Rockwood v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 22 June 1893
• Citation: 34 N.E. 521,159 Mass. 406
• Parties: ROCKWOOD v. ROBINSON et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

159 Mass. 406

34 N.E. 521

ROCKWOOD v. ROBINSON et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

June 22, 1893

The declaration charged trespass on plaintiff's premises, and taking and carrying away large quantities of gravel, sand, and loam, and converting same to defendants' own use, together with other damages. Plaintiff offered evidence tending to prove the value per cubic yard, as a commodity, of the sand and other materials taken by the defendants, and that the same was of great value, and that the plaintiff's damages were greatly enhanced thereby; but the court excluded this evidence, and ruled that plaintiff was a tenant for life under a will, and that as such she was not entitled to recover the value of said earth so taken by defendants as a commodity. The court found for the plaintiff, and assessed damages in the sum of $100.

COUNSEL

L.H Wakefield and G.L. Sleeper, for plaintiff.

Blaney & Robinson, for defendants.

OPINION

FIELD C.J.

We assume that in an action in the nature of a trespass quare clausum a tenant for his own life can recover only for the injury to his particular estate, and that this includes only the injury to the possession and enjoyment of the estate during his life, and that the reversioner can recover in an action on the case for the injury to the reversion. Bascom v. Dempsey, 143 Mass. 409, 9 N.E. 744. When the plaintiff is in possession, and is the owner in fee, the damages are the diminished value of the property by reason of the trespass. Mayo v. Springfield, 138 Mass. 70. If the land contains gravel, sand, and other materials which where the land is situated, are commonly bought and sold as a commodity, we think that the price commonly paid for such materials, as they lie in the land, may sometimes be competent on the question of the damages which an owner in fee has sustained by the removal of such materials. See Providence & W.R. Co. v. City of Worcester, 155 Mass. 35, 29 N.E. 56; Handforth v. Maynard, 154 Mass. 414, 28 N.E. 348.

We suppose the real question in this case is whether the plaintiff can recover full damages, as if she were the owner in fee. The plaintiff claims title under the will of Collins Morse. The devise of the residue of his estate, which included the land in question, is in these words: "I give, devise, and bequeath what is not otherwise disposed of by me, all the rest and residue of my estate, to my sister Louisa M. Rockwood, for and during her natural life, and she is empowered to sell and dispose of so much of my estate as will insure her a comfortable living, and to that end she is authorized to sell such portion of my real estate by public or private sale, giving good and sufficient deeds therefor meaning and intending to give her full control of the same with full power to deed to her grantees, their heirs and assigns, forever. And at her decease I give and devise the balance of my estate, of whatever name or nature, to the town of Natick, but in trust, nevertheless, the income of which is to be used for the preservation of the monument which my executor is hereby authorized to erect at my grave, and for the care and beautifying of my lot in the cemetery. A report of the expenditure shall be made in the annual report of the proceeding of said...