Rockwell Automation, Inc. v. United States
| Decision Date | 18 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | Court Nos. 05–00269,06–00054,10–00230,07–00294,11–00018,06–00348,Slip Op. 14–96.,07–00110,12–00001.,11–00250,10–00245,05–00582 |
| Parties | ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, INC., f/k/a Rockwell Automation/Allen–Bradley Co., LLC, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of International Trade |
John M. Peterson, Russell A. Semmel, and Maria E. Celis, Neville Peterson LLP, of New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
Alexander Vanderweide, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of New York, NY, for Defendant. With him on the brief were Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, and Amy M. Rubin, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch.
In the 11 above-captioned actions, Plaintiff Rockwell Automation, Inc. contests the classification of “certain short-body timing relays (SBTRs) used in manufacturing applications” that Rockwell imported into the United States. Plaintiff's Consent Motion for Leave to File Out of Time and for Extension of Time to Remain on Reserve Calendar (“Pl.'s Out–of–Time Motion”) at 1; see also Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Amended Consent Motion for Leave to File Out of Time, and to Extend Time to Remain on Reserve Calendar (“Pl.'s Supp. Brief”) at 2. According to Rockwell, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection “classified the merchandise in liquidation under HTSUS 9107.00.80 as time switches with a clock or watch movement or synchronous motor, and assessed duties accordingly.” Id. Rockwell maintains that “the merchandise is properly classified under HTSUS 8536.49.00 as electrical relays, at a lower rate of duty.” Id. Rockwell advises that, “[t]o date, twenty cases concerning this issue, including the eleven at bar, have been filed” in this court. Id. Rockwell further explains that one case, Court No. 03–00007, “was selected as a ‘test case’ and was litigated on the merits,” with summary judgment entered in Rockwell's favor. Id.; see Rockwell Automation, Inc. v. United States, 31 CIT 692, 2007 WL 1314616 (2007) ; Rockwell Automation, Inc. v. United States, 31 CIT 788, 2007 WL 1498318 (2007).
Since the 2007 decision in the test case, according to Rockwell, its counsel has “worked diligently” with counsel for the Government “to attempt to dispose of all of the related cases.” Pl.'s Supp. Brief at 2. Rockwell states that “[t]he parties have been able to work out stipulated judgments on agreed statements of fact ... in seven of the cases, and continue to work toward disposition of [the 11 actions here at issue],” as well as one additional case, Court No. 13–00185, which—according to Rockwell—“is on the Reserve Calendar[ ] for its original eighteen-month period, through November 30, 2014.” Id. at 2–3.
Pending before the court is Plaintiff's Consent Motion for Leave to File Out of Time and for Extension of Time to Remain on Reserve Calendar (filed July 2, 2014), filed in each of the 11 actions, as supplemented by Plaintiff's Amended Consent Motion for Leave to File Out of Time, and to Extend Time to Remain on Reserve Calendar, which is, in turn, supported by Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief (both filed July 17, 2014).1 The Government has weighed in as well. See generally Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Amended Consent Motion for Leave to File Out of Time, and to Extend Time to Remain on Reserve Calendar (filed July 18, 2014) (“Def.'s Response Brief”).
As summarized below, Plaintiff's Amended Consent Motion for Leave to File Out of Time, and to Extend Time to Remain on Reserve Calendar is granted as to all 11 actions, qualified by several significant reservations and understandings.
Two rules of the court bear on Rockwell's pending motions—Rule 6 and Rule 83. USCIT Rule 83 (captioned “Reserve Calendar”) governs cases on the Reserve Calendar, including the 11 actions here. In general, an action commenced under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) or (b) is placed on a Reserve Calendar when a summons is filed. See USCIT R. 83(a). The action may remain on the Reserve Calendar for an 18–month period. Id. The rules further specify that “[a] case may be removed from the Reserve Calendar on: (1) assignment; (2) filing of a complaint; (3) granting of a motion for consolidation pursuant to Rule 42; (4) granting of a motion for suspension under a test case pursuant to Rule 84; or (5) filing of a stipulation for judgment on agreed statement of facts pursuant to rule 58.1.” USCIT R. 83(b) (“Removal”).
Of particular relevance here are two other subsections of Rule 83. The first—Rule 83(d), captioned “Extension of Time”—provides that “[t]he court may grant an extension of time for [a] case to remain on the Reserve Calendar for good cause.” See USCIT R. 83(d). However, the second sentence of Rule 83(d) requires that “[a] motion for an extension of time [to remain on the Reserve Calendar] must be made at least 30 days prior to the expiration of the 18–month period [or later, if the 18–month period has been extended pursuant to USCIT Rule 83(d) ].” Id. (emphasis added).
The second key subsection is Rule 83(c), which is ominously but unambiguously captioned “Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution.” In its entirety, that subsection reads:
A case not removed from the Reserve Calendar within the 18–month period [specified in Rule 83(a), or later if that period has been extended pursuant to USCIT Rule 83(d) ] will be dismissed for lack of prosecution and the clerk will enter an order of dismissal without further direction from the court unless a motion is pending. If a pending motion is denied and less than 14 days remain in which the case may remain on the Reserve Calendar, the case will remain on the Reserve Calendar for 14 days from the date of entry of the order denying the motion.
USCIT R. 83(c) (emphases added). In short, the terms of Rule 83(c) are unequivocal. In relevant part, they mandate the dismissal for lack of prosecution of an action that is not removed from the Reserve Calendar within the 18–month period (as that period may be extended). Rule 83(c) instructs the clerk in no uncertain terms to “enter an order of dismissal without further direction from the court,” unless a motion (such as a motion to extend the time to remain on the Reserve Calendar) is pending at the time the clerk otherwise would be required to enter such an order.
USCIT Rule 6 governs “Computing and Extending Time; Time for Motion Papers.” Rule 6(b), in particular, addresses “Extending Time.” Rule 6(b)(1)(A) governs timely-filed motions for extensions of time, and authorizes a court to grant an extension of time upon a showing of “good cause”—a relatively lenient standard—where an extension is sought before the deadline at issue has expired. See generally USCIT R. 6(b)(1)(A) ; 1 Moore's Federal Practice § 6.06[2], p. 6–32 (3d ed. 2014) (). In contrast, Rule 6(b)(1)(B) concerns untimely (i.e., out-of-time) motions for extensions of time. See generally USCIT R. 6(b)(1)(B). Such motions may be granted only where a party makes a showing of “excusable neglect or circumstances beyond the control of the party”—an exacting standard that is much more stringent than the demonstration of “good cause” that is required in circumstances where an extension of time is timely sought. Id. ; see also 1 Moore's Federal Practice § 6.06[3][a], pp. 6–33 to 6–43 ().
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has succinctly put it, “ ‘[e]xcusable neglect’ is not easily demonstrated, nor was it intended to be.” Thompson v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 76 F.3d 530, 534 (4th Cir.1996). Findings of excusable neglect should be reserved for “extraordinary cases.” Id. Similarly, in the words of the Sixth Circuit, “the excusable neglect standard has consistently been held to be strict,” Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 650 (6th Cir.2005) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “requires ‘unique or extraordinary circumstances.’ ” Duncan v. Washington, 1994 WL 232397 *2 (6th Cir.1994). And the Second Circuit states that, “[i]n [its] cases addressing when neglect is ‘excusable,’ [the courts] have ... taken a hard line.” Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 333 F.3d 355, 368 (2d Cir.2003).
Moreover, even where “excusable neglect” is demonstrated, the judge retains discretion to deny relief. See, e.g., McCool v. Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire, LLC, 222 Fed.Appx. 847, 857–58 (11th Cir.2007). An out-of-time extension of time thus “is by no means a matter of right.” See 4B C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1165, pp. 523–32 & n. 13 (3d ed. 2014) (“Wright & Miller”).
The seminal decision on the definition of “excusable neglect” is the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Pioneer. See generally Pioneer Inv. Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in that case to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether a rule of procedure authorizing the granting of out-of-time extensions of time for “excusable neglect” required a movant to demonstrate that its failure to timely act was due to “circumstances beyond the movant's control” or whether a “more flexible analysis” applied. See Id., 507 U.S. at 386–87 & n. 3, 113 S.Ct. 1489. The Supreme Court concluded that the “excusable neglect” standard “is not limited strictly to omissions caused by circumstances beyond the control of the movant” and that it extends beyond such circumstances to certain limited instances of “neglect” that may be “excusable.” Id., 507 U.S. at 392, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489.2
The Supreme Court expressly stated that...
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