Rocky Mountain Timberlands, Inc. v. Lund, 93-539
| Citation | 877 P.2d 1018,265 Mont. 463 |
| Decision Date | 12 July 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-539,93-539 |
| Parties | ROCKY MOUNTAIN TIMBERLANDS, INC., a Montana Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Betty T. LUND, as County Clerk and Recorder of Ravalli County, Montana, Defendant and Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Montana |
John J. Jardine, Jardine & Fehlig, Whitehall, Patrick Dougherty, Worden, Thane & Haines, Missoula, for plaintiff and appellant.
George H. Corn, Ravalli County Atty., Gerald D. Williams, Deputy County Atty., Hamilton, for defendant and respondent.
This is an appeal from a denial of writ of mandamus by the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County. We affirm.
We consider the following issues on appeal:
I. Did the District Court err in determining that a landowner cannot legally divide a large parcel of land into smaller parcels by executing a deed in which the grantor and the grantee are the same party?
II. Did the District Court err by determining that the Clerk and Recorder properly refused to record the deed in question and, therefore, a writ of mandamus was not appropriate?
The facts of this case are not disputed. Rocky Mountain Timberlands, Inc. (RMT) is a Montana corporation located in Bozeman. It is engaged in the acquisition and subdivision of Montana land which is then marketed nationwide.
RMT bought several large tracts of land totalling 580 acres in rural Montana, located about one mile east of the town of Stevensville in Ravalli County. On February 25, 1993, RMT tendered 27 quitclaim deeds to the Ravalli County Clerk and Recorder, Betty T. Lund. The 27 deeds were all similar and had RMT listed as both grantor and grantee on each one. The deeds purport to quitclaim a 1/32nd part of a government section (a 20-acre tract) of the aforementioned 580 acres of land purchased by RMT. Included in the 27 deeds recorded on February 25, 1993, was a deed describing the S 1/2, NW 1/4, SE 1/4 of Section 22, Township 9 North, Range 19 West, P.M.M. (20 acres) as an unsegregated part of the SE 1/4 of Section 22.
Following her filing of these 27 deeds, the Clerk sought a legal opinion from the county attorney on the advisability of recording these 27 deeds in which the grantor and grantee were the same entity. The county attorney advised the Clerk that, in his opinion, these deeds were ineffective to pass property and, in essence, were void instruments unless the deeds had modified the nature of the interests held by the grantor and grantee.
On April 6, 1993, the legislature changed certain definitions within the statutes pertaining to the Subdivision and Platting Act. The amendments, Chapter 272, Laws of Montana, 1993, define "subdivision" as "a division of land or land so divided which creates one or more parcels containing less than 160 acres ..." This new limit of 160 acres within this definition effectively means that a plat must be filed of record before title to subdivided ground--any piece smaller than the 160 acres--can be sold or transferred. The prior statutory limit was 20 acres.
On April 20, 1993, fourteen days after the new amendments to the Act went into effect, RMT made a deed conveying the S 1/2, NW 1/4, SE 1/4 of Section 22, T9N, R19W, to John Jardine. RMT attempted to have the deed recorded on April 22, 1993, but the Clerk refused to accept it on the basis that it was not in compliance with the 1993 Legislature's changes to the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act (the Act), §§ 76-3-101, et seq., M.C.A. The Clerk took the position that because the underlying 20-acre deed purporting to convey the segregated parcel to RMT did not meet the requirements of the Act, any subsequent deed purporting to convey the parcel would first have to fall into compliance with the Act. Thus, because the 20 acre tract had not been surveyed, it could not be recorded.
On May 24, 1993, RMT petitioned the Ravalli County District Court for a Writ of Mandamus directed to the County Clerk. The Clerk appeared before the District Court on June 17, 1993, and contested the Writ. The parties stipulated to the facts of the case and submitted the case to the court on August 12, 1993, without a hearing.
The court issued its Memorandum and Judgment on August 27, 1993, concluding that RMT's prior 27 quitclaim deeds to itself were void and inoperative for any purpose whatsoever, including the division of RMT's lands into 20-acre parcels, and that RMT's subsequent warranty deed failed to comply with Montana's Subdivision Act as amended by the 1993 Legislature.
The District Court quashed, vacated, and set aside the Writ of Mandamus and affirmed the Clerk's refusal to record RMT's subsequent warranty deed. RMT appeals the August 27, 1993 judgment of the District Court.
Both issues which we here review concern matters of legal interpretation. We review the district courts' legal interpretations as to whether they are correct. Steer Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 803 P.2d 601.
Did the District Court err in determining that a landowner cannot legally divide a large parcel of land into smaller parcels by executing a deed in which the grantor and the grantee are the same party?
Appellant argues that the common law rule prohibiting the grantor and grantee of a land conveyance from being the same person is not followed in Montana because the legislature has made conveyancing subject to statutes. The appellant further argues that our statutes do not forbid the grantor and grantee being the same person. According to appellant, Montana has eliminated the requirement that the grantor and grantee in any land conveyance must be different persons, refusing to require a "strawman" in situations where land is conveyed by one person to himself or herself.
Respondents argue that the conveyancing law in Montana is statutory and the statutes do not abrogate the common law but incorporate it by reference. The District Court pointed out that the English common law held that a man cannot make a conveyance to himself. In further considering this aspect, the District Court determined that the cases involving establishment or severance of a joint tenancy are not applicable because a joint tenancy involves a conveyance of a different, or lesser, estate than the original one.
We do not consider common law concerning joint tenants because resolution of this issue pivots on purely statutory grounds. "The statutes establish the law of this state ..." Section 1-2-103, MCA. It is undisputed, here, that RMT's whole purpose in recording the 27 deeds was to divide its 580 acre tract into smaller parcels minimally large enough to avoid the survey and platting requirements of the Subdivision and Platting Act then in effect. The Montana Subdivision and Platting Act in effect at the time of the original filing of the 27 alleged deeds is specific as to the ways in which land in this state can be divided:
(3) "Division of land" means the segregation of one or more parcels of land from a larger tract held in single or undivided ownership by transferring or contracting to transfer title to or possession of a portion of the tract or properly filing a certificate of survey or subdivision plat establishing the identity of the segregated parcels pursuant to this chapter. (Emphasis added.)
Section 76-3-103(3), MCA (1991).
Since 1895, the word "transfer" in connection with any conveyance of real property has been defined by Montana statute as follows:
Transfer defined. Transfer is an act of the parties or of the law by which the title to property is conveyed from one living person to another. (Emphasis added.)
Section 70-1-501, MCA (1991). Under the statute, a "transfer" of land requires a conveyance of title from one person to another. If the persons are the same, then a "transfer" does not occur. If there is no "transfer," then there is no division of land under § 76-3-103(3), MCA.
We affirm the holding of the District Court that a landowner cannot divide a...
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