Rochleau v. Town of Millbury

• Decision Date: 29 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 97-40208-NMG.,CIV. A. 97-40208-NMG.
• Citation: 115 F.Supp.2d 173
• Parties: Dana ROCHLEAU, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF MILLBURY, Richard Handfield, and Jane Doe, an Unidentified Police Officer Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

115 F.Supp.2d 173

Dana ROCHLEAU, Plaintiff, v.TOWN OF MILLBURY, Richard Handfield, and Jane Doe, an UnidentifiedPolice OfficerDefendants.

No. CIV. A. 97-40208-NMG.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

September 29, 2000.

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Stephen Gordon, Stephen Gordon & Associates, Worcester, MA, for Plaintiff.

Joseph L. Tehan, Jr., Jonathan M. Silverstein, Kopelman & Page, P.C., Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

GORTON, District Judge.

PlaintiffDana Rochleau("Rochleau") brought this action against the Town of Millbury("the Town"), Richard Handfield, the Chief of Police for the Town ("the Chief"), and Jane Doe, an unidentified police officer, for damages allegedly sustained while confined in a Millbury Police Department holding cell.

Against the Town, Rochleau alleges (1) violations of his civil rights under the 4th, 5th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) negligence, and (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Against the Chief, Rochleau alleges (1) the same violations of his civil rights under said 4th, 5th and 14th Amendments, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Rochleau also alleges that the actions of both the Town and the Chief violated the provisions of M.G.L. c. 40, § 36(b).

Pending before this Court are motions by the Chief (DocketNo. 23) and the Town (DocketNo. 25) for summary judgment.

I.Background

On the evening of August 8, 1994, Rochleau learned that the Police Department had a warrant for his arrest.He voluntarily presented himself at the police station and was arrested, booked and placed in a cell.Rochleau does not challenge his arrest or the legitimacy of his detention in the Millbury jail.

The bars of the cells in the Millbury jail are covered with plexiglass from one or two inches above the floor to the ceiling, as is required by the state suicide prevention law, M.G.L. c. 40, § 36(b).Ventilation in the cells is provided by a vent designed to draw warm air from the top of the cell, allowing cool air to flow into the cell from the bottom.The ventilation systems in the cells must be activated manually.

Upon being placed in the cell, Rochleau went to sleep.He awoke about one hour later, experiencing chest pains and shortness of breath.He kneeled down on the cell floor and placed his face near the opening in an attempt to get some fresh air.He called out several times for help and requested to be taken to a hospital.The dispatcher on duty called an ambulance, paramedics arrived and Rochleau was taken to the hospital and admitted.

Upon admission to the hospital, Rochleau's symptoms had abated.His vital signs were normal, with the exception of a slightly elevated blood pressure.Various tests were conducted to rule out that Rochleau had suffered a heart attack and when the results returned, they were normal.

Several hours later, Rochleau was observed to be "awake" and "alert" and "denie[d][chest pain] at present."When nursing staff attempted to place an intravenous tube in Rochleau he became "very agitated," stated that he"wanted to go back to the station [and] hopped off the examination table".As soon as he did, his color turned ashen and he fainted.A doctor who has been designated as Rochleau's expert attributed the fainting spell to Rochleau's sudden rise from the reclining position and a drop in his blood pressure.

Rochleau admits that he has not suffered any lasting physical effects from the incident and that he is mentally and physically healthy.He has had three or four nightmares since the incident and claims that the lack of ventilation in the jail cell caused his shortness of breath and chest pain.

II.Discussion

The role of summary judgment is "to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial."Mesnick v. General Elec. Co.,950 F.2d 816, 822(1st Cir.1991)(quotingGarside v. Osco Drug, Inc.,895 F.2d 46, 50(1st Cir.1990)).The burden is upon the moving party to show, based upon the pleadings, discovery on file and affidavits, "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).The Court must view the record in the light most hospitable to the non-moving party and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor.O'Connor v. Steeves,994 F.2d 905, 907(1st Cir.1993)."Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial."Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538(1986)(citations omitted).

A. Rochleau's Claims against The Town(1)§ 1983

Municipalities cannot be held liable for constitutional torts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.SeeMonell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York,436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611(1978).Municipalities may be sued for their own unconstitutional or illegal policies, but not for the acts of their employees.Id.A municipal liability claim under § 1983 requires proof that the municipality maintained a policy or custom which caused, or was the moving force behind, a deprivation of constitutional rights.SeeOklahoma City v. Tuttle,471 U.S. 808, 819, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791(1985);seeMonell at 69498 S.Ct. 2018.Existence of a municipal policy is shown by:

a deliberate choice to follow a course of action ... made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.

A custom or practice must be attributable to the municipality, i.e., it must be "so well settled and widespread that the policymaking officials of the municipality can be said to have either actual or constructive knowledge of it yet did nothing to end the practice."Miller v. Kennebec County,219 F.3d 8(1st Cir.2000).

Rochleau fails even to allege that the Town has an illegal policy or custom with respect to the conditions at the jail or the provision of medical care to pre-trial detainees.The Board of Selectmen is the final policymaker with respect to police department matters, but Rochleau's complaint does not contain a single allegation regarding the Board's knowledge, action or inaction on the matters at issue.¹

Nor is the Town liable based on a policy of inadequate training and supervision.To establish an official policy of inadequate training or supervision, a plaintiff must show proof of deliberate indifference by the local government.City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412(1989).Courts have found deliberate indifference where a city fails to act in response to repeated complaints of constitutional violations by its officers.See e.g.Gentile v. County of Suffolk,926 F.2d 142(2d Cir.1991).A single alleged incident of individual misconduct will not, however, support a claim that the Town failed to train, supervise or discipline police officers.Hathaway v. Stone,687 F.Supp. 708, 710-11(D.Mass.1988).Rochleau has presented no evidence of "deliberate indifference" by the Town.

(2) Negligence and (3) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

With regard to the negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, the Town offers four arguments in support of its motion for summary judgment.The town contends that (a) it did not breach any duty owed to Rochleau, (b) even if it did, it is immune from liability under the discretionary function exception to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act ("the MTCA"), (c) Rochleau has failed to prove that the harm he alleges to have suffered was foreseeable, and (d) Rochleau has failed to adduce objective evidence of physical manifestations of severe emotional distress.

The MTCA states that

[p]ublic employers shall be liable for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any public employee while acting within the scope of his office or employment, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.

M.G.L. c. 258, § 2 (1988 ed.).

To establish a claim for negligence under Massachusetts law, a tort plaintiff must show that the defendant owed him a duty, the defendant breached that duty, the breach constituted a proximate cause of the ensuing harm, and the breach caused actual injury.SeeFithian v. Reed,204 F.3d 306(1st. Cir.2000);Jorgensen v. Massachusetts Port Auth.,905 F.2d 515, 522(1st Cir.1990);Swift v. United States,866 F.2d 507, 508-09(1st Cir.1989).

(a) Breach of Duty

Rochleau appears to allege two bases for the negligence claims, first, that police personnel were unresponsive to his requests for medical attention, and second, that the cell in which he was incarcerated was uninhabitable.

Regarding Rochleau's claim that police personnel did not respond to his requests for medical attention, it appears from the record that a period of one half hour at most passed between Rochleau's first complaint of chest pains and the time when paramedics arrived.By the time he had arrived at the hospital, his symptoms had abated.

Assuming Rochleau's negligence claims are predicated on the theory that the Town failed to train adequately its officers to provide medical care to detainees, Rochleau has failed to produce any evidence indicating that such training was not provided.On the other hand, the Town has presented evidence indicating that it complied with and exceeded all state statutory and regulatory requirements relating to the training of police officers in first aid and CPR, specifically, M.G.L. c. 111, § 201.Massachusetts courts have recognized that compliance with safety regulations is...