Rocker Spring Co. v. William D. Gibson Co.
| Decision Date | 07 September 1893 |
| Docket Number | 22,871,,22,594,22,872. |
| Citation | 58 F. 217 |
| Parties | ROCKER SPRING CO. v. WILLIAM D. GIBSON CO. (three cases.) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Banning Banning & Payson, for complainant.
Offield Towle & Linthicum, for defendant.
Motion is made for preliminary injunction in three actions in equity by the Rocker Spring Company against the William D. Gibson Company upon the following letters patent, respectively: (1) No. 354,043, of December 7, 1886, to M. D. & T. A. Connolly (2) No. 247,472, of September 27, 1881, to Biersdorf & Bunker; (3) No. 297,108, of April 22, 1884, to W. J. Bunker. The complainant's claim rests mainly on the first-mentioned (Connollys') patent, and, for right to injunction, a decision is shown in the northern district of Ohio sustaining the first two patents, in Spring Co. v. Flinn, 46 F. 109. Public acquiescence is alleged as to all, and submissions to injunction, where suits have been brought.
It is asserted that these patents cover the use in platform rocking-chairs of 'broad, short, stiff springs, closely coiled, rigidly attached to brackets at their ends, and constituting the only connection between the rockers and the base of the chair, so as to dispense with ancillary or additional fastening devices.' If the Connolly patent appears valid, and entitled to this construction, for the purposes of this motion, I think infringement by defendant is clear, and the injunction must issue. The complainant owns these patents, and its principal business appears to be the manufacture of spring attachments for rockers. Its litigation in the Flinn Case was arduous and expensive, resulting in decree in its favor. There can be no just question as to the conduct of complainant in that matter. Its case was fairly presented, and the contest was bona fide. Under these circumstances, it has earned the right to protection by injunction against other infringers, unless new defenses are clearly shown, which did not enter into consideration at the other hearing, and which strongly tend to invalidate the patent, or change the construction there placed.
Respect for the rights and privileges guarantied by the law for the encouragement of invention, and well-recognized rules of comity, as well, forbid reconsideration here, for the purposes of this motion, at least, of the facts which were actually litigated and considered by the court in the Flinn Case. On the other hand, if the new defense appears material and cogent, presenting a different, new, and other state of facts than shown in the previous case, it is proper and necessary to give consideration to the new phase. As held by the circuit court of appeals, in this circuit, in Starling v. Plow Co., 9 U.S. App. 318, 3 C. C. A. 471, 53 F. 119, (affirming 49 F. 637,) in such case 'the rule of comity has no application, or its application is limited.' It would be unjust to grant the preliminary injunction, based wholly upon that adjudication, if it appears probable that the new facts, well proved, would have led, or would lead, to different results. The record in the Flinn Case is here, with complainant's moving papers, and it is claimed in behalf of complainant that the defense brings nothing 'which was not produced in kind before Judge Ricks' in the former case. The issue will be considered as narrowed to a clear showing of material difference, and without unnecessary comment upon the merits, which must be determined at final hearing.
1. This record shows that the Flinn defense was entirely directed to acts of Flinn and his foreman, Bell, under him, and to proving his knowledge, use, and invention of platform rocker springs prior to the alleged Connolly invention, and that Flinn's patents were entitled to priority. There was no testimony upon the part of that defendant as to the prior state of the art,...
To continue reading
Request your trial