Rockhill Iron & Coal Co. v. Fulton County

• Decision Date: 13 October 1902
• Docket Number: 16
• Citation: 204 Pa. 44,53 A. 530
• Parties: Rockhill Iron & Coal Company, Appellant, v. Fulton County
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

53 A. 530

204 Pa. 44

Rockhill Iron & Coal Company, Appellant, v. Fulton County

No. 16

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

October 13, 1902

Argued June 3, 1902

Appeal, No. 16, May T., 1902, by plaintiff, from order of C.P. Fulton Co., June T., 1901, No. 62, sustaining decision of county commissioners on tax assessments in case of Rockhill Iron & Coal Company v. Fulton County. Reversed.

Appeal from decision of county commissioners on tax assessment. Before McSWOPE, P.J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the case.

Error assigned was the order of the court.

George A. Smith, for appellant. -- Under the act of assembly of April 19, 1889, the lands of the appellant cannot be assessed, for taxation, at a higher valuation than other lands of like character in the vicinity -- "with due regard to the valuation and assessment of other real estate in the county."

In other words taxation must be uniform and fair. One man's property cannot be taxed higher than another's unless of greater value. Yet that is what has been done in this case and for that we complain of the decree and judgment of the court below, and seek its reversal.

John P Sipes, for appellee. -- The act of 1889 is unconstitutional: Kister's Petition, 9 Pa. Dist. Rep. 64.

There is nothing before this court but the record: Rand v. King, 134 Pa. 641; Christner v. John, 171 Pa. 527; Diamond Street, 196 Pa. 259; Mauch Chunk v. Nescopeck, 21 Pa. 46; Kimber v. Schuylkill County, 20 Pa. 366; Silver v. Schuylkill County, 20 Pa. 369; Case of the Phila. & Trenton R.R. Co., 6 Wheat. 41; Holland v. White, 120 Pa. 228; Young's Petition, 9 Pa. 215; Hughes v. Kline, 30 Pa. 227.

On the merits of the case the judgment of the court below should be affirmed.

Before MITCHELL, DEAN, FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT and POTTER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE DEAN:

The plaintiff is the owner of a large body of land lying in the three counties of Fulton, Huntingdon and Bedford. The land in Fulton county amounts to about 4,000 acres made up of separate tracts adjoining each other. Altogether, there were twenty-four separate tracts valued and assessed for taxation in Fulton county. As to eight of these, no complaint is made; as to the remaining sixteen, appellant alleges the valuation is grossly excessive and out of proportion to the valuation put upon other lands belonging to resident owners, of the same quality in the same county.

As to these sixteen tracts, appellant appealed from the action of the assessor to the board of county commissioners, who overruled the appeal; it then appealed, under the act of April 19, 1889, to the court of common pleas of Fulton county. That court, after hearing the parties, made this decree: "After a very careful examination of all the testimony taken on this hearing, we discover no sufficient reason to justify us in altering the assessment of the properties as made by the assessor of Wells township, and approved by the board of commissioners and we, therefore, dismiss the appeal." From this decree, under the provisions of the Act of June 26, 1901, P.L. 601, the iron and coal company brings this appeal before this court.

As preliminary to a discussion of the questions involved, we are compelled to say, we have had but little if any aid from the court below. No opinion is filed; there is but a pro forma decree dismissing the appeal. Yet the constitutionality of the acts of 1889 and 1901 was attacked in the court below; and it was argued, that even if constitutional, both were subject to different and wholly conflicting interpretations. If the appeal to the common pleas raised the merits of the complaint, it was the duty of that court to rule on the competency or incompetency of the evidence, to specifically set out its findings of fact and conclusions of law, so that this court would have the case in an orderly shape for review; the duty of the learned court of common pleas in such a case, is not that of a clerk to the county commissioners, but that of a court, whose duty it is, to hear, deliberate and decide, and then make a proper record of its adjudication. As this record presents itself to us, we must take up the questions of law and fact de novo, without the advantage of the reasons and conclusions of the learned judge of the court below. The disapproval by this court of such a record, as the one before us, in Morgan's Appeal, 125 Pa. 561, Scheppers's Appeal, 125 Pa. 598, and Williams v. Concord Congregational Church, 193 Pa. 120, is pointedly applicable. True, in those cases the court reversed, without opinion filed, the findings of fact and conclusions of law by a master and auditor. But here the record is still more meager. It practically shows nothing of value to us but the first assessment by the township assessor.

First, as to the duty of the appellate courts on an appeal from the township assessor's valuation. The first act, that of April 15, 1834, authorized an appeal to the county commissioners from the valuation fixed by the assessors. For nearly seventy years, the uniform interpretation of this act has been, that it was the duty of the commissioners to hear and determine the facts and to revise the valuation according to the facts. Before the adoption of the present constitution, special acts for different counties were passed authorizing appeals from the valuation of the commissioners to the courts of common pleas. But no general act was passed, until that of 1889. The provisions of that act, so far as they are material to our present purpose, are as follows:

"An act authorizing appeals from assessment of taxes in this commonwealth to the court of common pleas," provides: "That any owner of real estate or taxable property in this commonwealth, who may feel aggrieved by the last or any future assessment or valuation of his real estate or taxable property may appeal from the decision of the county commissioners, or board of revision and appeal, to the court of common pleas of the county wherein such property is situated, and for that purpose may present to said court, or file in the prothonotary's office, within sixty days after the county commissioners or board of revision and appeal have held the appeals provided by law, and acted on said assessments and valuations, a petition signed by him, his agent or attorney, setting forth the facts in the case, and thereupon the said court shall proceed at the earliest convenient time to be by them appointed, of which notice shall be given to the county commissioners of the proper county, or to the board of revision and appeal of the proper city to hear the appeal, and the proofs in the case, and to make such orders and decrees touching the matter complained of as to the judges of said court may seem just and equitable, having due regard to the valuation and assessment made of other real estate in such county or city, the costs of the appeal and hearing to be apportioned or paid as the court may direct."

If there is one question more than another, in our system of self-government, which arouses the interest of the citizen it is that of the imposition of taxes; it comes home to, and directly affects all classes; they will bear with equanimity high taxation for any reasonable governmental purpose; they will not submit to unjust taxation for any purpose. The injunction of the constitution is: "All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax." The moment taxes within the territorial limits of a county are not uniform on the same class of subjects, the nonuniformity results in injustice to the taxpayer whose valuation is placed above that of his neighbor; the imperative necessity for prompt payment gives the complaining taxpayer but one remedy, and that is through appeal to the courts from the assessment or valuation; the very law which gives the...