Rockey v. 84 Lumber Co.
Decision Date | 21 April 1993 |
Docket Number | Nos. 91-2001,91-2335,92-248,s. 91-2001 |
Citation | 611 N.E.2d 789,66 Ohio St.3d 221 |
Parties | ROCKEY, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. 84 LUMBER COMPANY, Appellant and Cross-Appellee. WALSH et al., Appellees, v. JAGADEESAN, Appellant. COPES et al., Appellees, v. GOOD SAMARITAN HOSPITAL et al., Appellants. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. R.C. 2309.01 is in conflict with Civ.R. 8(A) and is invalid and of no force and effect.
2. The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, which were promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, must control over subsequently enacted inconsistent statutes purporting to govern procedural matters.
On November 28, 1988, plaintiff-appellee and cross-appellant, Mildred C. Rockey, commenced a personal injury action in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County against defendant-appellant and cross- appellee, 84 Lumber Company. Appellant's prayer for relief in her complaint requested " * * * compensatory damages which are reasonable * * *."
On July 17, 1989, two days before trial, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint instanter setting forth a $300,000 prayer for relief. On the morning of trial, the court denied the motion, but stated the recovery could exceed $25,000 to a reasonable amount. After a jury trial, a verdict for the plaintiff was returned in the sum of $60,000.
On August 14, 1989, defendant filed a timely motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, remittitur, or in the alternative, new trial. On September 27, 1989, the court issued its opinion and judgment entry reducing the jury verdict to $25,000.
The court of appeals upheld the trial court's judgment on the ground that plaintiff's " * * * failure to timely amend her pleadings setting forth a specific monetary demand in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars as required by R.C. 2309.01(D), necessarily limits her maximum recovery to twenty-five thousand dollars." (Emphasis sic.)
This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a motion and cross-motion to certify the record.
These cases have been consolidated with case No. 91-2001 for purposes of final determination. The facts of these cases are stated infra.
Fadel & Beyer, William D. Beyer and Steven D. Jones, for appellee and cross-appellant in case No. 91-2001.
McNeal, Shick, Archibald & Biro Co., L.P.A., and Charles H. Bragg, for appellant and cross-appellee in case No. 91-2001.
Denmead & Maloney and Craig Denmead, urging invalidity of R.C. 2309.01 for amicus curiae, Patsy E. Cook, in case No. 91-2001.
Hermanies & Major and Ronald D. Major; Casper & Casper and Michael R. Thomas, urging invalidity of R.C. 2309.01 for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, in case No. 91-2001.
The Okey Law Firm, L.P.A., Eugene P. Okey and Brian R. Wilson, for appellees in case No. 91-2335.
Jacobson, Maynard, Tuschman & Kalur Co., L.P.A., Robert C. Maynard, Joseph A. Farchione, Jr., and Steven J. Hupp; and Fritz Byers, for appellant in case No. 91-2335.
Gardner, Ewing & Souza and C. David Ewing; Hochman & Roach Co., L.P.A., Gary D. Plunkett and James B. Hochman, for appellees in case No. 92-248.
Jacobson, Maynard, Tuschman & Kalur Co., L.P.A., Robert C. Maynard, Gregory C. Gibson, Patrick K. Adkinson and Steven J. Hupp; and Fritz Byers, for appellants in case No. 92-248.
Rockey v. 84 Lumber Co.
We cannot address the issue of the trial court's application of R.C. 2309.01 to this cause without initially addressing the arguments raised by amici curiae that R.C. 2309.01 is invalid and of no force and effect by virtue of Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, for being in direct conflict with Civ.R. 8(A). For the following reasons, we hold that R.C. 2309.01 is in conflict with Civ.R. 8(A) and is invalid and of no force and effect.
R.C. 2309.01 states, in pertinent part:
R.C. 2309.01(B)(2) prohibits a plaintiff commencing an action from specifying in the complaint the specific amount of monetary damages where the damages sought are in excess of $25,000. This statute is in direct conflict with Civ.R. 8(A).
Civ.R. 8(A) provides:
Civ.R. 8(A) requires all complainants to specify in the complaint the actual amount of damages sought. The complainant has the option to later amend the demand for judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 54(C), but plaintiff is not required to do so.
It is obvious that R.C. 2309.01, which became effective October 20, 1987, as amended January 5, 1988, is in direct conflict with Civ.R. 8(A), since a plaintiff who complies with the mandate of R.C. 2309.01 automatically is in noncompliance with the Civ.R. 8(A) requirement of specifying an actual amount of damages and, thereby, fails to state an actionable cause. See Jemo Associates, Inc. v. Garman (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 267, 24 O.O.3d 358, 436 N.E.2d 1353.
Furthermore, R.C. 2309.01 also conflicts with Civ.R. 8(A) by placing additional obligations on the plaintiff. Prior to enactment of the statute, plaintiff had the option of filing an amended demand for judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 54(C). However, since plaintiff could specify an actual amount of damages in the original complaint under Civ.R. 8(A), which Civ.R. 8(A) requires plaintiff to do, he did not have to amend the demand for judgment at a later date. With the enactment of R.C. 2309.01, plaintiff is required to amend the complaint in order to state an actionable cause and comply with Civ.R. 8(A). This additional requirement has led to harsh results in that plaintiffs who specify no actual damages in the original complaint, in an attempt to comply with R.C. 2309.01, face a judgment for zero damages when they do not later comply with the R.C. 2309.01 requirement that they amend the complaint. Regardless of whether these situations are framed as failure to comply with Civ.R. 54(C) or as noncompliance with R.C. 2309.01, they are all glaring examples of the inherent unfairness which results from the R.C. 2309.01 requirement that plaintiff specify no damages in the original complaint when those damages are in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars. In addition, Civ.R. 15(A), which governs amendment of complaints, requires leave of court or written consent of the adverse party to obtain such an amendment after a responsive pleading is served. Thus, if the court in its discretion refused to grant plaintiff leave to amend the complaint and defendant refused consent to grant same, plaintiff would be in noncompliance with R.C. 2309.01. Thus, a clear conflict exists between R.C. 2309.01 and the Civil Rules.
The Civil Rules are the law of this state with regard to practice and procedure in our state courts. Bishop v. Grdina (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 26, 28, 20 OBR 213, 214, 485 N.E.2d 704, 705-706. The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, which were promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 5(B) Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, 1 must control over subsequently enacted inconsistent statutes purporting to govern procedural matters. See Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr. (C.P.1976), 3 O.O.3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903; Graley v. Satayatham (C.P.1976), 74 O.O.2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832; see, also, Jacobs v. Shelly & Sands, Inc. (1976), 51 Ohio App.2d 44, 47, 5 O.O.3d 165, 167, 365 N.E.2d 1259, 1262; In re Vickers Children (1983), 14 Ohio App.3d 201, 204, 14 OBR 228, 231, 470 N.E.2d 438, 442. This interpretation is the only one consistent with the original reason for adopting Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution--that of constitutionally granting rule-making power to the Supreme Court. In re Vickers Children, supra.
Thus, since the pleading requirements of R.C. 2309.01 are in conflict with the pleading requirements of Civ.R. 8(A) on a procedural matter, Civ.R. 8(A) prevails. The requirements of R.C. 2309.01 are, therefore, invalid and of no force and effect.
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals in case No. 91-2001 and reinstate the jury verdict in the amount of $60,000.
Walsh v. Jagadeesan
On January 25, 1989, plaintiffs-appellees, Marcus J. Walsh and James F. Walsh, commenced a medical malpractice action in the Court of Common Pleas...
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