Rodas v. Seidlin

Citation656 F.3d 610
Decision Date31 August 2011
Docket NumberNo. 09–3760.,09–3760.
PartiesGloria L. RODAS, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.John SEIDLIN, M.D., et al., Defendants–Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Margaret Mary O'Leary (argued), Attorney, Chicago, IL, for PlaintiffAppellant.Craig L. Unrath (argued), Attorney, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Peoria, IL, Deborah Marie Rusoff O'Brien (argued), Attorney, Lowis & Gellen LLP, Chicago, IL, for DefendantsAppellees.Monica Mallory, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, David P. Faulkner, Attorney, Faulkner Law Firm, LLC, Rockford, IL, for Defendants.Dana Kaersvang (argued), Attorney, Department of Justice, Civil Division, Appellate Staff, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae.Before BAUER, FLAUM and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

Gloria Rodas's appeal presents an important question about the meaning of a provision of the Illinois Good Samaritan Act, 745 ILCS 49/1 et seq. , in a case that was removed to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442. The state-law question is whether and under what circumstances the protections of the Good Samaritan Act turn on the business model physicians use to charge patients for emergency services. The law shields from liability physicians who render certain services “without fee.” Rodas was charged a fee for the services she received, but two of Rodas's physicians were not paid from that fee. Instead, they received a salary from their medical practice. The district court agreed with the defendants that the salary-versus-fee distinction cloaked the physicians with statutory immunity. Rodas appeals.

The United States, a party to the underlying action but not to this appeal, has filed a brief as amicus curiae urging that we lack jurisdiction. The argument is that the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction created a latent jurisdictional defect that persists on appeal. The doctrine provides that a federal court acquires no jurisdiction upon removal where the state court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties. That principle, the government maintains, robbed the district court of subject matter jurisdiction and deprives us of appellate jurisdiction.

We disagree with both the government's position about our jurisdiction and the defendants' interpretation of the Illinois statute. As to jurisdiction, we join every other circuit to have considered the question and hold that the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction is cabined by the principles announced in Grubbs v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 92 S.Ct. 1344, 31 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), and Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 117 S.Ct. 467, 136 L.Ed.2d 437 (1996). As to the merits, we conclude that the defendants' interpretation of the Good Samaritan Act is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and the case law interpreting it. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

In 2001, Gloria Rodas had been receiving prenatal care at the Crusaders Central Clinic Association (“Crusader Clinic”) in Rockford, Illinois. The Crusader Clinic is a community health center and recipient of federal funds under 42 U.S.C. § 254b. Doctor William Baxter was one of the physicians who provided care; he was a family practice physician and clinic employee. In a limited sense, however, Baxter had two masters: because of the relationship between the Crusader Clinic and the federal government, both the clinic and Baxter were deemed to be employees of the United States for purposes of medical malpractice liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)(n). As a consequence of Baxter and the Crusader Clinic's (deemed) federal status, the United States could be substituted as a party if either were ever sued. 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(1). Claims against them would be governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act, and neither would face liability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1); Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 229–30, 127 S.Ct. 881, 166 L.Ed.2d 819 (2007) (explaining the statutory interplay that produces this result). The statutory scheme is designed to allow certain health care providers serving underserved populations to save money on malpractice insurance and direct funds toward patient care. See H.R.Rep. No. 104–398, at 6, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 767 (1995).

Baxter was not the only physician providing care to Rodas and other Crusader Clinic patients. For medically complex situations, the Crusader Clinic contracted with the University of Illinois College of Medicine (“UIC”) to provide specialist services. The arrangement called for UIC obstetrician/gynecologists to provide care at the Crusader Clinic, to provide on-call backup to clinic doctors, and to be on call when clinic patients were treated at local hospitals. In exchange, the Crusader Clinic paid UIC a fixed amount each year. The UIC physicians would fill out billing forms for their work and submit them to the Crusader Clinic; the Crusader Clinic had the right to collect the fees.

The two salaried UIC physicians implicated in this appeal are Doctor Ana–Maria Soleanicov and Doctor John Seidlin. Unlike Baxter, they were not deemed to be employees of the United States, and so they generally faced the specter of individual liability for any medical malpractice they committed. The alleged malpractice in this case occurred on August 2, 2001. During that day's pre-dawn hours, Rodas went into labor. Following previously provided instructions from the Crusader Clinic, she went to the delivery floor at Swedish American Hospital. There, she was seen by a UIC resident until Baxter—our deemed federal employee—arrived at the hospital. Baxter took over care for Rodas, along with another UIC resident. Baxter's understanding was that Soleanicov and Seidlin would be available to assist if needed. And they were needed, because Rodas's delivery became an emergency. After about eight hours of labor, the baby's heart tones had dropped, Rodas was not pushing effectively, and the baby was not descending. Soleanicov and Seidlin arrived to provide assistance. After multiple unsuccessful attempts to deliver the baby using a vacuum extractor and then forceps, Andrea Rodas was delivered via Cesarean section. She would not live very long. Less than two weeks later, she died from hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy, a condition in which the brain does not receive sufficient oxygen. Soleanicov prepared a bill for her work. Seidlin, deviating from his common practice, did not. The Crusader Clinic was reimbursed for the services Soleanicov provided.

Gloria Rodas filed a tort suit in state court in 2003, naming as defendants Baxter, Soleanicov, Seidlin, the Crusader Clinic, and Swedish American Hospital. The complaint alleged that the defendants negligently managed Rodas's labor in a variety of ways, resulting in Andrea's death. The United States removed the case to federal court, substituting itself as a party in place of the Crusader Clinic and Baxter. See 42 U.S.C. § 233(c) (removal); 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (substitution). Because the action was against the United States and could proceed only under the Federal Tort Claims Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1), Rodas was required to seek relief directly from the appropriate federal agency before filing suit, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Therefore, she voluntarily dismissed her claims against the United States and the remainder of the case was remanded to state court. Rodas v. Swedish Am. Health Sys. Corp., 3:03–cv–50483, ECF No. 4 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 19, 2003). Rodas then filed an administrative claim with the United States Department of Health and Human Services.

The agency denied Rodas's claim for damages, ruling that she had not established that the death of Andrea was caused by a negligent act or omission of a federal employee acting within the scope of employment. The letter informed Rodas that, if dissatisfied with the determination, she could appeal within the agency hierarchy or file suit against the United States “in the appropriate federal district court within six (6) months from the date of mailing this determination (28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)).” Rodas, however, did not seek to return to federal court.

Instead of returning to federal court, Rodas amended her state-court complaint against Swedish American Hospital, Soleanicov, and Seidlin. And instead of re-adding Baxter and the Crusader Clinic as defendants to that complaint, she named the United States directly (along with Soleanicov and Seidlin). The United States again removed the case to federal court, this time invoking in its notice of removal the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442. Section 1442(a)(1) provides that a “civil action ... commenced in a State court may be removed to federal court if the action is against [t]he United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, sued in an official or individual capacity for any act under color of such office....” After removal, the case proceeded through the motion to dismiss phase and discovery was taken. By the time defendants Seidlin and Soleanicov separately moved for summary judgment in June 2008, the case's second life in federal court was more than three years old.

Seidlin and Soleanicov filed their summary judgment motions in late May and early June 2008. Both contended that they were shielded from liability by the Illinois Good Samaritan Act provision governing emergency care. The Act shields from liability physicians “who, in good faith, provide[ ] emergency care without fee to a person.” 745 ILCS 49/25. The district court agreed that Soleanicov and Seidlin fell within the Act's ambit because fees from Crusader Clinic patients did not go directly to them. Expanding on dicta from the Illinois Appellate Court's decision in Estate of Heanue v. Edgcomb, 355 Ill.App.3d 645, 291 Ill.Dec. 537, 823...

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