Rock of Ages Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 203-75
| Decision Date | 01 June 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 203-75,203-75 |
| Citation | 134 Vt. 356,360 A.2d 63 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | ROCK OF AGES CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF TAXES. |
Paterson, Gibson, Noble & Brownell, Montpelier, for plaintiff.
M. Jerome Diamond, Atty. Gen., and Georgiana O. Miranda and Richard Johnston King, Asst. Attys. Gen., Montpelier, for defendant.
Before SMITH, DALEY, LARROW, and BILLINGS, JJ., and KEYSER, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned.
On November 22, 1972, the Vermont Department of Taxes issued an assessment of additional sales/use tax against appellee Rock of Ages, a Vermont corporation located in Barre, Vermont. The appellee taxpayer is engaged in the business of the operation of granite quarries and the selling of stone that is quarried there. The additional assessment covered the period from June, 1969, through September, 1972, and was levied on the liquid oxygen, drilling rods and bits, and explosives consumed by the appellee in its quarry operations. The assessment included interest and penalty charges, and amounted to $21,355.07.
Appellee, pursuant to 32 V.S.A. § 9777, filed its appeal from this assessment to the Commissioner of Taxes on the ground that the items taxed were consumed in such a fashion as to be exempt from the tax under 32 V.S.A. § 9741(a)(14). A hearing was held before the commissioner on March 19, 1974. On April 23, 1974, the commissioner tendered his determination finding that the appellee's use of the taxed materials was not encompassed by the term 'manufacture' within the meaning of § 9741(a)(14) and therefore affirmed the department's assessment, but reduced the penalities and interest, lowering the amount due by $2,673.65.
Rock of Ages appealed the commissioner's ruling to Washington Superior Court. The matter came up for hearing before the court on April 30, 1975. By its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order dated June 27, 1975, the superior court held that appellee's consumption of the goods in question did form a part of the manufacturing process and was to be included in the language of 32 V.S.A. § 9741(a)(14). In accordance with its conclusion, the court reversed the decision of the commissioner and vacated the additional tax assessment. The commissioner had filed his appeal from the judgment below arguing that it was 'contrary to the spirit and letter of § 9741(a)(14)'. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we agree with the commissioner and reverse the decision of the superior court.
The sole question presented for our review is whether Rock of Ages, by removing blocks of stone from its quarries via a drilling and blasting process, may be said to 'manufacture' those blocks for purposes of § 9741(a)(14). In resolving this dispute, it is necessary to include a brief description of the process involved. The initial operation of appellee in its quarrying is to free large blocks of stone from the rock in appropriate sizes and shapes. To do this, drills and bits are used to make fault lines in the stone to outline the cutting path to be followed. The actual cutting is done by a process which unites oxygen and fuel oil to form a torch that severs the stone. The severed mass is then removed from its resting places by explosives. Appellee contends, and the superior court so found, that the consumables employed in the above manner are exempt from the sales/use tax under the following language of 32 V.S.A. § 9741(a)(14):
Tangible personal property which becomes an ingredient or component part of or is consumed or destroyed or loses its identity in the manufacture of tangible personal property for later sale . . ..
The crucial word here is, of course, 'manufacture'. Nowhere in Chapter 233 of Title 32 is the term defined, therefore we are required to endow it with a meaning that comports with the legislative intent as expressed in the legislation involved. Camp v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 131 Vt. 536, 310 A.2d 35 (1973). As we noted in McClure Newspapers, Inc. v. Vermont Dept. of Taxes, 132 Vt. 169, 315 A.2d 452 (1974), the case law from other jurisdictions is of little help in this process...
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Tarrant v. Department of Taxes
...observe that material changes in statutes evince an intent to change the effect of existing law. See Rock of Ages Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 134 Vt. 356, 359, 360 A.2d 63, 65 (1975) (construing amendment that expressly brought extraction of mineral deposits under purview of manufacturi......
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Ash Grove Cement Co. v. Neb. Dep't of Revenue
...670, 467 N.E.2d 472 (1984) ; Solite Corp. v. County of King George , 220 Va. 661, 261 S.E.2d 535 (1980) ; Rock of Ages Corporation v. Com'r of Taxes , 134 Vt. 356, 360 A.2d 63 (1976) ; Iowa Limestone Co. v. Cook , 211 Iowa 534, 233 N.W. 682 (1930) ; Inhabitants of Leeds v. Maine Crushed Roc......
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Solite Corp. v. King George County
...of the United States. Courts have uniformly held that the quarrying of rock is not manufacturing. See, e. g., Rock of Ages Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 360 A.2d 63 (Vt.1976). In addition, a majority of courts have held that the process of crushing and screening of rock into various sizes......
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Tilcon-Warren Quarries Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue
...(1938); Commonwealth v. Welsh Mountain Mining & Kaolin Mfg. Co., 265 Pa. 380, 382-383, 108 A. 722 (1919); Rock of Ages Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 134 Vt. 356, 360 A.2d 63 (1975). In addition, numerous courts have held that the crushing and screening of rock into various sizes do not co......