Rocky Point Oyster Co., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of New York

• Decision Date: 23 April 1920
• Docket Number: 1343.
• Citation: 265 F. 379
• Parties: ROCKY POINT OYSTER CO., Inc., v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW YORK.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

265 F. 379

ROCKY POINT OYSTER CO., Inc., v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW YORK.

No. 1343.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

April 23, 1920

William J. Brown, of Providence, R.I., for plaintiff.

Lee Boss & McCanna, of Providence, R.I., for defendant.

BROWN District Judge.

The plaintiff asserts title and rights of occupancy of tide-flowed lands in Providence river and Narragansett Bay as a private and several oyster fishery for the planting and cultivation of oysters, and charges the defendant with violation of its rights, and with causing damage to its oyster beds and oysters through dredging and other operations, whereby mud, sand, and other substances were discharged over and deposited on plaintiff's oyster beds and oysters.

In the first and third counts of the declaration the plaintiff alleges title under lease for the period of 10 years, at a rental of $10 per acre, from the state of Rhode Island through shellfish commissioners, bearing date July 7, 1916 at which date the leased lands were outside the harbor line as then established.

The subject of 'Private and Several Oyster Fisheries' is dealt with in chapter 203, General Laws of Rhode Island which provides for leases in the name of the state of certain tide-covered lands 'not within any harbor line.'

The second and fourth counts allege rights in the tide-covered lands derived from the sole use and occupation thereof.

By act of the General Assembly passed April 14, 1917 (Public Laws of R.I.c. 1483), a new harbor line was established on the easterly side of Providence river, from Kettle Point to Nayatt Point, which brought the plaintiff's oyster beds within the new harbor line.

By various pleas the defendant sets up its ownership of the uplands with riparian rights; that, at the time of the acts complained of plaintiff's oyster beds were wholly within the harbor line, and located between defendant's shore line and the new harbor line; that the defendant obtained authority from the harbor commissioners to build bulkheads, dikes, and seawall, and to dredge; and that its dredging was by authority of the harbor commissioners, and was carried on in a reasonable and proper manner for the purpose of reclamation and improvement of the tide-covered land between its shore and the harbor line. Defendant further alleges that its dredging, filling in, and building were done under authority granted to defendant by the Secretary of War, and that the work was carried on under the supervision and inspection of a United States government representative, and that it was necessary for the enjoyment of the property of the defendant to fill in between its shore and the harbor line, for the purpose of improving navigation and making the location available for vessels to load and unload.

The principal question before us is whether the grant of tide-flowed lands for private oyster fisheries operates as a limitation upon the power of the Legislature to provide for and authorize harbor improvements, which may impair or destroy the private fisheries, and acts as a limitation upon the rights of the riparian owner to wharf out to the harbor line.

It is the plaintiff's contention that it has a grant of an interest in the lands for the period of 10 years, which is a vested right, which cannot be divested by subsequent grants, change of harbor line, or other legislation, but only for breach of the lessee's covenants.

Plaintiff relies upon the form of the instrument, the terms, 'The state doth hereby lease, demise, and let unto the lessee,' and other terms, which are ordinarily regarded as appropriate to an irrevocable grant of a leasehold estate, and inappropriate to a mere license, revocable at will, and also upon section 19 of chapter 203, General Laws of Rhode Island, which relates to the execution and contents of the lease and to 'proper clauses reserving to said commissioners a right to re-enter on behalf of the state and to terminate said lease for breach of any of said covenants' (i.e., the lessee's covenants), and to the fact that the statute provides for no other right of revocation.

But the question cannot be solved merely by an acceptance of the plaintiff's contention that no general right of reservation or alteration is reserved by the statute or by the instrument which evidences the plaintiff's title.

In the leading case of Illinois Central Rd. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 13 Sup.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018, the grant was in fee, yet the court said, at page 450 of 146 U.S., at page 117 of 13 Sup.Ct. (36 L.Ed. 1018):

'Treating it as such a conveyance, its validity must be determined by the consideration whether the Legislature was competent to make a grant of the kind.'

Though there may be no express reservation in a public grant, yet there are implied reservations resulting from the nature of the title of the state to tide-flowed lands as a trustee for the public.

As was said by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Company, 31 R.I. 295, 313, 77 A. 145, 152 (Ann. Cas. 1912B, 65), as to the question of constitutionality of the legislation relative to the leasing of oyster grounds in that state:

'A consideration of the subject involves an inquiry into the nature of the right thereby granted. It has been decided that the privilege of locating oyster beds on public lands, and of planting and taking oysters therefrom, is merely a license which may be revoked at the pleasure of the legislature, and which ceases with the use of the land for that purpose. It is also subject to the public's right of navigation and of fishery, and if it interferes therewith, the oysters or clams, etc., may removed as a nuisance.'

A decision that there are no restrictions or limitations of the plaintiff's rights, other than those expressly set forth in the lease, and that the statute of the state authorizes such a grant, would at once give rise to serious doubt of the constitutionality of that statute; a doubt which is avoided by the application of the rule that both the statute and the grant made thereunder are to be read as subject to the dominant rights of the public and to the continuous control of the state Legislature, acting in the interests of public navigation and commerce.

'The soil under navigable waters being held by the people of the state in trust for the common use and as a portion of their inherent sovereignty, any act of legislation concerning their use affects the public welfare. It is, therefore, appropriately within the exercise of the police power of the state. ' Illinois Central Rd. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 459, 460, 13 Sup.Ct. 110, 120 (36 L.Ed. 1018).

There can be no contract and no irrepealable law on governmental subjects; every succeeding Legislature possesses the same jurisdiction and power as its predecessor.

'The Legislature could not give away nor sell the discretion of its successors in respect to matters, the government of which, from the very nature of things, must vary with varying circumstances. The legislation which may be needed one day for the harbor may be different from the legislation that may be required at another day. Every Legislature must, at the time of its existence, exercise the power of the state in the execution of the trust...