Rock Cnty. v. P.P. (In re P.P.)
| Decision Date | 16 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | Appeal No. 2021AP678 |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF the Condition of P.P.: Rock County, Petitioner-Respondent, v. P.P., Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
¶1 In April 2020, the circuit court ordered P.P. to be subject to an involuntary mental health commitment and an involuntary medication or treatment order pursuant to WIS. STAT. ch. 51. P.P. challenges only the involuntary medication or treatment order, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to meet Rock County's burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. I conclude that the only issue raised on appeal is moot and that no exception to the mootness doctrine applies. Accordingly, I affirm the circuit court without reaching the merits.
¶2 P.P. was placed in emergency detention in Winnebago Mental Health Institution in March 2020, and the police officer who took him into custody filed a statement of emergency detention. See WIS. STAT. § 51.15(5) (); § 51.20(1), (7)(a). The circuit court held a final hearing in April 2020 to determine whether P.P. met the criteria for an order for involuntary commitment and an order for involuntary treatment and medication.2 See WIS. STAT. §§ 51.20(1), (10), (13), 51.61(1)(g). At the hearing, counsel for P.P. informed the court that P.P. was "in agreement for the Court to order the commitment," but was taking the further position that the commitment should be "on an outpatient basis without a medication order."
¶3 The County called a psychiatrist to testify regarding the appropriate level of care for P.P. and the potential need for a medication order. Without objection by P.P., the circuit court admitted a written report of the psychiatrist offered by the County. After hearing argument from the parties, the circuit court issued a commitment order and a medication order. Each order was to last six months, or until October 2020.
¶4 In September 2020, a hearing was held on the County's petition to extend both P.P.’s commitment and medication orders. At this hearing, P.P., through counsel, stipulated to twelve-month extensions of both orders.3
¶5 P.P. appeals, challenging only the April 2020 medication order.
¶6 P.P.’s sole basis for challenging the April 2020 medication order is that it was based on insufficient evidence. As to potential mootness, he argues that the issue raised in this appeal is not moot, despite expiration of the challenged order. This is so, he argues, because the expired order has collateral consequences for him that could be practically affected by reversal. In the alternative, P.P. argues that I should disregard mootness based on multiple exceptions to the general mootness rule. The County argues that this issue in this appeal is moot, based largely on P.P. stipulating to a new medication order in September 2020, and that no mootness exceptions apply. I agree with the County that the issue raised is moot and that no exception applies.
¶7 "Mootness is a doctrine of judicial restraint." Marathon County v. D.K. , 2020 WI 8, ¶19, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901. " ‘An issue is moot when its resolution will have no practical effect on the underlying controversy.’ " Id. (quoted source omitted). "Because moot issues do not affect a live controversy," appellate courts generally decline to reach them. See id. This court may overlook mootness when one of several exceptions applies, as addressed below. See id. Whether the issue raised in this appeal is moot and whether an exception applies are questions of law that I determine independently. See id. ; Waukesha County v. S.L.L. , 2019 WI 66, ¶10, 387 Wis. 2d 333, 929 N.W.2d 140.
¶8 P.P. argues the issue he raises on appeal is not moot based on the concept of collateral consequences as it is discussed in case law regarding the mootness of involuntary commitment orders. I summarize this law before describing P.P.’s argument in more detail.
¶9 Our supreme court has stated that a challenge to a commitment order is not moot if the subject of the order would experience negative collateral consequences from the existence of the order. See D.K. , 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶¶23-25. The specific collateral consequence referred to in D.K. was a ban on D.K. possessing firearms. The firearms ban resulting from the commitment order lasted beyond the expiration of the commitment order. See id. , ¶25. The court noted that, in the absence of the firearms ban, D.K. would otherwise have a constitutional right to bear arms, which is "no minor consequence." See id. The court stated that a decision in that case could have a "practical effect" because a reversal of the order would "void the firearms ban." See id. Because the firearms ban on its own was a collateral consequence that prevented mootness from arising, the court did not address whether other potential consequences for the subject of a commitment order that can last beyond the order's expiration—specifically the payment of costs of care under WIS. STAT. § 46.10(2) - (3) or "negative stigma"—could also avoid application of the mootness doctrine. See D.K. , 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶25 n.7.
¶10 As both parties note, our supreme court in D.K. drew on the logic of case law discussing mootness in the context of challenges to criminal convictions when the sentences were fully served before the appeals processes were resolved. See D.K. , 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶¶23-24. The court noted that, in its earlier decision State v. Theoharopoulos , 72 Wis. 2d 327, 240 N.W.2d 635 (1976), the court had concluded that a challenge to a conviction with a completed sentence was not moot because " ‘on the face of the record, there [was] a causal relationship between the defendant's present confinement [due to a later conviction] and the prior conviction which he wishes to attack.’ " D.K. , 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶23 (quoting Theoharopoulos , 72 Wis. 2d at 333 ) (first alteration in D.K. ). The court in D.K. went on to state that, although D.K. dealt with a chapter 51 commitment order and not a criminal matter, "the logic of Theoharopoulos , is just as sound here," because in D.K. there was a " ‘causal relationship between’ " the firearms ban and the expired civil commitment. See D.K. , 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶24 (quoted source omitted). And, as P.P. emphasizes, D.K. also quotes U.S. Supreme Court precedent stating that an issue in a "criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction."See Sibron v. New York , 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968) ; D.K. , 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶23.
¶11 Against this background, P.P. argues that his sufficiency challenge is not moot based on the collateral consequence of negative stigma for him arising from the April 2020 medication order. See Addington v. Texas , 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979) ().4
¶12 In support of this argument, P.P. urges this court to extend the reasoning of D.K. in several ways. First, P.P. argues that I should treat the mootness-related discussion in D.K. in the context of commitment orders as analogously applicable to medication orders. Second, P.P. contends that the question of whether stigma should count as a collateral consequence preventing mootness, left open in D.K. , should be resolved against mootness. Indeed, P.P. contends that an appeal challenging a medication order should never be deemed moot based on the fundamental liberty interests at stake, or at least not unless the petitioner shows "that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged [medication order]." See Sibron , 392 U.S. at 57.
¶13 I assume without deciding, in P.P.’s favor, that the stigma that potentially arises from the existence of a medication order is a collateral consequence that could, at least under some circumstances, render an otherwise moot issue not moot for purposes of challenging the order on appeal.5 Further, I assume without deciding that P.P. need not provide affirmative evidence that he does, or likely will, face some amount of stigma from the April 2020 order, and that it is the County's burden to show that the April 2020 order creates no risk of stigma. But see Diaz v. Duckworth , 143 F.3d 345, 346 (7th Cir. 1998) (). I also assume that whatever stigma could be caused by a medication order can be remedied by reversing the order. Having made these assumptions, I conclude that the County shows that resolving P.P.’s sufficiency challenge to the April 2020 medication order would not practically affect mental-health-related stigma faced by P.P. As I now explain, this is due to the presence of other orders that limit his liberties based on findings regarding his mental health—orders which, so far as the record shows, P.P. has never challenged, so that there is no prospect that these other orders will at some point also be reversed.
¶14 Explaining further, I agree with the County that reversing the April 2020 medication order would not have a practical effect on the assumed stigma associated with his having been involuntarily medicated under that order, given the existence of the other commitment and medication orders noted above that P.P. did not successfully contest. Those other commitment and medication orders stand as valid orders representing findings that P.P. was, at pertinent times, deemed by a court to be dangerous to himself or others and...
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