ROCK DRILLING, ETC. v. Mason & Hangar Co.
Decision Date | 16 May 1950 |
Citation | 90 F. Supp. 539 |
Parties | ROCK DRILLING, BLASTING, ROADS, SEWERS, VIADUCTS, BRIDGES, FOUNDATIONS, EXCAVATIONS & CONCRETE WORK, etc., LOCAL UNION NO. 17, v. MASON & HANGAR CO., Inc. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Francis Martocci, Charles DeLa Vergne, Kingston, N. Y., Boudin, Cohn & Glickstein, New York City (Hyman N. Glickstein, Daniel W. Meyer, Jerome B. Lurie, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff.
Nevius, Brett & Kellogg, New York City, for defendant.
The defendant's motion is two-pronged. For one, it seeks dismissal of the action on the ground of want of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Secondly, it urges dismissal by reason of the insufficiency of the complaint.
The complaint alleges that plaintiff is an unincorporated labor union all of whose members are citizens of New York; that it represents employees in an industry affecting commerce; that it has brought the action in a representative capacity on behalf of such of its members as were employed by defendant in the performance of a certain contract between the defendant and the City of New York. Plaintiff prays for an award of $600,000, the aggregate of the damages sustained by such members. The complaint further alleges that defendant is a Virginia corporation; that the court has jurisdiction by virtue of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185, and by reason of diversity of the parties, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332. The crucial allegations are that defendant bribed one James Bove, an officer of the international union to which plaintiff local union belonged, for the purpose of causing upwards of four hundred members of the plaintiff, who were employed by defendant, to accept in payment for their services lower wages and, in general, less favorable working conditions than they would otherwise have obtained, and that Bove accomplished the purpose for which he was bribed.
One basis for the claim of want of jurisdiction is that it does not appear that the amount in controversy exceeds $3,000 when calculated separately for each of the injured employees, and that the claims of the several employees may not be aggregated to arrive at an amount sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Plaintiff does not controvert the assertion that the amount in controversy, if calculated with respect to each of the employees, does not exceed $3,000. Moreover, plaintiff concedes that aggregation of the several claims would not be permissible if this were really a spurious class suit — a suit where one sues on behalf of a class and the character of the right sought to be enforced is several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought. Rule 23(a) (3), Federal Rules Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.
Plaintiff, however, denies that the action belongs to the category of spurious class suits, and contends that Sec. 301(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(b), in effect, establishes the plaintiff union as trustee for the purpose of suing to enforce claims accruing to the employees it represents, provided only that the claims arise out of the employment relationship. According to plaintiff's theory, a union is authorized by the statute to sue in its own name and need not join the parties for whose benefit the action is brought. Moreover, under this reasoning, the amount in controversy is the total sum the union seeks to recover and the jurisdictional amount is present without aggregation. Local Union No. 497, etc., v. Joplin & P. R. Co., 8 Cir., 1923, 287 F. 473.
I think there is no doubt but that plaintiff's action prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act would have been classified as a spurious class suit. The question is thus squarely presented whether Sec. 301(b) has accomplished such a change as plaintiff alleges. Has it in fact appointed the union a quasi trustee or a trustee ad prosequendum to enforce the several claims of its members in all or some categories of action?
Defendant also attacks plaintiff's claim that jurisdiction is founded not only on diversity but on Sec. 301(b). It denies that Sec. 301(b) is a jurisdictional provision. It asserts that in any event the section applies only to suits on collective bargaining contracts and is not applicable here. Moreover, defendant argues that plaintiff seeks to apply § 301(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which was passed in 1947, retroactively and that this may not be done.
The second aspect of defendant's motion, that which attacks the sufficiency of the complaint, also ultimately depends upon the answer to the question of the proper interpretation of § 301(b). If the plaintiff is by virtue of § 301 (b) a trustee to prosecute, then it is specifically endowed with capacity, and it is a "party authorized by statute" and meets the real party in interest requirement of Rule 17(a), Federal Rules Civil Procedure. Otherwise, the complaint would be defective. Surely plaintiff could not qualify as the representative of a class in a class suit action since it is not a member of the class. Rule 23(a), Federal Rules Civil Procedure. Nor is plaintiff the assignee of the several claims.
The portions of the Taft-Hartley Act most relevant to this case are Sec. 301(a) and Sec. 301(b), which read as follows:
The language upon which plaintiff focuses attention is: "Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States." As already indicated, plaintiff reads this language to invest the union with authority to sue on behalf of the designated class or on behalf of members of that class. A sense of self-restraint motivates the plaintiff to limit the broad sweep of this grant of power to controversies arising out of the employment relationship. Such a limitation confessedly is not expressed in the statute. The motivation behind the proposed limitation reveals the plaintiff's awareness of the weakness of the entire argument it makes. The limitation suggests, by illustration, the host of questions which the Congress has left unanswered if by the language of Sec. 301(b) it meant to appoint the union the litigating agent for those it represents as collective bargaining representative. What categories of claims may the union assert? Shall it be limited to claims arising out of the employment relationship or may it...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Association of Westinghouse v. Westinghouse El. Corp.
...F. Supp. 669; United Shoe Workers v. Le Danne Footwear, D.C.D.Mass.1949, 83 F. Supp. 714. 13 See Rock Drilling etc. Local Union No. 17 v. Mason & Hangar Co., D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1950, 90 F.Supp. 539. 14 Restatement, Judgments § 85(1). (1942). 15 United Protective Workers of America v. Ford Motor C......
-
Food & Service Trades Council v. Retail Associates
...108 F.Supp. 871; Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union of America, 4 Cir., 1948, 167 F.2d 183; Rock Drilling, etc. v. Mason & Hangar Co., Inc., D.C.N.Y.1950, 90 F.Supp. 539; Textile Workers Union of America, CIO v. Arista Mills Co., 4 Cir., 1951, 193 F.2d 529; J. I. Case Co. v. Na......
-
Ketcher v. SHEET METAL WORKERS'INTERNATIONAL ASS'N
...signatory to the contract, * * *." 204 F.2d at page 496. 5 We do not overlook the fact that in Rock Drilling, etc., Local Union No. 17 v. Mason & Hangar Co., D.C.N.Y., 90 F. Supp. 539, 542, Judge Rifkind said: "* * * the gist of the statute (Section 185(b) is to dispense with the class suit......
-
Employing Plasterer's Ass'n v. OPERATIVE PLASTERERS, ETC.
...N. L. R. B. v. Somerset Classics, 2 Cir., 193 F.2d 613, 615; N. L. R. B. v. Lund, 8 Cir., 103 F.2d 815, 819; Rock Drilling, etc. v. Mason and Hangar Co., D.C., 90 F.Supp. 539. As to defendants' third contention in support of their motion to dismiss, I hold that plaintiff's failure to bargai......