Rockwell v. Warren County
| Decision Date | 24 May 1910 |
| Docket Number | 316 |
| Citation | 77 A. 665,228 Pa. 430 |
| Parties | Rockwell, Appellant, v. Warren County |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued May 3, 1910
Appeal, No. 316, Jan. T., 1909, by plaintiffs, from judgment of Superior Court, April T., 1909, No. 31, reversing decree of C.P. Warren Co., March T., 1908, No. 41, granting injunction in case of F.H. Rockwell & Company v. Warren County and C.S. Keefer, Treasurer. Affirmed.
Appeal from Superior Court. See 39 Pa.Super. 468.
Error assigned was judgment of the Superior Court.
Decree affirmed at the cost of appellant.
D. I Ball, for appellants.
John Siggins, Jr., county solicitor, for appellees.
Before FELL, C.J., BROWN, POTTER, ELKIN and STEWART, JJ.
The question involved here is whether the oil, gas and minerals reserved from the grant of the surface of several tracts of unseated land and now in a separate ownership can be taxed as real estate. If they are real estate of course they can be taxed as such, and whether they are or not always depends upon the nature of the reservation or grant. A mere license to mine coal or to drill for oil and gas, unaccompanied by the right of ownership in the minerals underlying the surface, does not constitute an estate in land. On the other hand, oil, gas and coal are minerals and when the title to the same is severed from the owner of the surface and is vested in a separate owner, an estate in land is thus created, which if it be of any value, may be taxed. In the court below it was sought to restrain the collection of certain taxes which had been assessed against the oil, gas and minerals in several tracts of unseated land on the ground that there was no authority of law for the assessment of such minerals in unseated lands. It is contended that an unseated tract of land must be assessed as one entire body and cannot be divided horizontally into different estates which may be separately owned. It has been held over and over again that there may be different estates and separate ownership of title in the same tract of land. One person may own the surface, another the coal, another the fire clay and another the granite rock. It is too well settled to admit of argument that there may be such a severance of estates in a tract or tracts of land, and when there is such a severance, each separate owner has an estate therein. It is just as well settled that each separate estate is subject to valuation and assessment as land. As we understand the argument of the learned counsel for appellant it is conceded that this is true as to seated lands, but it is earnestly contended that the rule should not apply to unseated lands. This distinction is too artificial to be substantial. As to the character of the estate and the right of ownership therein there is no difference between seated and unseated lands. There is and can be no reason why the coal and other minerals underlying unseated lands may not be severed from the surface in the same manner and subject to the same incidents of ownership as in seated tracts.
It is argued that because seated lands are assessed in the name of the owners while unseated lands are assessed by survey or warrant numbers regardless of the owners whose names if used at all are only for the purpose of description there being a personal responsibility for the payment of the taxes on seated tracts and the lands alone being bound if unseated, that the right of severance for the purpose of taxation at least does not exist in the same manner in both instances. This position is unsound and results from a confusion of the rights of owners in dealing with their own estates and the power of taxing authorities in the levy and assessment of taxes. The authority to tax and the manner of its exercise has nothing to do with the right of the owner either to hold his tract of land entire or to sever it by the grant of different estates therein. The tax is assessed upon the property to be taxed, and that property may consist of the entire tract, or of the surface, or of...
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