Rockstroh v. AH Robins Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 February 1985
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. M-82-108.
• Citation: 602 F. Supp. 1259
• Parties: Sharon L. ROCKSTROH and Carl R. Rockstroh v. A.H. ROBINS COMPANY, INC. and Hugh J. Davis, Jr., M.D.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

602 F. Supp. 1259

Sharon L. ROCKSTROH and Carl R. Rockstroh v. A.H. ROBINS COMPANY, INC. and Hugh J. Davis, Jr., M.D.

Civ. A. No. M-82-108.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

February 20, 1985.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael A. Pretl, Nicole Schultheis, H. Robert Erwin, Jr., and Pretl & Schultheis, P.A., Baltimore, Md., for plaintiffs.

Charles P. Goodell, Jr., Susan T. Preston, and Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, Baltimore, Md., for defendant A.H. Robins Company, Inc.

Joseph G. Finnerty, Jr., Deborah E. Jennings, and Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, Md., for defendant Hugh J. Davis, Jr., M.D.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JAMES R. MILLER, Jr., District Judge.

Presently pending in this action are several Motions for Summary Judgment filed by defendant, A.H. Robins Company, Inc. ("Robins") (Paper Nos. 36-45), in which defendant Hugh J. Davis, Jr., M.D., has joined (Paper Nos. 46-55). Plaintiffs have filed answers to these motions (Paper Nos. 63-68), to which Robins has filed replies (Paper Nos. 70 & 75). Plaintiffs have filed also a supplemental memorandum (Paper No. 76), to which Robins has also filed a reply (Paper No. 77). No hearing is necessary to decide the motions. Local Rule 6(E).

I. Statute of Limitations

In four of the cases consolidated for trial in March 1985, defendants have moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. In Rockstroh v. A.H. Robins Co., M-82-108, Manipole v. A.H. Robins, M-83-347, Pearsall v. A.H. Robins Co., M-83-702, and Redmond v. A.H. Robins Co., M-83-1712, defendants assert that the plaintiffs' causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations (Paper Nos. 42-49). The plaintiffs in these cases have filed an opposition (Paper No. 63).

A. Which Law Applies

In diversity cases such as these, this court must apply the law of the forum state, Maryland, including its choice of law rules. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). In tort actions, Maryland applies the doctrine of lex loci delecti, so that the substantive law of the state where the wrong occurs governs. Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983). See also Pottratz v. Davis, 588 F.Supp. 949 at 951 (D.Md. June 1, 1984); President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Madden, 505 F.Supp. 557, 569 (D.Md.1980), aff'd in part and appeal dismissed in part, 660 F.2d 91 (4th Cir.1981). As to matters of procedural law, however, Maryland law applies the law of the forum. Doughty v. Prettyman, 219 Md. 83, 88, 148 A.2d 438 (1959). See also President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Madden, 505 F.Supp. at 569.

Maryland law governs the applicability of the relevant statute of limitations. Pottratz v. Davis, at 952; Mills v. International Harvester Co., 554 F.Supp. 611, 612 (D.Md.1982); Doughty v. Prettyman, 219 Md. at 88, 148 A.2d 438. Therefore, the characterization, i.e., substantive or procedural, which a Maryland state court would give the statute of limitations of the state whose substantive law applies, is binding on this court. See Pottratz v. Davis, at 952; President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Madden, 505 F.Supp. at 571.

"Under Maryland law, a statute of limitations is generally considered to be procedural. Doughty v. Prettyman, 219 Md. at 88, 148 A.2d at 438. `However, when the statute of limitations bars the rights and not merely the remedy, an exception to the general rule applies and the statute of limitations is considered substantive.' President and Directors of Georgetown College, supra at 571. (Footnote omitted). The statute, if conceived of as a grant of immunity from suit, is also considered to be substantive. President and Directors of Georgetown College, supra at 571."

Pottratz v. Davis, at 952.

The parties agree that Maryland law governs the limitations issue in Rockstroh, Pearsall, and Redmond. With regard to Manipole, where the alleged wrongs occurred in Florida, defendants assert that the Florida statutes of limitations, F.S.A. §§ 95.11(3) and 95.031(2), should be characterized as substantive law, and that, therefore, Florida law should govern the limitations issue in Manipole.¹ Plaintiff disputes this contention and argues that Maryland law should also govern the limitations issue in Manipole.

In Bauld v. J.A. Jones Construction Co., 357 So.2d 401, 402 (Fla.1978), the Supreme Court of Florida described the applicable Florida statutes as follows:

"Section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), provides that the limitations period for negligence actions is four years. Section 95.031 deals with the computation of time. It states that `except as provided ... in these statutes, the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues.' Subsection (1) of Section 95.031 provides, in pertinent part, that `a cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.' Subsection (2) provides that in actions for products liability, the period runs `from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence,' but that in any event the action must be begun `within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser ... regardless of the date the defect in the product was or should have been discovered.'"

Defendants argue that, because the Florida courts have found their limitations statutes to be substantive, this court should apply Florida law for the limitations issue. This argument is misplaced for two reasons. First, the characterization which Florida courts have given to their statutes is not dispositive. Florida law will govern the limitations issue in Manipole only if the Florida statutes would be characterized as substantive by Maryland state courts. See Pottratz v. Davis, at 952; President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Madden, 505 F.Supp. at 571. Second, the provision of the Florida statutes, which is arguably substantive under Maryland law, is that part of § 95.031 requiring an action to be brought within 12 years after the date of delivery of the product to its original purchaser. This court, however, need not consider whether this provision is substantive or procedural under Maryland law, since defendants do not, and indeed could not, assert that the Manipole action is barred under it. The Manipole suit was filed in 1983, less than 12 years after the 1973 insertion of Mrs. Manipole's Dalkon Shield.²

Section 95.11(3) provides that actions for negligence, fraud, and products liability accrue when plaintiff discovers her injury, and that, thereafter, plaintiff has four years within which to institute suit. This statute does not bar a plaintiff's right, but, instead, merely bars the plaintiff's remedy if she does not file suit within four years from the time the cause of action accrues. Since § 95.11(3) is similar in concept to the Maryland statute, it is clear that the Florida statute would be characterized under Maryland law as procedural as is the Maryland statute itself. See President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Madden, 505 F.Supp. at 571; Doughty v. Prettyman, 219 Md. at 88, 148 A.2d 438. Accordingly, Maryland law will govern the limitations issue in Manipole as well as in the other cases at issue here.

B. Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann., § 5-204

Before addressing the substantive merits of defendants' other motions, this court will consider plaintiffs' contention that under the Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann., § 5-204, Robins cannot invoke limitations as a defense because it did not comply with the requirements of the Maryland Corporations and Associations Article. In that regard, this court will follow the previous holdings of other members of this court that § 5-204 is part of the substantive law of Maryland, even though statutes of limitation are generally considered procedural. Amsler v. A.H. Robins Co., B-82-3295 (D.Md. Oct. 19, 1984) (attached to Paper No. 63 as Exhibit 5); Seigman v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., H-82-1741, slip op. at 4 (D.Md.1984). This finding was explicitly approved by a Maryland state court in Bigelow v. Davis, No. 83-213-002/L-8951 (Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Aug. 14, 1984) (attached to Paper No. 43 as Exhibit 7). Therefore, plaintiffs cannot rely upon § 5-204 in these cases, because the substantive law of Maryland is not applicable to any of these four cases.³

C. Maryland Limitations Standard

The applicable statute of limitations is the general three year statute of limitations for civil actions provided in the Md. Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann., § 5-101. As there is no statutory guidance as to when a cause of action accrues, the question of when the action accrues is left to judicial determination. Harig v. Johns-Manville Products, 284 Md. 70, 75, 394 A.2d 299 (1978).

In Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981), the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted the "discovery" rule for determining when a cause of action accrues. Thus, "the cause of action accrues when the claimant in fact knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong." 290 Md. at 636, 431 A.2d 677. The court continued that:

"The discovery rule contemplates actual knowledge — that is, express cognition, or awareness implied from `knowledge of circumstances which ought to have put a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry thus, charging the individual with notice of all facts which such an investigation would in all probability have disclosed if it had been properly pursued.'"

290 Md. at 637, 431 A.2d 677 (quoting Fertitta v. Bay Shore Dev. Corp., 252 Md. 393, 402, 250 A.2d 69 (1969)). See also O'Hara v. Kovens, 60 Md.App. 619, 628, 484 A.2d 275 (1984); Lutheran Hospital v. Levy, 60 Md.App. 227, 233, 482 A.2d 23 (1984).

Under Maryland law, the plaintiff must have knowledge not only of the injury, but also that the injury resulted from a wrong. Jones v. Sugar, 18...