Rock v. Quindley

• Decision Date: 01 February 1896
• Parties: LITTLE ROCK v. QUINDLEY
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

33 S.W. 1053

61 Ark. 622

LITTLE ROCK v. QUINDLEY

Supreme Court of Arkansas

February 1, 1896

Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, JOSEPH W. MARTIN, Judge.

Judgment reversed and case remanded.

J. W Blackwood, City Attorney, for appellants.

1. The circuit judge held the act unconstitutional, upon the ground that it was in violation of sec. 23, art. 5, const. 1874. The law is, and purports to be, an independent act. It nowhere attempts to revive or amend the provisions of any act, or to confer anything by reference to the title of any other act nor to revise, alter or amend any prior act or law. It repeals all inconsistent acts. It is not unconstitutional. 13 Mich. 481; 70 Ill. 388; 109 id. 593; 20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases, 32; Cooley on Const. Lim. p. 185 (4 ed); 86 Ala. 22. Statutes which amend others by implication are not within the provision. The constitutional provision reaches those cases where the act is strictly amendatory or revisory in its character. 40 Ala. 77; 11 S.W. 265; 10 Col. 403; 4 L.R.A. 94; 47 Ark. 480; 52 id. 329. See also Suth. St. Constr. sec. 135; Sedgw. Const. St. & Const. Law, p. 530; 28 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 276; Potter, Dwar. on St. & Const. p. 154; Cooley Const. Lim. p. 152. The enactment of one law is as much a repeal of all inconsistent laws as if those inconsistent laws had been repealed by express words. 61 Am. Dec. 331; 50 Ark. 132; 46 Ark. 229; 54 id. 346. The power of courts to declare legislative acts unconstitutional is to be exercised with the most guarded circumspection and care. 52 Am. Dec. 694; 63 id. 487; 89 id. 221; Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 194. The statute must be plainly and manifestly unconstitutional. 41 Am. Dec. 636; 26 id. 221; 59 id. 756. In doubtful cases, legislative acts are never pronounced unconstitutional. 92 Am. Dec. 646; Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 194-195. Courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or the policy of the law. The legislature had the power to pass the law, and it must stand.

Whipple & Whipple, for appellees.

A regular system of organization and procedure is provided for improvement districts in Sand. & H. Dig. secs. 5337 to 5362, etc. Sec., 5267 id., prescribes the duties of city collector. Now, in lieu of this complete system, the legislature presents a crude, incomplete and obscure act, covering but a small portion of the ground. It is strictly amendatory of every one of the above sections, and yet does not re-enact any portion of them. It confers greatly increased duties upon the city collector, without so much as referring to sec. 5267. It repeals nothing. It relates only to cities of the first class. It is within the letter and very spirit of sec. 23, art. 5, Const. It both amends prior acts, and confers and extends the provisions of prior acts, without so much as a reference to the titles of the acts so affected. The reasons of this rule are laid down in Cooley on Lim. p. 15. See also 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 278; 4 L.R.A. 742. All that is really attempted by this act is to strike out "collector" where it occurs and insert "city collector." It attempts to abolish all other collectors, and devolves upon the new collector but one or two duties, and practically abolishes all other duties required of collectors. 39 F. 380. The leaning of the courts is so strong against repeals by construction as almost to establish the doctrine of "no repeal by implication." Potter's Dwar. St. p. 154; 3 Bibb (Ky.), 180; 7 Nev. 15; 50 Ind. 203; 70 Ill. 391; 4 Neb. 354; 43 N.J. 388; 2 Or. 71; 31 Ark. 239; 47 id. 482; 49 id. 133; 52 id. 295.

RIDDICK J. BUNN, C. J., dissents.

OPINION

RIDDICK, J.

This action arose upon a petition of James O'Brien, as collector for the city of Little Rock, for a writ of mandamus to compel A. J. Quindley, as collector, and certain others, as commissioners of the Scott Street Paving District No. 46, to deliver the tax books for said district to said petitioner. The only question before us is whether the act of the legislature, approved April 19, 1895, entitled "An act to provide for the collection of assessments by the local improvement districts in cities of the first class," is a valid law or not. The act in question requires that "in the collection of all assessments in local improvement districts in cities of the first class the assessment shall be payable to the city collector," etc. Under this act the appellant, as city collector, claims the right to possession of the tax books for certain improvement districts in the city of Little Rock.

It is contended by the appellee that the act is in conflict with section 23 of article 5 of the state constitution, which provides that "no law shall be revived, amended or the provisions thereof extended or conferred by reference to its title only; but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended or conferred shall be reenacted and published at length." It is argued that the statute in question is amendatory of certain sections of the digest relating to the levying and collecting of assessments for local improvements in towns and cities, and that it is void because it does not re-enact and publish at length the sections as amended. After a consideration of the question, our conclusion is that this position is not tenable. The act in question does not expressly amend any section of the statute. Whatever amendatory effect it had upon the law existing at the time of its passage was by implication only. The rule is settled, by a decided weight of authority, that repeals by implication are not within the meaning of this provision of the constitution, and it is not essential that they should re-enact, or even refer to, the acts or sections which, by implication, they repeal or amend. Watkins v. Eureka Springs, 49 Ark. 131, 4 S.W. 384; Scoles v. State, 47 Ark. 476, 1 S.W. 769; People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481; Cooley's Con. Lim. 182, 185; Sutherland, Stat. Construction, sec. 135, and cases cited.

The purpose of such a provision in the constitution has seldom been better expressed than by Mr. Justice Cooley in the old case of People v. Mahaney. "The mischief designed to be remedied," he said, "was the enactment of amendatory statutes in terms so blind that legislatures themselves were sometimes deceived in regard to their effect, and the public, from the difficulty in making the necessary examination and comparison, failed to become apprised of the changes made in the laws. An amendatory act which purported only to insert certain words, or to substitute one phrase for another in an act or section which was only referred to but...