanne C. Shapiro (Suzanne C. Shapiro Law, LLC of Baltimore, MD) on brief, for Respondent
Argued before Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald, Watts, Hotten and Getty, JJ.
Opinion by Adkins, J.
Respondent Starlena Stevenson was born on December 22, 1990. For the first ten months of her life, Stevenson lived at 2110 Clifton Avenue in Baltimore City with her mother, Charlena Montgomery, and maternal grandmother, Lorena Cooks. In the fall of 1991, Stevenson and Montgomery moved to 3823 Fairview Avenue ("Fairview"), where they lived for 15 months. At the time, Fairview was owned in part by Petitioner Stanley Rochkind. According to Montgomery, Fairview contained chipping and flaking paint on the windowsills, floors, and front porch. Montgomery witnessed Stevenson mouthing the windows at Fairview. In early 1993, Stevenson and her mother moved to an apartment on Pennsylvania Avenue ("Pennsylvania").
In 1992 and 1993, Stevenson's blood lead level was tested three times. The results were as follows:
Date Age Blood Lead Level1 Residence
October 29, 1992 1 year, 10 months 14 μg/dL Fairview
January 8, 1993 2 years 13 μg/dL Fairview
March 17, 1993 2 years, 3 months 11 μg/dL Pennsylvania
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When Stevenson was five years old, she was evaluated by Thomas Ley, Ph.D., a psychologist with the Kennedy Krieger Institute, because she was struggling to pay attention in school. Dr. Ley found that Stevenson's cognitive functioning was within the "low average to borderline range." He diagnosed Stevenson with ADHD and recommended that she begin taking medication to treat it. Over the next few years, Stevenson was prescribed Dexedrine
, Ritalin, and Adderall to treat her ADHD. In 2004, when she was thirteen years old, Stevenson attempted suicide by cutting her wrists and overdosing on prescription medication. The following year, Stevenson complained of auditory hallucinations and depression. She was evaluated by a psychologist at Mount Washington Pediatric Hospital ("MWPH") who diagnosed her with major depressive disorder
and generalized anxiety disorder.
Since graduating from high school in 2008, Stevenson has been sporadically employed. She has worked as a patient transporter for the University of Maryland Medical System ("UMMS"), a cashier for Royal Farms, and a babysitter. Stevenson was fired from her job at UMMS, and she testified that she quit her job at Royal Farms because she was bored. As of October 2014, Stevenson was unemployed.
In December 2011, Stevenson filed suit against Rochkind in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for negligence and violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act.2 In July 2012, Arc Environmental, Inc. conducted lead testing at Fairview. The testing detected lead-based paint on 22 interior surfaces and nine exterior surfaces. In February 2013, Cecilia Hall-Carrington, M.D., a pediatrician, filed a report concluding to "a reasonable degree of medical probability" that Stevenson was poisoned by lead at Fairview, and that "her lead poisoning
is a significant contributing factor" to her neuropsychological problems, including her ADHD.
Before trial, Rochkind filed four motions in limine seeking to exclude Dr. Hall-Carrington's testimony. He argued that she should not be permitted to testify that Fairview was a source of Stevenson's lead exposure or that such exposure caused Stevenson's "cognitive deficits," including, specifically, ADHD. Rochkind requested a Frye - Reed hearing on each motion. The court denied his request. After hearing arguments on the motions in limine , the court denied them as well. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Stevenson, awarding her $829,000 in economic damages and $534,000 in noneconomic damages. Rochkind filed a motion for a new trial, or, in the alternative, a remittitur. The court granted his motion in part and ordered a new trial on the issue of damages alone.
The partial new trial began in October 2014. Before trial, Rochkind renewed his motions in limine to exclude Dr. Hall-Carrington's ADHD testimony, which were again denied. The court declined to hold a Frye - Reed hearing, explaining that Dr. Hall-Carrington's opinions are "not new science" or "new conclusions." It admitted her testimony under Maryland Rule 5–702 because it found that she drew from "reliable sources."
During trial, Dr. Hall-Carrington testified as to both general and specific ADHD causation. She explained that studies show that lead exposure can cause "attention problems[ ] or ADHD" generally. She also opined "within a reasonable degree of medical probability" that lead exposure caused Stevenson's ADHD specifically. To support her testimony, Dr. Hall-Carrington relied on a publication from the Environmental Protection Agency reviewing the most recent studies on the effects of lead exposure in children, titled "Integrated Science Assessment for Lead" ("the EPA–ISA"). She testified that the EPA–ISA concluded that there is a causal relationship between lead exposure and the symptoms of ADHD, such as attention decrements, impulsivity, and hyperactivity. Dr. Hall-Carrington also testified that "some years ago there was a concern with suicide in kids [taking] Adderall." In closing argument, Stevenson's counsel implied that Stevenson's depression and hallucinations were side effects of her ADHD medications, including Adderall.
The jury awarded Stevenson $753,000 in economic damages and $700,000 in noneconomic damages. Due to the statutory cap on noneconomic damages, the court reduced the total judgment to $1,103,000. See Md. Code , § 11–108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
Rochkind filed a motion for a new trial, which the court denied. He filed a timely appeal.
The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court did not err in failing to hold a Frye - Reed hearing on Dr. Hall-Carrington's general causation testimony because the studies she relied upon did not reach novel conclusions and "used methodologies that are generally accepted" in the scientific community. Rochkind v. Stevenson , 229 Md.App. 422, 464, 145 A.3d 570 (2016). The intermediate appellate court also held that the trial court properly admitted Dr. Hall-Carrington's specific causation testimony under Rule 5–702 because her opinion "was supported by an adequate factual basis and was sufficient to allow the jury to decide the causal connection, if any, between lead exposure and [ ] Stevenson's ADHD." Id. at 465, 145 A.3d 570. Rochkind appealed.
We granted certiorari to answer the following questions:3
Because we answer the first question in the affirmative, we reverse the decision of the Court of Special Appeals and remand for a new trial on the issue of damages. Therefore, we do not reach the second question.
Rochkind challenges the trial court's decision to admit Dr. Hall-Carrington's expert testimony on the causal relationship between lead exposure and ADHD. "[T]he admissibility of expert testimony is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court." Bryant v. State , 393 Md. 196, 203, 900 A.2d 227 (2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony only for an abuse of discretion. Rollins v. State , 392 Md. 455, 499–500, 897 A.2d 821 (2006). "Such a ruling, however, may be reversed on appeal if it is founded on an error of law or some serious mistake, or if the trial court clearly abused its discretion." Sippio v. State , 350 Md. 633, 648, 714 A.2d 864 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, we will not affirm a decision within the discretion of the trial court if the judge acts in an "arbitrary or capricious manner" or "beyond the letter or reason of the law." Garg v. Garg , 393 Md. 225, 238, 900 A.2d 739 (2006) (citation omitted).
Rochkind argues that Dr. Hall-Carrington's testimony should have been excluded because it failed to meet the requirements of both Maryland Rule 5–702 and our Frye - Reed standard for testimony based on a novel scientific theory. Rule 5–702 governs the admissibility of all expert testimony. Reed v. State , 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978), which adopted the standard set forth by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Frye v. United States , 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), added an additional requirement for expert testimony based on a novel scientific method. Under Frye - Reed , a trial court must determine...
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