Rockafellow v. Newcomb

• Decision Date: 30 September 1870
• Parties: ABRAHAM J. ROCKAFELLOWv.MARY A. H. NEWCOMB.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

57 Ill. 186

1870 WL 6605 (Ill.)

ABRAHAM J. ROCKAFELLOW

v.MARY A. H. NEWCOMB.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1870.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. ERASTUS S. WILLIAMS, Judge, presiding.

The opinion states the case.

Messrs. BENNETT & VEEDER, and Mr. IRA O. WILKINSON, for the appellant.

Mr. DANIEL L. SHOREY, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE THORNTON delivered the opinion of the Court:

Appellant filed his bill, in the court below, alleging, in substance, that he and appellee entered into a marriage contract, which she has refused to fulfill; in consideration of which, and induced by urgent and repeated solicitations, and her false and fraudulent representations, he executed and delivered to her a deed to a tract of land adjoining the city of Chicago, and known as the Hyde Park property in this record; and that appellee conveyed to him some Iowa land, not in consideration of the Hyde Park property; but, as she stated, to relieve her from continued annoyances on the part of her mother, who was constantly importuning her to convey the Iowa land to her brother Henry; that the Iowa land was worth about $700, and the Hyde Park property about $7000; that he tendered her a deed to the Iowa land; and praying that the deed executed by him be set aside, or appellee be compelled to reconvey.

Answer and replication were filed; and upon the hearing the court dismissed the bill.

Does the evidence sustain the allegation of a marriage contract, before, and subsisting at the time of, the exchange of deeds? We think it does. The deeds were executed and exchanged on the 21st of September, 1868.

Appellant testified, that by request of appellee he visited her on the 4th of July, 1868; remained two days; and they talked of marriage. In July again, and in August, he visited her, at her request, when she said she had no objection to the marriage, and had determined to marry him. Mutual visits were interchanged, and a correspondence carried on between them until the 10th of September. At this time she spoke of the trade, and said: “I wish you would make the trade you and Emily have been talking of so long.” She wished him to have the Iowa land, to avoid the importunities of her mother in behalf of her brother Henry; that she would keep the deed to the Hyde Park property in her own hands, and not put it on record, and after the marriage both deeds should be destroyed. Thus urged, and upon such promise, he agreed to make the exchange. On the 19th of September he again visited her, and she informed him the deeds were ready. He declined to proceed further. She insisted and urged that, as she had promised not to record the deed, his refusal evinced an entire want of confidence in her, and the marriage need not be solemnized. He replied that he would execute the deed, upon her promise not to record it. She assented, and the deeds were signed on the 21st of September.

Appellee contradicts these statements to a great extent; and her sister Emily testified that the Iowa land was the consideration for the deed.

He is, however, very strongly corroborated. After she had refused to marry him, he, with his attorney, Mr. Bennett, had an interview with her, and tendered a deed for the Iowa land, and demanded a deed for the Hyde Park property, and said to her: “You know you agreed to keep the deed in your hands and not record it.” She replied, “What if I did, and what if I didn't; what are you going to do about it? John Van Arman is my lawyer.” Mr. Bennett distinctly recollects this language. In letters from appellee to appellant, in October, she said: “I have never had that deed recorded, though you accuse me, without any reason, of forgetting my word.” “I have thought you had some regard for me; and that your happiness, in some measure, depended on me.” “I feel so sorry on your account, a good deal more than on my own.” “Try and forget this, and bestow your affections on another.” “Is it possible that you would be willing to give me the place in your family that you proposed, &c.” In a letter of appellant to appellee, introduced by her, of date August 31st, he said: “I could not see you often enough, but loved you too well. Now, dear Mary, this is the truth.” “Permit me to come down on tomorrow's train, and receive me back to your heart.” In one to Emily, dated October 8, he said: “Do you think it advisable for your sister Mary to come into my family? Mary says she loves me, and I think I do her.” Mary McCorkle testified that in October, appellee informed her that she had determined to marry appellant. Harsh testified that, in speaking to appellee about the marriage, he said to her, “I thought there was a matrimonial difficulty;” she replied, “I guess that is so.” Mr. Waite, in detailing a conversation with appellant, brought out by appellee, testified that appellant said he made the deed, supposing that he and Mary were to be married; they had been engaged for some time; she said as soon as they were married she would give up the deed; that the best way to quiet her mother was to make him a deed to the Iowa land, and he make a deed to her, so that the transaction would look right.

It seems that Emily Newcomb, sister of appellee, had been negotiating with appellant, about this trade, for more than a year prior to the courtship between the parties, and had failed in the accomplishment of her purpose. She resided in Chicago; appellee and her mother lived in Galesburg. The mother, probably without the knowledge of appellee, obtained the deed and sent it to Emily, who had it recorded. When this was done Emily purchased a part of the lot; she knew its value; owned property near to it; is a prominent actor in the entire transaction; and is a quasi real estate dealer in Chicago.

From the whole proof, the Hyde Park property, at time of the trade, was worth five thousand dollars; the Iowa land about seven hundred dollars.

We are satisfied that at the time of the trade there was a subsisting marriage contract between the parties. Their conduct and correspondence can not be explained upon any other hypothesis. The frequent visits; the intimacy for months; the numerous letters; the expressions of endearment, all prove the existence of the relation. An express promise need not be proved. A mutual engagement may be inferred from constant and devoted attentions gladly welcomed, reciprocal affection, and the interchange of letters expressive of earnest love.

What then was the consideration in the deed to the Hyde Park property? What induced its execution? The inequality in the value of the two pieces of property was too great to justify the conclusion that the Iowa land constituted the consideration. There was other cause--other inducement, of a stronger character. This man, with his fervid passion and strong love, was not well matched against an accomplished woman, in the incipient stage of their engagement. She requests, he demurs; she urges, he yields. The relation between the parties, and the consequent influence of the woman over the man, and the promise not to record the deed, but destroy it after marriage, make the real, the sole, consideration.

A marriage contract, then, was made. It was a contract which was valid and effectual in law. Marriage is a valuable consideration. There is no stronger consideration in law upon which to found a gift or grant. “Marriage contracts do not differ in principle from other species of contracts, where mutual and concurrent acts are to be performed.”...